The lessons not learnt from Op Sindoor

ON May 7, 2025, Pakistan anticipated an imminent Indian strike. When the Indian Air Force (IAF) took to the skies, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was ready — well-rehearsed and strategically positioned. Remaining within its own airspace, the PAF engaged IAF aircraft as it was executing its operations. In the ensuing combat, the PAF downed some Indian jets, including a Rafale.

The causes remain murky: flawed technological assessments, possible intelligence lapses and misjudged trends in aerial warfare. In the aftermath, some aircraft were temporarily grounded. As acknowledged by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), India revised its strategy — shifting to precision strikes from the safety of standoff ranges using a variety of air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) available with the three armed forces.

These inflicted very significant damage on Pakistani assets and permitted us to rightly claim victory. Less than the desired number of aircraft squadrons did not impede the IAF and had no role to play.

Yet the IAF’s reluctance to acknowledge operational shortcomings whilst it is claiming it won every war and skirmish since Independence is not new — books abound on this subject. During the Balakot airstrikes in February 2019, deploying an outdated MiG-21 in a high-threat environment and facing F16s surely raised eyebrows and was not explained. The loss of an IAF helicopter to friendly fire — despite minimal aerial activity — was unacceptable poor preparation and training.

Similar issues resurfaced during Operation Sindoor. Despite possessing capable aircraft, the IAF aircraft were not able to break the PAF’s fighter defences or project strategic dominance.

The damage inflicted by ASMs, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and S-400 systems — while commendable — was largely detached from the performance of fighters, including the latest out-of-the-crate Rafale. This disconnect is a national strategic embarrassment that needs a critical examination at the highest level.

The key lesson from Op Sindoor and other engagements is that future air combat is likely to occur at standoff and beyond-visual-range (BVR) distances. Close dogfights are increasingly becoming obsolete.

In such scenarios, quantity, sensors and missile capability will matter more than expensive platforms. Lesser aircraft equipped with superior BVR weapons may suffice. With the availability of precision BrahMos and similar missiles that can cover almost every part of Pakistan from land or sea, the IAF’s primary role must be air combat and aerial supremacy. Let the strategic forces and other services attend to such tasks.

After initial setbacks, India’s political and military leadership allowed the IAF to recover lost ground through standoff missile assaults — safely launched from inside India, some 300 km behind the border.

The BrahMos missile, which caused the most damage, is also available to the Army and the Navy and would have achieved the same goals with similar results without risking air assets. Yet they were not employed. The IAF’s traditional role — airspace dominance — was not even attempted after the initial losses, and this is a matter of concern.

This raises a critical question: if future operations will rely on standoff weapons launched from safe distances in keenly contested domains infested with radars, drones, SAMs and S400 types, why invest in increasingly expensive aircraft that won’t cross borders or engage in close combat?

What India needs are longer-range airborne weapons such as air-to-air missiles and sensors — not costlier foreign platforms designed for an era that is being overtaken by technology and wouldn’t be relevant after a decade or two. Yes, we do need fifth and sixth-generation Indian aircraft.

Also, on an allied front, the Air Chief is even now fighting a rearguard action to persuade the Raksha Mantri away from jointness, that he has ordained and is the call of the day. These are pressing issues, even as the IAF continues to push for more Rafales and resist integration into joint theatre commands.

For decades, it has operated in isolation, seeking accolades without offering mutual support to the other services. Even the 1971 missile attack on Karachi went without air support. Post-Sindoor, the Air Chief has repeatedly sought access to the Raksha Mantri to revisit decisions — but has mercifully made little headway.

The Indian Army did a wonderful job on the front with SAM, drones, anti-drone operations and more during Op Sindoor but little has been written or appreciated, though paltry few drones or missiles trespassed into India.

The larger tragedy is that these debates are not new. The IAF has often been accused of overstating its achievements while underplaying its lapses.

Unless the service embraces transparency and accepts its evolving role within a joint framework, India risks repeating the same mistakes in a future conflict.

The world of airpower is shifting rapidly — towards drones, hypersonic and AI-enabled targeting. If the IAF clings to outdated notions of prestige platforms and solitary glory, it will not only squander scarce resources but also compromise national security.

These are pertinent issues today, even as the IAF increasingly continues its drumbeat of claimed victories. It is time for the IAF and its leadership to be held to account.

They must come clean — not just about the causes of recent setbacks and what they plan to do about it, but about the service’s evolving role in India’s strategic future, its acquisition priorities and its place in joint operations under theatre commands — if we are not to suffer in a future war.

Vice Admiral Harinder Singh (retd) is a former Deputy Chief of Naval Staff and Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Southern Naval Command.

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