A truce in Syria, at crossroads of empires

Syria’s location at the crossroads of major religions, empires and economic and mercantile networks makes it a pivotal state in the Middle East. Its enduring proclivity to engender and synthesise diverse, often contradictory, streams of thought, religion and politics have made it a battleground for opposing ideas, beliefs and practices. It is rightly said that what happens in Syria affects the entire region.

This explains the continuing interest, both military and financial, of both regional and global powers during the long civil war by insurgent groups backed by regional powers fighting the Assad regime till its fall in December 2024. We see the same proclivities on the part of the regional and global powers after the takeover of the country by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) led by Ahmed al-Shaara, the now rehabilitated terrorist group backed by Turkey and other powers from the region and the West.

Ahmed al-Sharaa, who became the de facto leader of the post-revolutionary caretaker government from 8 December 2024, has gained backing from various regional and international actors, driven by strategic interest in Syria’s stability and reconstruction, and to counter Iran’s influence.

Key financial and political backers include the US, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. Russia, along with the US and some European nations, is also undertaking cautious engagement with the removal of sanctions. Several nations, including Israel, retain a military presence inside Syria.

In a far-sighted move, India opened its first formal outreach only last week, on July 28, with Suresh Kumar, a mid-level officer at the Ministry of External Affairs leading a delegation to Syria to hold talks with Foreign Minister Assad Al-Shaibani. Their discussions covered ways of enhancing the bilateral relationship including possibilities of economic assistance to the new regime.

Located on the east coast of the Mediterranean, Syria with 22 million, mainly Sunni Muslims, borders Turkey to the north, Lebanon and Israel to the west and south west, Iraq to the east and Jordan to the south.

For the transitional government the fall of the Assad regime has become the benchmark towards Syria’s democratic transition. Parliamentary elections will be held in September and the next presidential election within five years. A staunch Sunni, al-Shaara has promised an inclusive government with equal treatment to women and Syria’s many minorities.

Internal Situation

The country remains geographically divided between various interest groups threatening its cohesion. HTS itself is not the only powerful militia in Syria’s umbrella group of rebels leading to the fragmented control of the country.

The US-backed Kurdish-led Syrian Defence Forces (SDF) currently controls the northeast. They have gained ground, taking advantage of the collapse of the Syrian army, to capture the main desert city of Deir ez-Zor, and are determined to remain independent against the Syrian government and Turkey which views it as a terrorist group. The US has also repositioned its troops in eastern Syria.

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) has taken control of parts of northwestern Syria. Although SNA is neither cohesive nor centralised, it remains the bulwark aimed at preventing Kurdish militias from threatening Turkey.

This fragmentation has been the reason for internal military clashes that have undermined the status of the Syrian government. On March 6, 2025 the ‘large and coordinated’ ambush by Assad loyalist Alawites, in the town of Jableh near Latakia, was ruthlessly put down by Syrian government forces.

Similarly, fighting erupted between Druze and Bedouin Sunni groups in Sweida on July 13, 2025. Till a fragile peace, based on a US-brokered cease-fire, was restored after nearly 10,000 Bedouin exited Sweida with Bedouin clans announcing their withdrawal from the Druze-majority city.

President al-Shaara urged them to leave the city, saying they ‘cannot replace the role of the state in handling the country’s affairs and restoring security.’

The violence drew in Syrian government forces and prompted Israeli airstrikes supposedly in sympathy with their own Druze community. These armed disturbances killed hundreds of people and threatened to unravel Syria’s fragile postwar transition.

Role of External Powers

Turkey’s support for rebel groups such as HTS was critical to its recent offensive making it the most influential foreign actor in the country. Turkey with the most Syrian refugees has now promoted their return home. Its main interest remains to topple the Kurdish forces in the north, where the Democratic Union party (PYD), an offshoot of the banned Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK), operates. Ankara will also want to ensure that any government in Syria is friendly to Turkey, and not Iran.

Russia and Iran are no longer the major players in Syria. For Iran, the ousting of Assad was a huge loss denying a land bridge to the eastern Mediterranean, an important base for Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah, and a route through which weapons could reach Lebanon. The loss of Iran’s strategic depth in Syria has weakened its ability to support Hezbollah, itself severely weakened by continuing conflict with Israel.

The loss is similarly huge for Russia. Moscow shored up Assad by sending thousands of Russian troops in 2015 and engaging in brutal airstrikes on Syrian rebel groups and civilian infrastructure.

With the continuing war with Ukraine, Russia did not continue its support to Assad and its Middle East project has been a spectacular failure. The future of Russia’s Syrian naval and air bases, on long lease, in Latakia governorate, giving it a foothold in the eastern Mediterranean, remains uncertain.

Israel’s belligerent attitude to the al-Shaara government has led to their warplanes reportedly carrying out hundreds of airstrikes targeting Syrian Army military facilities. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) claims that it has destroyed around 80% of the Assad regime’s military capability, ostensibly to prevent weapons falling into the hands of extremists and to support its Druze community, during Syria’s post-Assad transition.

Israel has also seized control of all of the demilitarised buffer zone in the Golan Heights, on the ground that the 1974 disengagement agreement with the Assad regime had ‘collapsed’ with the rebel takeover of the country. The Golan Heights, a rocky plateau about 60 km (40 miles) south-west of Damascus, inhabited by the Druze, was partly seized by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War and unilaterally annexed it in 1981.

Rajendra Abhyankar is ex-Ambassador to Syria.

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