The real drone war is yet to come

IT’s now over two months since Operation Sindoor, and with the media frenzy having subsided, a dispassionate assessment can be made of some of the key military issues surrounding the operation. One of these issues is the description of the conflict as South Asia’s first drone war. Senior Indian military officers have spoken about the revolutionary employment of drones during the operation and the effectiveness of India’s counter-drone systems.

Drones have undoubtedly become central to modern conflict, and India’s successful defence against Pakistani intrusions has been justifiably praised. Yet a closer analysis of drone employment during the operation shows that drone warfare in both countries is still at a nascent stage. This is borne out by how the two countries utilised drones during the operation.

On the night of May 7-8, a day after India launched strikes on nine terrorist camps, Pakistan retaliated with drone activity, targeting Indian military bases at 15 locations across Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Gujarat, and Rajasthan. The following night saw further intrusions at 36 locations, stretching from Leh to Sir Creek, with an estimated 300 to 400 drones. According to official briefings, the aim of these incursions was likely to test Indian air defence systems and gather intelligence.

On the night of May 9-10, drone activity was reported at 26 locations, spanning from Srinagar to Naliya. Most of these drones were successfully neutralised, though limited damage was sustained at Udhampur, Pathankot, Adampur and Bhuj.

According to media reports, most of the drones employed by Pakistan were unarmed. A few specialised military drones, such as Turkey’s Asisguard Songar and the Yiha-III loitering munition, were used. The Songar has a range of about 10 km and can be equipped with a light armament, such as a gun or grenade launcher. The Yiha-III is designed for precision strikes against high-value targets, but it remains a low-end capability compared to more sophisticated systems.

Indian drone strikes, though fewer in number, were more targeted and precise. These employed loitering munitions such as the Harpy and Harop. The Harpy is an anti-radiation drone designed to destroy enemy radar systems, while the Harop has electro-optical sensors and can engage a broader range of targets. Polish Warmate and the indigenously developed Nagastra-1 loitering munitions were also employed.

It is likely that some of the Indian strikes on terrorist camps on May 7 were carried out by drones, though this has not been officially confirmed. What has been revealed through press briefings is that on May 8, Indian drones targeted air defence radars and systems at multiple locations inside Pakistan, destroying one radar in Lahore. On May 9, four more air defence sites were targeted, with at least one additional radar destroyed.

On May 10, the Indian Air Force launched devastating airstrikes on Pakistani airbases, command centres and military infrastructure using long-range standoff weapons such as the BrahMos and SCALP cruise missiles, and air-to-ground munitions like the Crystal Maze and Rampage. These strikes were preceded by decoy drones and Harops designed to degrade Pakistani air defence systems.

On the counter-drone front, Pakistan claimed to have downed at least 48 Indian drones. The Indian counter-drone effort was commendable as it neutralised almost all Pakistani drone attacks. At the forefront were air defence guns like the L-70, ZU-23 and Shilka. India also has an indigenous Drone Detection and Interdiction System that would have played an important part in neutralising hostile drones.

India did come out on top in the brief drone war, but there are some important lessons. The reason drones are having such a significant impact on the battlefield is due to their affordability and ubiquity. Thousands of $500 drones in the hands of soldiers make aerial surveillance, precision strikes and real-time intelligence accessible to even small infantry units. Low-cost drones also permit strategic reach, as seen in Ukraine’s deep strikes into Russia.

It is not the technology, but the scale of drone warfare that is redefining warfighting. Both Ukraine and Russia are estimated to have between one and two million drones in their military inventory. It is the mass usage that is the fundamental characteristic of drone warfare, and this has sparked innovation in tactics and battlefield adaptation.

One might argue that a four-day conflict between India and Pakistan cannot be compared to the Ukraine war. There is merit in this argument, but then we should also not conclude that the Sindoor experience offers a reliable blueprint for future conflicts involving drones. In fact, it highlights several areas that must be addressed.

Indian drone strikes were precise but primarily carried out by specialised drones. Such drones are highly expensive; each Harop drone costs approximately $700,000. What is required is a massive infusion of low-cost drones, particularly in the Army. Units at the tactical level must then devise practical doctrines and battlefield tactics for their effective employment.

India must also indigenously develop medium and long-range strike drones. Ukraine has developed a series of drones with ranges of up to 1,000 km, which transitioned from concept to combat use in around six months. While this wartime mobilisation is not replicable in India, drone development timelines must be drastically shortened through mission-mode programmes and agile public-private partnerships.

The military must also not rest on its laurels of having countered Pakistani drones. With few exceptions, the drones were mostly unarmed and posed little direct threat. An effective counter-drone system must address both tactical and operational levels. Frontline troops must be equipped with portable jammers and rifle-mounted AI-assisted sights. At the operational level, the most effective architectures integrate long-range detection by radar and other sensors, mid-range disruption through jamming or spoofing, and close-in destruction by kinetic means. We may also need to examine new organisational structures that integrate radars, guns and Electronic Warfare resources.

Preparing for the future means thinking beyond the victories of Operation Sindoor. It requires scaling up the employment of drones, rewriting doctrine and integrating drone defences into every level of the battlefield. The real drone war is yet to come.

Lt Gen DS Hooda (retd) is former northern army commander.

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