OPINION | India-Russia relations run deeper than just oil and weapon sales

In recent weeks, the United States and NATO have sought to pressure India into cutting back its trade with Russia by threatening punitive tariffs. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, on July 15, 2025, has warned of 'secondary tariffs' of 100% on buyers of Russian exports—India included—unless a peace deal is reached within 50 days. On August 7, 2025, the US President announced an additional 25% duty on Indian imports—on top of an earlier 25% tariffs - for buying oil from Russia. Further,  Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, Chair of the Senate Budget Committee, and Democratic Senator Richard Blumenthal have jointly moved the Sanctioning Russia Act 2025 in the US Congress - proposing 500% tariffs on Russia and countries like India and China for allegedly violating Western sanctions on Russia following the Ukraine war. 

The assumption behind these threats is that India will bow to Western economic pressure, just as it did in 2015 when it scaled back oil purchases from Iran under similar US pressure. This assumption appears misplaced. India’s relationship with Russia is not just a transactional arrangement over oil—it is a strategic partnership with historical depth, unique trust, and multifaceted cooperation. Unlike ties with Iran or other partners, the Indo–Russian relationship rests on decades of mutual support, technology transfers, and alignment on global issues. Thus, these threats from the US or NATO could backfire as it may end up undermining India's strategic partnerships with these countries.

Also, US authorities need to note that, in light of  the recent  friction in the relationship between India and the US on  matters that impact India's security negatively, including the new-found love in Washington for arch-rival Pakistan and its military,  Indians have started  preferring Russia over the US  as a trustworthy strategic partner. While the US attracts Indians as a model of democratic practices and the rule of law, on the other hand, Russia, despite its authoritarian functioning,  draws favourable emotions as a reliable and trustworthy friend. Thus, in light of the ongoing Western threats of sanctions over import of Russian oil amid  perceptions of democratic backsliding within the US, public opinion in India is generally supporting the  strengthening of economic relations with Russia, rather than weaken it.

 

Strategic Autonomy and Historical Roots of India-Russia Relations 

 

India has always valued strategic autonomy. Soon after independence, it rejected offers to join US-led military blocs such as SEATO and CENTO. Instead, it pursued a non-aligned policy while cultivating close ties with the Soviet Union, which gave India room to manoeuvre between Cold War camps.

 

That relationship deepened in the late 1950s when the USSR became a key political, economic, and defence partner. Moscow repeatedly vetoed UN Security Council resolutions critical of India on Kashmir in the 1950s–70s. In 1971, the Indo–Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation—signed just before the Bangladesh Liberation War—amounted to a de facto security guarantee. At a time when the US and China backed Pakistan, the USSR stood firmly with India.

 

Importantly, Russia, unlike some Western powers, does not press India on domestic political issues such as human rights, religious freedom, or democratic standards. This makes the relationship politically less intrusive and more predictable.

 

Defence Cooperation: The Backbone of Ties

 

From the 1960s onwards, the Soviet Union became India’s main arms supplier. Over the decades, Moscow has supplied MiG and Sukhoi fighter jets, T-series tanks, submarines, helicopters, warships, missile systems, and more recently, the S-400 air defence system. Today, around 60–70% of India’s major military platforms are of Soviet/Russian origin.

 

Crucially, Russia has allowed joint production and licensed manufacturing—examples include the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile and the AK-203 assault rifle. Such technology sharing is rare among Western suppliers, who often impose restrictions or deny access to critical know-how. Russian equipment is generally more affordable and comes without overt political conditions. Long-term defence collaboration has also fostered enduring relationships between military and industrial elites on both sides.

 

Technology Transfers Beyond Defence

 

Russia’s willingness to share strategic technology extends beyond weapons. It played a central role in developing India’s civilian nuclear power sector, building the Kudankulam reactors. It leased India nuclear-powered submarines (INS Chakra) and has cooperated in space technology since 1975, when the USSR launched India’s first satellite, Aryabhata. Moscow trained Rakesh Sharma, India’s first astronaut, in 1984.

By contrast, despite signing the Indo–US Civil Nuclear Agreement in 2008, the US has yet to offer comparable technology transfers.

Geopolitical Alignment

India and Russia share a preference for a multipolar global order, resisting both Western interventionism and the unipolar dominance of any one power. This has translated into cooperation in forums like BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the G20.

However, Russia’s growing strategic alignment with China since 2022 complicates matters for India, given the unresolved border tensions with Beijing. Even so, New Delhi values Moscow as a counterweight in global diplomacy—especially as a partner willing to work outside Western-led frameworks.

Energy Cooperation

Energy is a recent but important pillar of the relationship. After Western sanctions on Moscow in 2022, Russia offered India steeply discounted crude oil. These purchases—priced $5–10 or more per barrel below market rates—have helped India manage inflation, reduce its current account deficit, and maintain economic stability amid volatile global energy markets.

By 2024, Russia had become one of India’s top crude suppliers. This arrangement benefits both countries: Russia finds a steady buyer for its sanctioned oil, while India secures affordable energy for its 1.4 billion citizens and growing industry.

 

Threats of Punitive Tariffs Against India are Unjustified

Moreover, there a number of reasons due to which the US threat of punitive tariffs against India is unjustified - on moral, legal and strategic grounds.

