Why J&K Statehood may be Premature?

Vijay Hashia
The demand for restoring full statehood to Jammu & Kashmir has grown louder, particularly under the leadership of present CM, Omar Abdullah. He has been consistently pressing the Government of India to reinstate the region’s democratic autonomy, calling statehood a “fundamental right” of the people of J&K. Rejecting any “hybrid model” where key powers like law and order remain with the Centre, Abdullah insists that the promise of statehood was made both in Parliament and in the Supreme Court. His party, the National Conference, is reportedly exploring legal options to secure this commitment.
Omar Abdullah has openly questioned the logic of retaining law and order under central authority, asking why such a governance model is not imposed on other large states like Uttar Pradesh or Maharashtra. He maintains that elected governments are better suited to manage internal security and administrative responsibilities than centrally administered Union Territory regimes. “The people of Jammu and Kashmir will not settle for anything less,” he declared, emphasizing the urgency of restoring full democratic governance in the region.
Adding to the political pressure, Congress leaders and workers from Jammu and Kashmir on Tuesday staged a protest at Jantar Mantar in Delhi, also demanding the immediate restoration of statehood. Led by senior leaders like K.C. Venugopal, Tariq Hameed Karra, and Ghulam Ahmad Mir, the protest emphasized the party’s stance that the downgrading of J&K into a Union Territory was unconstitutional and must be reversed.
Yet behind these calls for statehood lie deeper and more pressing questions, primarily those related to national security, governance stability, and the record of past political regimes in Jammu & Kashmir. These questions weigh heavily on the Government of India’s mind as it balances political demands with the imperative to safeguard the hard-won peace established since the abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019.
Why the caution from the past
The Government of India has not entirely ruled out the restoration of statehood. On multiple occasions, it has affirmed in Parliament that statehood will be granted “at an appropriate time.” However, the Centre has made it clear that any such move must be preceded by systemic reforms, effective counter-terrorism mechanisms, and a corruption-free administrative framework. Political analysts argue that restoring statehood is premature, as without such safeguards, may inadvertently revive the governance leniencies that once allowed radicalism and separatism to flourish.
The track record of political governance in J&K reinforces this caution. A closer look at various periods, from 1996 to 2018 reveal a pattern of political compromise, short-sighted populism, and policies that weakened the state’s internal security.
Farooq Abdullah’s return to power in 1996, following six years of President’s rule, was seen as a turning point. However, this period witnessed resurge in terrorism and insurgency-related violence. Allegations of human rights violations by security forces mounted, while growing youth alienation and the rise of separatist politics gained traction. The emergence of the Hurriyat Conference as a parallel political force marked a deepening of political instability. Critics pointed to centralized governance, failure to curb militancy, and a disconnect with grassroots, as key reasons for the NC’s declining popularity, that ended in 2002.
During the PDP-Congress coalition (2002-2008), Mufti Mohammad Sayeed’s “healing touch” policy aimed to humanize governance and reduce the military presence. While well-intentioned, critics argue that it emboldened separatists and weakened security enforcement. Individuals released from detention allegedly re-engaged in anti-national or militant activities. Infiltration and terror attacks persisted, and the period saw several high-profile attacks. The coalition collapsed amid the 2008 Amarnath land row, which triggered widespread communal and regional unrest, further destabilizing the region.
Omar Abdullah’s own tenure as Chief Minister (2009-2014), saw intensified street protests, frequent curfews, soft-pedaling on radicalism and failure to push reforms. His administration was accused of failing to introduce effective reforms and being disconnected from grassroots aspirations. Critics view his current call for statehood not merely as a plea for democratic restoration but also as an attempt to regain lost political ground and revive a governance style that, in the past, proved problematic.
During Mehbooba Mufti’s tenure, (2017-18), over 11,000 youths involved in more than 3,000 booked cases of stone-pelting on armed forces between 2008 and 2017 were granted general amnesty in phases, and cases withdrawn, many of whom were alleged to have returned to disruptive activities or joined militant ranks. The period witnessed unrest, civilian killings, widespread allegations of corruption and governance failures, spike in radicalization and stone pelting, growing alienation of youth, escalation of militant activities and resurgence of radical elements in the South Kashmir.
Governments led by PDP, NC and Congress authorized the release of numerous individuals, many of whom were detained under serious anti-terror laws. Some of these individuals went on to become prominent separatist or militant leaders. For example, Masarat Alam, the chief architect of the 2010 stone-pelting agitation and a hardliner separatist associated with Tehreek-e-Hurriyat, booked in 27 criminal cases, was released twice in 2010 and 2015. Yasin Malik, leader of the now-banned JKLF, was frequently released over the years. Despite his involvement in the killing of IAF personnel and the 1989 abduction of Rubaiya Sayeed, he was long treated as a political interlocutor. His organization was only banned in 2019. Prominent separatist leaders like Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Shabir Shah, and Asiya Andrabi operated freely under NC and PDP governments. They regularly held anti-national rallies, promoted pro-Pakistan narratives, and organized shutdowns that disrupted life across the Valley. Burhan Wani, the Hizbul Mujahideen commander who became a symbol of insurgency, rose to prominence in a political environment marked by state neglect and indirect legitimization of separatist elements.
Several others such as Showkat Bakshi, Vice Chairman (JKLF), Nasir Ahmed (HM), Mohd Abbas Sheikh (banned TRF) and Ashiq Hussain Faktoo etc were released under amnesty or political screening initiatives. Some, like Abbas Sheikh, rejoined militancy and remained active until their deaths. Faktoo, despite two decades in prison, continued to campaign for separatist causes. All these cases bring out the risks involved when political decisions override long-term national security considerations.
The Government of India and national security experts cite these past decisions as lessons in political recklessness. Restoring unconditional statehood without systemic reforms could invite a return to those same administrative indulgences that facilitated radicalism, undermined rule of law, and compromised national unity.
Statehood is not a symbolic prize to be returned to political elite; it is a constitutional responsibility that demands accountability, stability, and national alignment. While the demand for restoring statehood may resonate emotionally and politically, the Union Government is justified in proceeding with caution.
Until a framework for secure, transparent, and development-driven governance is assured, the restoration of full statehood must remain a future possibility, conditional, not guaranteed.

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