Ominous shadow of Myanmar’s civil wars and Manipur violence on India’s security calculus

In the early hours of July 13, 2025, drone strikes hit at least two insurgent camps of the Liberation Front of Asom - Independent (ULFA-I) in the Sagaing Region of Myanmar, close to India's Nagaland-Arunachal Pradesh border. The militant group ULFA-I claimed that over 150 armed drones of Israeli and Western origin carried out pre-dawn bombing attacks on its mobile camps, resulting in their three senior leaders killed, including Nayan Medhi Asom, and 19 others wounded. The drone strike—allegedly by Myanmar’s junta — underscores how volatile these sanctuaries have become. While New Delhi denied involvement, the episode highlights how Myanmar’s internal war can intersect directly with Indian security concerns.

In the meanwhile, the cause and effects of the gruesome violence of May 2023 in Manipur remain unresolved to this day. The violence has caused deep schisms between local communities and has undermined India's peace and security. Who was behind the violence? Who was responsible to cause so much death and destruction, including targeting places of religious worship?

Concurrently, the turbulence within Myanmar’s borders, exacerbated by civil wars and foreign strategic interests, casts a growing shadow over India’s security and strategic calculus. Myanmar’s protracted ethnic insurgencies, compounded by the military junta’s 2021 coup and the consequent emergence of the People’s Defence Force (PDF), have triggered a complex conflict with deep ramifications for India’s Northeast and the Bay of Bengal. As India faces ethno-religious violence, cross-border insurgency, transnational crime, refugee flows, and China’s expanding influence, New Delhi must recalibrate its approach to restore communal harmony within its borders as well as balance immediate security, long-term connectivity, and strategic rivalry in the Indo-Pacific.

Myanmar’s civil wars: The present context

Myanmar, sharing a 1,643 km land border with India, has been plagued by insurgencies since its independence in 1948. Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs)—the Kachin, Karen, Shan, Arakan, Chin, and others—have waged intermittent wars against central authority, driven by a sense of cultural suppression, economic marginalisation, and political exclusion.

The 2021 coup, in which the military junta ousted the elected National Unity Government (NUG), inflamed these long-running grievances. In response, the PDF, formed by pro-democracy activists and supported by EAOs, emerged as a potent armed movement. As of mid-2025, an estimated 52 per cent of Myanmar’s territory is under the effective control of the PDF and its allies, while the junta firmly controls only 17 per cent. The remaining 23 per cent is contested.

While the junta retains key urban centres, much of the countryside—particularly in Kachin, Sagaing, Chin, and Rakhine States—is under insurgent sway. These areas directly abut India’s sensitive border states—Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram—creating a security spillover that India cannot ignore.

India’s security challenges from Manipur violence and Myanmar conflict

1. Ethnic violence and arms flows in Manipur

The Meitei-Kuki violence in Manipur since May 2023 has deepened the vulnerability of India’s North-east. Relations between communities have been seriously damaged. Both sides reportedly procured arms illegally, some allegedly from Myanmar-based networks. The creation of buffer zones to separate warring communities has not fully quelled tensions, while cross-border tribal linkages—Nagaland’s Nagas, Manipur’s Kukis, and Mizoram’s Mizos—complicate fencing efforts.

Although the Indian government accelerated the long-delayed India-Myanmar border fence post-2023, tribal opposition, citing disrupted kinship ties, continues to slow progress.

2. Cross-border safe havens for Indian insurgent groups

Since the 1970s, Indian insurgent groups have exploited Myanmar’s porous, under-policed terrain to establish bases. Currently, Sagaing Division and the Kachin region, just across Nagaland and Arunachal, host camps of the United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I), led by Paresh Baruah; the NSCN-K-YA (Khaplang faction); and Manipuri-Meitei groups like the PLA, KYKL, PREPAK, and KCP. The Kuki National Army (Burma wing) also operates in Chin State.

For these groups, Myanmar's territory offers sanctuary from Indian security forces, enabling them to rest, recruit, and train. Cadres frequently come across the border to extort “taxes” or procure arms. Arms pipelines, often sourced from China and Southeast Asia, snake through Myanmar’s Shan and Kachin states, fuelling unrest in India’s North-East.

3. Rohingya displacement and Bay of Bengal instability

The Myanmar military’s campaigns in Rakhine (Arakan) state have displaced thousands of Rohingyas, triggering refugee flows into Bangladesh and the Bay of Bengal littoral. The United States’ growing attention to Rakhine—owing to human rights concerns and its strategic location—adds another external layer to regional dynamics.

