How Operation Sindoor revalidated principles of war
Though the character of war has undergone several changes over millennia, most of the cardinal principles of war as elucidated by ancient and modern strategists such as Kautilya, Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Liddell Hart have stood the test of time. Some important principles of war that merit a revisit in contemporary times in the backdrop of several conflicts that the world has experienced over the last few years are: selection and maintenance of aim, concentration of force, offensive action, surprise, unity of command, security, simplicity, morale and adaptability. Let us contextualise some of these principles in the aftermath of Operation Sindoor.
Frustrated by years of not being able to hit the epicentre of the Pakistan-based anti-India terrorist organisations such as the LeT and JeM, the strategic aims and objectives laid out by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his national security team were unambiguous — punish the LeT and JeM directly for their repeated terrorist attacks and send a signal to Rawalpindi that there would be costs that Pakistan would have to pay for its continued support to these organisations. It is to the credit of India’s armed forces’ leadership, particularly that of the Indian Air Force, that it was able to convert these strategic aims into operational outcomes despite the degree of difficulty they presented.
For too long (1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999), Pakistan has attempted to seize the initial initiative through offensive action but failed to follow through because of India’s superior combat resilience, depth and national power. Operation Sindoor heralded a fresh military approach that saw India initiate escalatory military action on May 7, albeit as a response to a dastardly terrorist provocation.
However, this offensive action was executed with ‘Indian characteristics’ of responsibility and restraint. Offensive action in isolation that exists within a defensive framework will rarely yield any outcomes.
Had India continued to absorb Pakistan’s drone blitz without responding in the manner it did on May 10 with offensive action of greater intensity than the previous attacks, conflict cessation may not have taken place.
India achieved strategic surprise with the scale and intensity of its precision attacks at Bahawalpur and Muridke. Considering that in comparison to the Balakot strike, these strikes marked a huge shift in India’s retaliatory appetite, the surprise and shock that manifested itself within Pakistani society will be a significant strategic marker in the years ahead.
Considering statements made by Pakistan PM Shehbaz Sharif that India had pre-empted Pakistan’s offensive plans, the IAF has raised the bar for preventive strikes to achieve operational surprise. However, it must be accepted that some degree of tactical surprise was lost owing to the continuous domestic chatter in India of an imminent strike that ensured a high-alert status of Pakistan’s air defence ecosystem. This could have played a critical role in the possible losses suffered by India.
The game-changer in Operation Sindoor was the unity of command, both at the strategic and operational levels. The concept of centralised command, distributed control and decentralised execution paid rich dividends. While the finer details of the planning process may not be revealed for decades, the dominant personality of PM Modi and his trust in his Defence Minister and National Security Adviser conformed to the traditional personality-centric Indian style of apex decision-making. At the operational level, the CDS seems to have emerged as a binding factor that facilitated a quick choice of the instrument needed to deliver the first punch.
Air defence systems operated in a far more streamlined and integrated manner as compared to the day after the Balakot strike as India ensured the security of its bases and military installations in the face of a relentless barrage of UAVs, drones and ballistic missiles. It was ensured that all aerial activity either by own manned or unmanned platforms was kept subordinate to ground-based air defence systems when Pakistan launched its unmanned aerial offensive on the nights of May 7, 8 and 9. This was a move that paid off for India as Pakistan was equally cautious not to escalate with intrusive or stand-off attacks by manned platforms.
Simplicity of strategic guidance and operational plans are critical for the achievement of outcomes and once the strategic guidance is given, there must also be an unwavering belief and trust that the instrument chosen will deliver the results.
After the IAF suffered a few setbacks on the opening night, precipitated by what appears to have been a ‘high-payoff-high-risk’ plan, instead of weighing the tremendous payoffs that accrued after the strikes, the strategic establishment could have easily switched to a more risk-averse strategy for any following counter-strike.
However, as the CDS pointed out in a recent interview, the IAF, backed by a resolute political leadership, demonstrated a high degree of adaptability, quickly plugged whatever loopholes were discovered during the first strike and delivered a hammer blow with greater intensity on May 10 in what is surely an air campaign that will be closely studied in the coming months.
India’s national and military morale was several notches higher than that of Pakistan, considering that the latter was facing the heat on several fronts, ranging from economic decline to severe internal strife that undermined the hitherto ‘invincible’ status of the Pakistan Army. The 15-day gap between the Pahalgam massacre and the commencement of Operation Sindoor offered the three services a valuable window to enhance training and preparedness and mentally prepare its forces for a warlike situation.
In the final analysis, while India’s success in Operation Sindoor pushed the boundaries of escalation and deterrence, it could do so because it adhered to the time-tested principles of war and decision-making in times of crisis.
Arjun Subramaniam is a military historian and strategic analyst.
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