Under US Law or International Law there are no legal obligations for India not to buy Russian oil if it desires to do so. Clearly,  the US sanctions on Russia after the Ukraine war are unilateral, not UN-mandated. India is not legally bound to follow US domestic sanctions; it only follows UN Security Council resolutions, which in this case do not exist. Applying US domestic law extraterritorially to Indian trade with Russia appear to violate the principle of sovereign equality in the UN Charter.

Further, India Has Not Violated the G7 Price Cap. The US–EU–G7 'price cap' on Russian oil only applies if Western shipping, insurance, or financial services are used. India has been buying largely outside the Western services ecosystem, often paying in rupees, dirhams, or yuan. If India is purchasing at or below the cap, or outside its jurisdiction, there is no breach even of the G7’s own rules.

Furthermore, India's economic necessity and energy security needs requires India to purchase oil from the cheapest sources. India imports over 85% of its crude oil — it must diversify suppliers to avoid vulnerability. The US itself bought Russian crude (via intermediaries) for months after the war began — making it hard to claim a moral high ground. In fact, the US continues significant trade with other countries under sanctions e.g., buying Venezuelan oil in 2023–24 after easing sanctions. It is also well known that European allies of the US still import Russian LNG in large quantities. Hence, Washington’s ire should not be focused disproportionately on India’s crude purchases.

 

India's Actionable Roadmap in the Short Term

First, India must push back firmly but calmly in public and privately. It must publicly restate India’s energy security needs and legal position; privately engage US officials to explain constraints and seek de‑escalation. This reduces miscalculation and preserves channels for negotiation. 

Second, India must ask for waivers or a structured dialogue. It should propose a bilateral task force to discuss energy, sanctions compliance, and supply diversification timelines rather than immediate punitive measures. Diplomacy buys time and can limit economic shock.

Third, India must coordinate messaging with other countries facing the same pressure. It must work with similarly affected  partners - from the  G20 and BRICS - to highlight perceived double standards and to build diplomatic cover. Internationalizing the issue would raise the political cost of unilateral US tariffs. 

Fourth, India must consider activation of economic, legal and trade tools to contain the damage and assert its rights. Legal and technical arguments about extraterritoriality must be used to emphasize that US domestic tariffs targeted at India for third‑country purchases would be extraterritorial and legally contestable under WTO principles and norms of sovereign equality. Notably, the US price‑cap regime depends on access to Western shipping or insurance; it does not automatically bind India. Also,  India must prepare calibrated retaliatory measures as leverage - but hold them in reserve. Towards that end, a small list of US goods/services - where temporary counter‑measures would be politically effective and legally defensible - need to be identified. Announcing these as contingent on tariffs deters unilateral US action while keeping room for negotiation.

Fifth, supply‑chain and trade continuity for strategic sectors would need to be ensured. Exporters and service sectors likely to be hit by US tariffs, e.g. textiles, gems, auto components, would need to be helped  with contingency credit lines, expedited FTAs with EU/UK/others, and short‑term fiscal support - to reduce domestic shock. 

 

Recommended Future Strategic Moves to Reduce Vulnerability

Prudent diversification of oil suppliers would need to be accelerated. Concentration risk would need to be reduced by expanding contracts with the Middle East, US, West Africa and strategic swaps — while phasing purchases so as not to destabilize domestic fuel prices suddenly. Analysts say the Russian discount is narrowing, so diversification is becoming more feasible. 

Further, alternatives to Western shipping and insurance dependencies should be identified, where feasible. Insurance and finance arrangements with non‑coalition providers should be expanded, and financial messaging by  BRICS/others must to strengthened to keep trade flowing compliantly for critical imports.

Domestic energy transition and strategic reserves must be fast-tracked. Renewables, strategic petroleum reserves, and demand‑management must be invested in more so that energy choices are less hostage to geopolitics over time.

And most importantly, defence & strategic cooperation balance must be preserved. Towards that end, diversification of defence suppliers (the West and domestic industry) must be strengthened while keeping necessary Russian equipment serviceability guaranteed. This would help maintains strategic autonomy without isolating partners.

 

Conclusion : Punitive Tariffs are Not the Way to Deal with Friends

In conclusion, it must be said that punitive tariffs against India would be legally dubious, strategically counterproductive and unfair, given that Western allies themselves continue energy dealings with Russia. Clearly, India’s discounted oil imports from Russia are a pragmatic response to market realities, not an ideological endorsement of the latter's war or its strategic policies. Sanctions against India by disregarding its genuine economic concern can be perceived as an unfriendly act, and set back all the progress made in improving India-US relations in recent decades. After all, in 2022, there was bipartisan approval by the US House of Representatives to recommend the CAATSA waiver for India to purchase the S-400 air defence systems from Russia, which  signalled that the US valued its relations with India and was mindful of the latter's security concerns.

It needs no emphasis that India buys energy from Russia to keep the Indian people and industry secure. India complies with applicable international measures and expect major powers to avoid unilateral extraterritorial penalties that hurt global trade stability. to that extent, there is a need to convert disagreement into a diplomatic process rather than resort to punitive measures, which may end up as self-defeating in the long run.

And most importantly, such tariff threats over oil purchases ignore the broader US–India strategic partnership as well as the defence and technological cooperation that has been ongoing for the past two decades or so. The US would be aware that such antagonistic moves risk alienating a partner that the US itself needs to balance China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific.

(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK)

Defence