Did Donald Trump really succeed in 'obliterating' key Iranian nuclear sites? Damage, denial and a dangerous future

In the wee hours of June 22, President Donald Trump launched an aggressive military operation targeting Iran’s key nuclear facilities. Air Force B-2 bombers and Navy submarines struck three locations: the underground enrichment site at Fordo, the larger complex at Natanz and a facility near Isfahan. Trump claimed the strikes had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear programme, but on the ground, the reality appears far more complicated.

 

While Trump declared victory, American intelligence and military officials struck a more cautious tone. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth and Joint Chiefs chairman Dan Caine confirmed “severe damage” at all three locations but avoided declaring total success. Satellite imagery of Fordo, deep beneath a mountain, revealed six craters caused by bunker-busting bombs. Israeli intelligence suggested the facility had suffered major damage, though it remained unclear whether it was still operational. Some Iranian officials, meanwhile, sought to downplay the impact of the strikes.

 

Rafael Grossi, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), acknowledged a “direct kinetic impact” at Fordo but said it was too soon to determine the full extent of the internal damage. He also revealed that his inspectors had last seen uranium enriched to 60 per cent — just shy of weapons-grade — a week before the first Israeli strikes on Iran. Satellite images taken before the US attack showed cargo trucks near Fordo’s entrances, leading analysts to believe that Iran may have moved nuclear material or equipment ahead of the strike. The uranium in question, weighing about 400kg, is enough to make roughly ten bombs. It is believed to have been relocated from Fordo to a facility near Isfahan, where it remains hidden underground in casks small enough to fit into car trunks.

 

Despite efforts to protect some of its nuclear assets, Iran could not relocate everything. Fordo’s large centrifuges, critical to uranium enrichment, are attached to the floor and likely could not have been removed in time. Historical records, technical equipment and key parts of the infrastructure may also have been lost. The facility’s partial destruction marks a serious setback to Iran’s enrichment capacity.

 

Natanz, the oldest and most extensive enrichment site, also suffered significant blows. Israel had already struck it repeatedly, destroying an aboveground facility and disrupting its electrical systems. The US followed up with two massive bombs and 30 cruise missiles. Satellite images showed fresh craters, but the full extent of the underground damage is not yet clear. Grossi suggested that the interruption of power may have caused centrifuges to malfunction or self-destruct.

 

Even if the underground equipment survived, reconstruction will take years. Iran, however, is already building a deeper and more fortified replacement for Natanz. Though Tehran claims the new site is not yet operational, it serves as a reminder of Iran’s determination to continue its nuclear development.

 

Since 2003, Iran has officially denied seeking nuclear weapons, pointing to a fatwa issued by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei banning the development and use of such arms. Nonetheless, leaked archives revealed that Iran had researched nuclear weaponisation components before 2003. Western leaders, including Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have claimed Iran secretly resumed those efforts, though they have offered no public evidence.

 

Iran’s decades-long nuclear pursuit now stands at a crossroads. Historically, military strikes and sabotage have yielded only temporary delays. Back in 2007, the US and Israel reportedly launched a cyberattack dismantling about 20 per cent of Iran’s centrifuges at Natanz, but Tehran repaired those damages quickly and expanded its facilities in no time. A decade and a half later, it had about 20,000 centrifuges. 

 

The only initiative that led to a tangible reduction of Iran’s nuclear assets was the 2015 nuclear deal signed with the Obama administration. The deal also allowed international inspections and monitoring in exchange for sanctions relief. After Trump chose to junk the deal, Iran ramped up uranium enrichment, undermined IAEA inspections and dismantled monitoring cameras. 

 

The war with Israel has further disrupted international oversight. Tehran has suspended IAEA inspections and it is unclear whether the inspectors present during the initial strikes will be allowed to return. Even if inspections resume, gaining access to the heavily bombed sites could be physically impossible.

 

The Trump administration’s current goal, as stated by Vice President J.D. Vance, is to “do something” with Iran’s remaining uranium stockpile. However, Iran refuses to negotiate with the US, accusing Washington of deceitfully preparing for war while pretending to pursue diplomacy. If possible, Tehran is likely to retain the uranium as a negotiating tool or as a future deterrent. 

 

The ongoing conflict also has the potential to undermine the existing global nuclear order. Tehran could withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), ending its formal cooperation with the IAEA and potentially legitimising its pursuit of nuclear weapons under international law. Tehran has long insisted that its enrichment activities were peaceful, protected under the NPT, but withdrawal would destroy that distinction.

 

Such a move would deal a serious blow to the international nonproliferation regime. The NPT is built on a fragile bargain: non-nuclear states forgo weapons in exchange for access to peaceful nuclear technology, while the recognised nuclear powers agree to work towards disarmament. If Iran walks out, one can expect a chain reaction, especially in the Middle East, and remove all avenues of international oversight. 

 

Meanwhile, Iran’s close ties with Russia and China could further complicate efforts to contain its nuclear programme. Earlier this year, Tehran signed a strategic partnership with Moscow, which has previously assisted in building and fuelling Iranian nuclear reactors. Western intelligence suggests Iran has asked Russia for nuclear materials and technical support. China has also been implicated in helping Iran obtain missile components. Both countries voted against a recent IAEA censure of Iran, indicating they may shield it from international pressure. With their veto power at the UN Security Council, Moscow and Beijing could block any collective response to Iran’s potential withdrawal from the NPT.

 

Should Iran pursue nuclear weapons, the US-Israeli strikes may well harden its resolve. The attack on Fordo and Natanz, once considered military options of last resort, may be perceived in Tehran not as deterrents but as confirmation of vulnerability. For Iran’s leadership, the logic may now be to complete a nuclear deterrent to ensure survival.

 

Whether the world is closer to halting Iran’s programme or hastening its weaponisation remains uncertain. But as Iran weighs its next moves, and the IAEA’s reach shrinks, the stakes could not be higher. Mick Mulroy, a former Pentagon and CIA official, estimates that the strikes have delayed Iran’s nuclear weaponisation by two to five years. But in the absence of diplomacy, time alone is not a solution.

 

As Grossi, the head of the IAEA, put it: “Inspections are not just about watching centrifuges spin. They are about keeping a conversation going, keeping hope alive. If the talking stops, the guessing begins — and guessing, in a nuclear standoff, is the most dangerous game of all.”

Middle East