Iran's covert war: Inside the escalating spy recruitment drive in Israel

Iran seems to have sharply escalated its efforts to recruit spies within Israel since the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023. Over the past year, more than 30 Israelis have been charged with collaboration with Iranian intelligence, with reports of more than 40 arrests or expected charges in total. The Israeli security agency Shin Bet has noted a fourfold rise in espionage cases, revealing a disturbing scale of infiltration and raising questions about loyalty within Israeli society.

Iran’s intelligence services, including the Revolutionary Guards and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, have pursued what Israeli officials describe as a scattergun approach. Rather than carefully selecting a few well-placed individuals, they cast the net wide with low-risk offers of money, hoping some recruits would prove useful. The principal aim appears to be building a crowdsourced network capable of mapping potential targets for missile strikes while also fuelling division inside Israel. Although Tehran has largely failed to execute high-profile assassinations, the sheer volume of recruits willing to carry out small missions has provided it with a steady trickle of information. This includes details of ports, military bases and defence systems that could be exploited in future conflicts. Beyond military value, the operations are intended to undermine Israeli confidence and exploit fissures within society.

Agents generally target Israelis under financial strain, including those with gambling debts, bankruptcies, or criminal records. They also look for fresh immigrants with relatively weaker ties to the state. Another target group is the ultra-Orthodox Jews who are opposed to the concept of Zionism. Recruits have included secular and religious Jews, Arab citizens, soldiers, new arrivals from abroad, and even a settler from the West Bank.

Recruitment usually begins with anonymous messages on social media. Potential recruits are targeted with offers of cash in exchange for information that seems harmless, such as taking photos of street corners or delivering random packages. Once a recruit shows interest, agents encourage them to set up digital wallets or cryptocurrency accounts for payment. Other methods have included online ads for private detective services and phishing campaigns.

Early missions may involve checking for hidden bags in public places for sums near $1,000, distributing anti-government leaflets, or spraying graffiti with slogans comparing Benjamin Netanyahu to Hitler. Some are asked to photograph mundane scenes such as car dealerships or residential neighbourhoods. These small tasks test reliability and willingness. Once a target is hooked, demands will start escalating to taking photos of sensitive sites and military installations. Examples include Haifa port, the Nevatim airbase in the Negev, Iron Dome missile batteries, the Glilot intelligence headquarters, and strategic routes near military zones. Some recruits have been asked to rent flats with views of key facilities or to document security measures at checkpoints.

The next stage introduces riskier missions. These include setting cars on fire, damaging electricity lines with acid, transferring packages suspected to contain explosives and experimenting with crude devices using hairspray cans or fireworks. Others have been asked to purchase and install CCTV cameras aimed at defence officials’ homes or busy crossings. Such assignments not only gather intelligence but also test readiness for sabotage.

At the highest level, recruits have been tasked with assassination plots against senior officials and nuclear scientists. While none have succeeded, they reveal Iran’s determination to retaliate in the long-running shadow war with Israel. One recruit was offered $60,000 to kill a scientist at the Weizmann Institute and his family, along with instructions to burn their house. The plan collapsed when security guards intervened. Another was asked to plant a GPS tracker on a scientist’s car and later to consider hurling a petrol bomb at Netanyahu’s vehicle. In another case, a man was promised $100,000 and relocation abroad if he assassinated an Israeli professor. He was arrested before acquiring a sniper rifle.

 

Mordechai “Moti” Maman, a 72-year-old businessman who had suffered failed ventures, was lured by offers of quick money. Smuggled twice into Iran from Turkey, he met intelligence officials who paid him thousands of dollars for errands such as leaving money or guns at agreed spots, photographing crowded areas and passing messages. Over time, the offers escalated to $150,000 for the assassination of Netanyahu, Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar or Defence Minister Yoav Gallant. He demanded $1 million and discussed targeting former prime minister Naftali Bennett for $400,000. Arrested in August 2024, he pleaded guilty and received a 10-year sentence in April this year. His lawyer claimed he had acted out of fear and had not realised the link to Iran.

Two 24-year-olds from Haifa, Roy Mazrahi and Almoog Attias, illustrate the lure of money for those in debt. Addicted to gambling, they were recruited via a Telegram group and began with simple photography tasks before moving packages thought to be explosives. Their most dangerous mission involved installing CCTV aimed at the entrance road to Defence Minister Israel Katz’s home. They were arrested in May 2025. Another case involved 31-year-old Vladislav Victorson and his 19-year-old partner Anya Bernstein. Starting with graffiti for $600, they soon escalated to arson, acid sabotage, attempted bomb-making and eventually a conspiracy to murder a professor. Both were arrested in October 2024 and are currently on trial.

An 18-year-old named Moshe Attias was paid nearly $2,000 for photographing a hospital where Bennett was admitted. Posing as a relative, he noted security arrangements and passed them on. Other networks have included an Israeli of Azeri descent who recruited relatives to photograph sensitive sites later targeted by missiles, a seven-member “Haifa Cell” paid modest sums to document dozens of bases, and two reservists who sold Iron Dome data for as little as $50.

The Shin Bet has succeeded in foiling most operations before they caused damage. Over 25 cases involving online recruitment have been exposed, with many others disrupted in early stages. Public campaigns warn citizens that easy money leads to years in prison. Sentences, however, vary widely, and some legal experts argue they are too lenient to deter financially desperate recruits. Although Tehran has gained some superficial intelligence, most material has not translated into concrete attacks. Israel’s leadership stresses that no senior figure has been harmed, yet the scale of collaboration remains troubling.

Some analysts say Tehran’s partial success is the result of not just financial incentives but also stems from deeper fractures within Israel. Critics blame a social collapse, marked by divisions, protests and political turmoil.

Middle East