Explainer: High on mobility and firepower, Rudra brigades align with post-Op Sindoor strategy

The Indian Army is forming all-arms brigades called ‘Rudra’ that integrate infantry, mechanised infantry, armour, artillery, special forces, and unmanned aerial systems, supported by specialised logistics and combat support. At the Kargil Vijay Diwas in Dras, Chief of the Army Staff, Gen Upendra Dwivedi announced these developments.

Alongside this, agile and lethal ‘Bhairav’ Light Commando Battalions are being established to deliver rapid and surprising strikes along the border.

This is a major force restructuring exercise, aimed at enhancing operational capabilities along the borders with China and Pakistan, and evolving into what is being termed as a future-oriented force.

“We are driven towards becoming a developed, modern and futuristic power,” the Army Chief had said. Already two Rudra brigades have come up.

Rudra and Bhairav would be capable of rapid and decisive action in modular and multi-domain warfare in battlefield environments dominated by information, digitisation, automation, precision and artificial intelligence driven systems.

What are Rudra brigades

Typically, a brigade is made up of three Infantry battalions or their equivalent regiments in the Armoured Corps, Artillery or Engineers. Commanded by a Brigadier, it comprises about 3,000 troops, with the core combatant units being from the same arm and some attached support elements from other arms and services.

Three brigades form a division, which so far are also arms-specific like an infantry division, armoured division or an artillery division.

The Rudra brigades will comprise a mix of battalions or regiments from different arms. The composition, according to sources, may vary depending on the operational requirements and tasks at hand. These would also be adequately equipped with force multipliers like drones’ surveillance equipment and area saturation weapons.

For example, in the mountains, it may have two infantry battalions and an artillery regiment or in the plains it may have a mechanised infantry battalion, an armoured regiment and a self-propelled artillery regiment more suited for offensive operations, an officer said.

Elsewhere it could be infantry battalions along special forces elements, more suited for operations along the Line of Control (LoC).

The Rudra brigades are structured to be operationally flexible and have the intrinsic capability to deter and respond to varied threats with greater speed, technological prowess and lethality.

Past restructuring exercises

In the mid-1980s, the then Chief of Army Staff, Gen K Sundarji conceptualised the Reorganised Army Plains Infantry Division (RAPID) to enhance the Army’s mobility, firepower and offensive capabilities by incorporating elements of mechanised infantry and armoured brigades within traditional infantry divisions.

A few divisions were converted to RAPIDs. These generally include two infantry brigades and one mechanised or armoured brigade. The integration of tanks and armoured personnel carriers, along with reconnaissance elements and engineering units enhanced the division’s ability to respond to enemy incursions and conduct offensive operations.

With enhanced mobility and greater firepower, RAPIDs are intended to operate in high-intensity, short-duration conflicts, particularly in the plains of Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat where the terrain favours mechanised warfare. Some RAPIDs continue to exist.

In the aftermath of Operation Parakram, the Cold Start Doctrine was introduced in 2004 to enable rapid, decisive offensive operations against Pakistan in response to provocations such as terrorist attacks or border incursions, while minimising the risk of escalation to full-scale war.

The prolonged time for mobilisation of Army formations during Operation Parakram in 2001–2002, running into two-three weeks, was the catalyst.

Cold Start called for swift deployment, with forces launching offensive operations within 48-96 hours of a crisis. It relied on pre-positioned, forward-deployed units to reduce response time for which the defensive or holding forces were also equipped with suitable offensive capabilities.

Cold Start focused on limited incursions up to 50-80 km inside Pakistani territory to seize strategically valuable areas, inflict significant damage, degrade enemy capabilities and create leverage for negotiations without escalating to full scale war.

The doctrine aimed to exploit surprise and maintain momentum and envisioned multiple simultaneous thrusts across the India-Pakistan border to overwhelm Pakistani defences, disrupt command and control and prevent a cohesive counter-response.

Meeting post Operation Sindoor requirements

The Army has been working on the concept of Integrated Battle Groups (IBG) for the past few years and the formation of Rudras seems to be an outcome of this exercise. The formation of IBGs also aligns with the Cold Start Doctrine.

IBGs, having combat elements from different arms and supported by different services, were supposed to be formations larger than a brigade but smaller than a division and commanded by a Major General. The composition and role of IBGs is largely similar to the Rudra.

Operation Sindoor conducted in May 2025 in retribution to the terrorist attack in Pahalgam that killed 26 persons, involved carrying out precision attacks by the three services deep inside Pakistan, demonstrating India’s intent to adopt a proactive, rapid-response posture against cross-border terrorism, a key objective of the Cold Start.

In a key doctrinal shift, India had announced that any terrorist attack would be considered an act of war.

Earlier, in response to a terrorist attack at an Army camp in Uri in 2016, the Army’s special forces had carried out surgical strikes on terrorist camps located across the LoC.

The Rudra Brigades along with Bhairavs, sources said, are designed to operationalise this doctrine by enabling swift, multi-axis offensives with integrated arms.

While a war-like situation prevailed with attacks and counterattacks by drones, artillery and missiles and forces were on high alert, there was little troop movement visible on ground because of the ability to mobilise and strike within 12-24 hours.

India