How far will Modi go to oblige Trump
Indian foreign policy is being buffeted by strong crosswinds. Two events in June are particularly illustrative. On June 18, in an unprecedented gesture, US President Donald Trump hosted Pakistan Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir to a two-hour luncheon meeting at the White House.
A day later, China hosted the first trilateral meeting of
senior Pakistani-Bangladeshi-Chinese foreign ministry officials in Kunming. This meeting demonstrated that China’s ingress into India’s immediate neighbourhood is moving from bilateral to multilateral formats. The honour given to Munir should break the complacency in Indian foreign policy circles that India had become central to America’s global strategic calculus, with Pakistan relegated to the margins. At the same time, the Kunming meeting profiles India’s general inability to successfully combat Chinese moves in South Asia.
India’s foreign policymakers, particularly External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, who has unparalleled first-hand experience of the US system, it would seem, initially failed to appreciate that Trump 2.0 was politically and diplomatically very different from his earlier avatar. Perhaps, Jaishankar’s presence at Trump’s inauguration ceremony and the invitation to Prime Minister Narendra Modi to visit Washington masked the enormous variance between the two Trump versions.
However, Trump’s new avatar became apparent when Trump publicly and gracelessly declared that reciprocal tariffs would be imposed on India in Modi’s presence on February 13 in Washington. He went ahead and announced a 26 per cent tariff on Indian exports but later suspended them for 90 days. Both countries are now negotiating to reach an agreement before that period ends on July 9. How far will India accommodate Trump’s demands, especially in the agriculture sector? Concessions in this sector will dent Modi’s popularity among farmers, but that is a risk that he has to take to get an agreement.
While India was taking stock of the implications on Trump’s demands on tariffs, New Delhi felt that its interests were secure in the strategic realm — both in the Indo-Pacific region and in its western neighbourhood. The belief regarding the latter region has now been deeply shaken. This is because of Trump’s approach on India and Pakistan in the wake of Op Sindoor. Besides, Trump has continued to insist that he mediated a ceasefire, a claim that Pakistan has readily endorsed and India has repudiated. Trump has also lauded both Modi and Munir; thereby, virtually equating them. The manner in which he issued an off-hand invitation to Modi to drop in for a short visit even while he was feting Munir at the White House would have offended Modi.
All this has embarrassed those who have assiduously sought over the past eleven years that India leaned strategically more and more towards Washington. The US’ indifference to terrorism, notwithstanding the right words it has used, has also caused deep resentment in India. Consequently, Trump is being re-evaluated in strong terms by those who have wished for a stronger India-US strategic embrace. This is despite the near certainty that the US will continue to seek India’s strong participation in the Quad.
Unlike the past, India’s strategic options are limited. For instance, the Cold War enabled it to play the hedging game; non-alignment gave it flexibility. Now, with its contentious relationship with China and its pronounced tilt towards the US, it has no scope to hedge. On its part, China is unwilling to give any quarter either bilaterally or in the multilateral context. Not only are the Sino-Indian agreements of the 1990s effectively over, China’s militarisation of Tibet now means that India will have to greatly augment its force levels and infrastructure along the LAC.
Equally worrying is the obvious Chinese desire, with Pakistani and Bangladeshi assistance, to develop a China-centric South Asian multilateral format. Where will that leave India? Despite the dependence of countries like Nepal and Bangladesh on India because of geography, such Chinese attempts cannot be dismissed as hypothetical. In this context, to rely on Indic cultural affinities is akin to relying on snow in the hot cauldron of economic realities. Modi had hoped that India will be able to knit South Asia together with these countries taking advantage of the dynamism of Indian economic success. That inclusive vision is far from being realised.
It is in this bleak backdrop that Modi has embarked on a five-nation trip. After the failure of the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s Defence Ministers to issue a joint statement because of India-Pakistan differences on terrorism, including the Pahalgam attack, it was natural that Dammu Ravi, the able Secretary (Economic Relations) in the MEA was asked if a consensus would be reached on terrorism in the BRICS summit. He said that it would. That would be a relief to the Modi government especially as India will chair BRICS next year. While India correctly displayed its resolve to meet Pakistan’s terrorism challenge through the use of force if necessary and conveyed this to the world through the seven all-party delegations, it was unable to secure any specific condemnation of Pakistan. All countries only condemned terrorism in general terms. India’s political class and diplomats need to examine this matter objectively.
During his current trip, Modi is visiting Ghana, Trinidad & Tobago, Argentina, Brazil and Namibia. This will provide an opportunity to India to project its Global South credentials. In the face of the Chinese challenge India faces in the Global South, it has to think innovatively, focusing on its strengths especially in the skills development areas. In the past, Indian democracy and social solidarity, impressed the Global South more than anything else. In this digitally wired world, nothing escapes attention. While India’s ancient wisdom and glory is an attribute of its soft power the Global South is far more impressed with a country’s present achievements and its equitable political and social systems.
The challenging external environment and Trump’s disruptions require clear, realistic and consistent policies, not smart one-liners. Unfortunately, there has been a surfeit of the latter.
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