Uncontrolled migration, combined with narcotics and human trafficking from Myanmar, threatens India’s coastal security, especially in the Andaman Sea.

4. China’s expanding footprint

Myanmar is central to China’s “String of Pearls” strategy. The Kyaukpyu port in Rakhine State, linked by pipelines to Yunnan, offers Beijing a route to import Middle Eastern and African energy, bypassing the Malacca Strait. Reports of Chinese military facilities on the Coco Islands, overlooking India’s Andaman & Nicobar chain, amplify New Delhi’s concerns.

China’s naval outreach, bolstered by Bangladesh’s submarine base at Cox’s Bazar and access to Sri Lankan ports, risks encirclement of India’s eastern seaboard. With Bangladesh’s 2024 political upheaval tilting Dhaka closer to Beijing, India faces a shifting strategic landscape.

India’s strategic and security imperatives

1. Securing the Northeast

Stability, peace and communal harmony in Manipur, Nagaland, and other North-Eastern states must be India’s first priority. The region cannot remain a pressure point for adversaries to exploit. India must accelerate fencing along the India-Myanmar border, while engaging local tribes to address kinship concerns through regulated transit points.

It must strengthen counter-insurgency operations, targeting ULFA-I, NSCN factions, and Meitei insurgent groups, while offering credible surrender and rehabilitation packages to bring militants overground. Arms flows need to be curtailed by disrupting Myanmar-based trafficking networks in collaboration with friendly EAOs and regional partners.

2. Calibrated Engagement with Myanmar’s Junta and EAOs

While the Tatmadaw is deeply unpopular and increasingly embattled, India cannot ignore its relevance. Pragmatic engagement is essential for coordinating counter-insurgency operations against Indian insurgent groups. Further, securing infrastructure projects like the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, are critical to India’s Act East Policy.

China’s influence would need to be balanced, which would otherwise deepen by default. Simultaneously, selective outreach to EAOs—particularly those not hostile to India, such as certain Chin and Kachin factions—should be implemented to help secure India’s borders and provide leverage against both insurgent groups and the junta.

3. Safeguarding the Bay of Bengal and Andaman front

India must treat Myanmar’s coastal instability as a maritime security issue. This requires enhancing naval and air surveillance around the Andaman & Nicobar Islands and along key shipping lanes.

Chinese inroads need to be countered by deepening ties with Myanmar’s civilian stakeholders, investing in infrastructure near Kyaukpyu, and coordinating with regional partners like Japan, the US, and ASEAN nations.

Also, non-traditional threats such as refugee-driven migration, trafficking, and cyber vulnerabilities in the maritime domain need to be pre-empted.

4. Strengthening regional diplomacy

India’s leverage lies not only in direct engagement but also in shaping the regional environment:

Revitalising BIMSTEC as a forum for coordinated maritime security, counter-terrorism, and disaster response, despite divergent member interests.

Rebuilding trust with Bangladesh post-2024 to deny China and Pakistan a free hand in Dhaka’s strategic calculus.

Aligning Indo-Pacific partnerships—through Quad and trilateral arrangements—to counterbalance China’s presence in Myanmar and the Bay of Bengal.

Conclusion

The instability caused by the lingering ethnic violence in Manipur needs to be resolved at the earliest, employing all the resources available to the state. The more time it takes, the more complex the situation will become from the security point of view.

This needs to be viewed in the context that Myanmar’s civil wars present India with a layered challenge—cross-border insurgency, ethnic volatility, refugee flows, narcotics trafficking, and the spectre of Chinese strategic encirclement. The July 2025 drone strike on Indian insurgent camps in Sagaing is a stark reminder that instability across the border can flare into crises impacting India’s internal security and external posture.

New Delhi’s response must be multi-dimensional. Securing India's North-East through effective counter-insurgency operations and community reconciliation is the immediate need. Concurrently, strategic engagement—both with the Tatmadaw and select EAOs—can help neutralise cross-border threats while balancing China’s growing sway. Maritime security in the Bay of Bengal and regional diplomacy, especially with Bangladesh, will be critical to protecting India’s broader interests.

Only by ensuring peace and stability within its border states of the North-east as well as adopting a pragmatic, layered approach can India prevent Myanmar’s instability from undermining its Act East ambitions and its role as a stabilising power in the Indo-Pacific.

Defence