Bangladesh says it is not trying to join an alliance with China and Pakistan to sideline India in the region, but here is how their actions under Yunus govt suggest the opposite

Bangladesh’s interim government under Muhammad Yunus is actively deepening engagements with Pakistan and China, especially after Operation Sindoor. However, the Bangladesh government is simultaneously denying any intent to form alliances targeting India, even though their actions suggest so.

This diplomatic recalibration of Bangladesh marks a significant shift from the India-aligned posture of ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s administration and has introduced new complexities into South Asia’s geopolitical landscape.

Bangladesh revitalizing Pakistan relations

The most striking transformation has taken place in Bangladesh-Pakistan relations, historically strained since Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan 1971. Under Yunus’s caretaker administration, bilateral ties have witnessed unprecedented momentum.

After a 13-year pause, direct trade has resumed, highlighted by Bangladesh’s import of 50,000 tons of Pakistani rice in February 2025 and the movement of over 1,000 containers through Chittagong port. Visa procedures have been simplified, and direct flights restarted, facilitating people-to-people exchanges.

A high-level Bangladeshi military delegation visited Pakistan in January for talks with Army Chief General Asim Munir. The Bangladesh Navy’s participation in Pakistan’s AMAN-25 multinational exercise the first in over a decade signals expanding defence cooperation. Discussions about Bangladesh acquiring Pakistani JF-17 Thunder fighter jets underscore the relationship’s strategic depth.

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar is scheduled for the first ministerial-level visit to Dhaka in 13 years, reflecting mutual eagerness to normalise relations despite historical grievances.

Strategic alignment with China

Concurrently, Bangladesh has accelerated its pivot toward Beijing, moving beyond Hasina’s cautious balancing act. China is expanding its Industrial Economic Zone in Chattogram and modernizing Mongla Port. Most provocatively, Dhaka has invited Chinese involvement in the Teesta River project, a longstanding friction point in India-Bangladesh relations.

During his state visit to China in March, Yunus framed Northeast India as “landlocked” and declared Bangladesh the region’s “only guardian of the ocean,” suggesting it could become “an extension of the Chinese economy.” These remarks triggered outrage in India and revealed Dhaka’s willingness to leverage geography against New Delhi.

Following Yunus’s visit, both countries established eight memoranda of understanding on economic and technological cooperation, embedding Chinese influence deeper into Bangladesh’s development architecture.

The Kunming trilateral and diplomatic denials

The June 19 meeting in Kunming, China, between Bangladeshi, Chinese, and Pakistani officials became the focal point of regional anxieties. While Bangladesh framed it as an “informal” discussion on connectivity and trade, Pakistan hailed it as the “inaugural meeting of the Bangladesh-China-Pakistan trilateral mechanism”. Key contradictions emerged:

•⁠ Divergent Characterizations: China and Pakistan announced the creation of a “joint working group” to advance cooperation in infrastructure, trade, maritime affairs, and climate change. Bangladesh’s statements conspicuously omitted this institutional framework.
•⁠ ⁠Official Reassurances: Foreign Affairs Adviser Touhid Hossain vehemently denied alliance-building: “We are not forming any alliance… It is certainly not targeting any third-party.” He emphasized the meeting’s “official-level, not political-level” nature and offered that Bangladesh would similarly engage if India proposed a trilateral with Nepal.
•⁠ ⁠Strategic Ambiguity: Despite these denials, the convergence of interests is evident. The discussions identified 12 cooperation areas—from agriculture to disaster management—that align perfectly with China’s Belt and Road Initiative ambitions to integrate South Asia under its leadership.

India’s countermeasures and regional implications

New Delhi has responded with calibrated pressure, viewing these developments as strategic encroachment. India revoked Bangladesh’s transshipment rights through Indian territory to Nepal, Bhutan, and Myanmar, citing “congestion” a move widely interpreted as punishment for Dhaka’s outreach to Beijing and Islamabad.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi limited his interaction with Yunus to a brief handshake at April’s BIMSTEC summit, a stark contrast to his warm rapport with Sheikh Hasina. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar pointedly reinforced India’s view of the Northeast as a BIMSTEC connectivity hub, countering Yunus’s “landlocked” characterization.

India perceives Chinese infrastructure plans near Bangladesh’s Lalmonirhat district proximity to the vulnerable Siliguri “Chicken’s Neck” corridor as a direct threat. Renewed Bangladesh-Pakistan defense ties compound fears of a two-front challenge during India-Pakistan tensions.

The delicate balancing act

Bangladesh walks a diplomatic tightrope, seeking economic diversification while managing fallout with India. Hossain admits the relationship with India is in “readjustment,” lacking the “deep relationship” of the Hasina era but insisting Dhaka maintains “no dearth of goodwill”. Yunus recently proposed an “integrated economic plan” for Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and India’s Northeast, a seeming softening from his Beijing remarks. However, the proposal notably excludes India itself from the planning framework.

Analysts question whether this reorientation can survive Bangladesh’s transition to an elected government. As South Asia expert Michael Kugelman notes, India may tolerate commercial ties but views Bangladesh-Pakistan military cooperation as a “red line”.

Redrawing South Asia’s map

The emerging alignment carries profound regional consequences:

•⁠ China’s Regional Architecture: Beijing advances its vision of an India-free regional bloc, potentially expanding its 2020 quadrilateral dialogue (with Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal) to include Bangladesh and Myanmar. Chinese-backed corridors connecting Chittagong to Gwadar or undermining India’s highway projects could fracture South Asia into competing zones of influence .
•⁠ ⁠SAARC’s Irrelevance: The Kunming process accelerates the decline of India-centered SAARC, replacing it with Chinese-convened minilaterals that exclude New Delhi.
•⁠ ⁠Multilateral Risks: Should Bangladesh align with China-Pakistan positions on Kashmir or Indo-Pacific strategy at UN forums, it could affect India’s ability to form regional consensus.

Bangladesh’s interim government insists its engagements remain transactional, not strategic. Yet the geopolitical undertones are unmistakable. As Hossain conceded about India ties: “Let us acknowledge the truth”. Whether this recalibration represents temporary hedging or a lasting realignment depends on Dhaka’s ability to navigate the competing gravities of regional power dynamics where economic aspirations must continually be weighed against the inescapable realities of geography and India’s enduring strategic footprint.

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