A flashpoint: Will Iran cross nuclear Rubicon?

THE US had been restraining Israel for some weeks from attacking Iranian nuclear infrastructure. The US President, Donald Trump, wrote to the Iranian leadership on March 25, suggesting talks on their nuclear programme. Trump, during his first term, had abandoned the 2015 nuclear deal between the P-5 members of the UN Security Council plus Germany and Iran. It was called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Oman had mediated the talks.

A US proposal on May 16 was ignored by Iran, leading Trump to recently say that he was “less confident" of a deal. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei tweeted on June 4 that the “US’ proposal is 100% against the spirit" of Iranian self-sufficiency as Americans wanted Iran to “have no nuclear industry."

Iran was negotiating to resurrect the JCPOA, which restricted it to limited and supervised uranium enrichment, for a specified period. The Trump administration and, especially, Israel want the Iranian nuclear programme dismantled or tightly controlled by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The Israeli attack on Iran appeared imminent when the US began reducing its diplomats in Iraq and getting families removed from their Gulf military facilities. An IAEA resolution on June 12, adopted by 19 votes out of 35, listed Iranian failures to explain undeclared nuclear material and activities. Iran, a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory, has treaty obligations in that regard.

As Ambassador to Iran in 2003-05, I would urge Iran to not compare its nuclear programme to India’s because India never signed the NPT.

As Iran-US talks stalled, Iranian President Ali Khamenei maintained that Iran had sought nuclear “self-sufficiency". It ignores Iran amassing over 408 kg uranium enriched to 60 per cent, a level close to weapons-grade. One nuclear device requires about 25 kg of uranium enriched to 90 per cent.

Iran also announced replacing first generation centrifuges — which Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ Khan had clandestinely sold to Iran – with the latest sixth generation ones. The 90 per cent weapons-grade enrichment, from 60 per cent, is achievable quickly.

Even before the Oman talks began, regional geopolitics had evolved dramatically. Israel had continued its brutal military repression in Gaza, eliminated the top Hamas leadership and decapitated Iran’s powerful ally Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Furthermore, the Iran-friendly Assad regime in Syria had got overthrown and replaced by a reformed Sunni extremist. Thus, with Iran’s vaunted Shia Crescent of allies and surrogates in West Asia demolished or weakened, Israel saw an opportunity to attack Iranian nuclear facilities with limited Iranian retaliation.

Israeli domestic politics also entered an uncertain phase, with PM Benjamin Netanyahu’s government barely surviving a confidence vote. Israeli support in the West was also floundering over continued onslaught against civilians in Gaza.

Post attack, Netanyahu claimed the likelihood of an Iranian regime change. Saudi Arabia and the Lebanese President promptly condemned the attack. The Gulf countries had earlier announced that they would not permit military facilities in their nations to be used for attacking Iran.

Similarly, the US has avoided joining the Israeli attack. But such a comprehensive attack was impossible without using the airspace of multiple Arab nations. Are the US and its Gulf allies merely playing the “good cops" while Israel carries out an attack they all tacitly approve of?

President Khamenei’s X account carries the Iranian reaction. Post attack, on June 13, he wrote: “With this crime, the Zionist regime has prepared for itself a bitter, painful fate, which it will definitely see." He also mourned the death of several commanders and scientists and observed that Israel even attacked civilian areas. Reports indicated multiple explosions having been heard in Tehran.

Earlier, on June 5, he alleged that “The US is a definite accomplice" in the crimes of the “Zionist regime." Amongst those killed is the IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps) commander, Mohammad Bagheri.

The full extent of the damage to the Iranian nuclear programme would take time to emerge. Iran has embedded its enrichment facilities deep inside the mountains or well beneath the surface. Only the US has bombs capable of reaching such facilities. Did the US make them available to Israel? If so, will Iran act on its warning earlier and retaliate against the US forces or its facilities in the Gulf or West Asia?

Multiple concerns and lessons from these developments confront India.

Firstly, any escalation of hostilities in the Gulf region threatens Indian trade, energy security and the Indian diaspora. It can, thus, cause massive economic and humanitarian disruption.

Secondly, there is the geopolitical dimension. The US outreach to Pakistan, despite Indian protests, including financial aid and now Field Marshal Asim Munir getting invited to a military parade, becomes easier to understand. The US, Israel and the American allies in the Gulf share concern over the Iranian nuclear programme. Their approach towards South Asia is conditioned by that. Pakistan is seen as an important Sunni counterweight to the Iranian Shia regime.

Thus, the Shashi Tharoor-led multi-party delegation may have been great for domestic political optics. It was outweighed by the looming American geopolitical concerns.

Iran is also seen as aligning with the China-Russia axis, thus requiring it to be contained. It has been supplying drones to Russia for its Ukraine war. China is happy to monopolise the purchase of Iranian energy and have its goods dominate the Iranian market.

However, Iran is not Syria or even Iraq. Its 92-million population and a proud history, dating from the Achaemenid empire in 550 BC, make it a powerful entity. Its historical pride and Shia religious commitment will make Iranians rally behind the regime, despite its lack of popularity. Iranians are politically astute and may avoid widening the confrontation and drawing the US into it. They know that Trump dreads getting drawn into another military conflict in the region.

Iran would consult Russia and China. It has already retaliated by firing drones, to appease domestic opinion and sustain international prestige. But it would need to demonstrate that its nuclear programme is intact.

Thus, an opportunity is now available for it to cross the nuclear Rubicon and even test a nuclear device. If not that, penetrating the Israeli air defences to inflict enough damage to deter Israel is impossible. The US can step in to visibly restrain Israel and continue nuclear talks with Iran. The window for containing the escalation is, indeed, narrow.

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