India & The Taliban: A New Chapter In Asian Geopolitics

Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s week-long visit to New Delhi marks a watershed moment in South Asian diplomacy. The image of Muttaqi shaking hands with External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar would have been unthinkable just a few years ago. Yet, here it is—a powerful symbol of India’s pragmatic foreign policy and the Taliban’s hunger for legitimacy beyond Pakistan and China. India has opened its embassy in Kabul which may prove turning point in strengthening the ties in future.

India has upgraded its technical mission in Kabul into a full-fledged embassy, signalling a deeper engagement with the Taliban regime that seized power in August 2021. However, New Delhi continues to withhold formal recognition of the Taliban government, maintaining a calibrated diplomatic stance. In a reciprocal move, the Taliban has begun operating its embassy in New Delhi, marking a cautious yet pragmatic step in normalising working relations between the two sides.

A Remarkable Diplomatic Turnaround

After decades of hostility—stretching back to India’s backing of the Northern Alliance in the 1990s and continued engagement with the U.S.-supported Afghan republic—New Delhi has now chosen cautious outreach over isolation. The reopening of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, permission for Taliban officials to operate consulates in Mumbai and Hyderabad, and a series of high-level interactions in Dubai, New Delhi, and beyond all signal that India is ready to engage, though not yet to recognise.

This re-engagement is driven by clear strategic compulsions. India seeks to protect its long-standing investments in Afghanistan, worth over $3 billion in development aid. Roads, schools, and hospitals built by Indian engineers remain popular among Afghans, giving New Delhi immense soft power leverage.

Mutual Interests: Legitimacy for the Taliban, Access for India

For the Taliban, friendship with India offers multiple dividends. First, it breaks the isolation imposed by Western powers and Pakistan’s growing hostility. Second, it attracts much-needed economic and technical cooperation to stabilise Afghanistan’s battered economy. And third, it allows the Taliban to diversify its foreign relations beyond China and Pakistan, giving Kabul some strategic autonomy.

For India, Afghanistan is a vital link to Central Asia, where it has long sought energy and trade access. The Taliban’s willingness to revive the Chabahar–Zaranj–Delaram route could transform regional connectivity, bypassing Pakistan’s traditional blockade of Indian transit. This would give India a logistical bridge to Iran, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—enhancing its continental outreach in a manner China has long pursued through its Belt and Road Initiative.

The Pakistan Factor: Islamabad’s Strategic Setback

The most immediate fallout of India-Taliban engagement is visible in Pakistan, where the military establishment finds itself cornered. Once the Taliban’s chief patron, Pakistan now faces an increasingly hostile Kabul. The Taliban’s refusal to recognise the Durand Line, their tolerance of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) sanctuaries, and repeated cross-border clashes have shattered the myth of “strategic depth.”

Islamabad’s protest note to Kabul following Taliban condemnation of the recent Pahalgam terror attack on Indian pilgrims shows how the narrative has flipped. By publicly criticising terrorism in India, the Taliban sent a message that they are no longer beholden to Pakistan’s script. This opens a rare diplomatic space for New Delhi—an opportunity to neutralise a traditional adversary by engaging its former protégé.

Impact on China and the United States

China watches this evolving dynamic with a mix of anxiety and calculation. While Beijing has built a cautious economic relationship with the Taliban—mainly to secure its investments in the Mes Aynak copper mines and to prevent Uighur militancy spilling over—it remains wary of India gaining a foothold in Kabul. A stronger India-Afghanistan bond could complicate Beijing’s Western frontier strategy and dilute its influence in Central Asia.

The United States, though far removed militarily, cannot ignore this new equation. Washington’s chaotic withdrawal in 2021 left a vacuum that India is quietly filling—not to restore the old order, but to ensure Afghanistan does not again become a base for transnational terror. American policymakers might quietly welcome India’s engagement, seeing it as a stabilising alternative to Chinese and Pakistani dominance, even if formal endorsement remains unlikely.

Strategic Gains and Economic Possibilities

The potential economic benefits for both sides are significant. India’s pharmaceutical, construction, and IT sectors could find new markets in Afghanistan, while the Taliban could access affordable goods and training for its nascent bureaucracy. Joint working groups on trade, transit, and humanitarian relief are reportedly under discussion.

The revival of the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline could also regain momentum if Kabul assures the security of the route. Energy-starved India stands to benefit, while the Taliban could earn steady transit revenue—providing an incentive to maintain regional peace.

Future Challenges and Cautionary Notes

However, optimism must be tempered by realism. India’s engagement comes without formal recognition, reflecting concerns over the Taliban’s oppressive domestic policies—especially their denial of women’s education and work rights. The recent controversy in New Delhi, when women journalists were barred from a Taliban press conference, reminded Indian policymakers of the reputational risks involved.

Security remains another red flag. India wants concrete guarantees that anti-India groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed will not be allowed to operate on Afghan soil. The Taliban’s track record here is mixed: while it opposes Islamic State-Khorasan, it has been ambivalent toward Pakistan-backed terror outfits.

Regional Implications: A Balancing Act in Asia

The India-Taliban rapprochement may quietly redefine Asian geopolitics. It introduces a new triangular balance—India, the Taliban, and Iran—capable of countering the China-Pakistan axis. If managed prudently, it could stabilise Central Asia and reduce the security vacuum exploited by extremist groups. Yet, it also poses risks of friction with Western allies and potential backlash from women’s rights groups within India and abroad.

For New Delhi, the challenge will be to maintain a policy of calibrated engagement—trading development aid and diplomatic access for security cooperation and counterterrorism assurances, without crossing the line into endorsement of an unrecognised regime.

The Road Ahead

As Amir Khan Muttaqi departs New Delhi after his week-long stay, both sides know this new partnership is born of necessity, not affection. For India, it is a matter of securing its western flank and economic interests. For the Taliban, it is a path toward partial legitimacy and strategic diversification.

In a region long dominated by mistrust and militarism, this pragmatic diplomacy could turn into a stabilising force—if both parties resist the temptations of old alignments. Afghanistan’s neutrality and India’s cautious engagement might, together, open a rare window for peace and cooperation in an otherwise turbulent Asian landscape.

(Writer is strategic affairs columnist and senior political analyst based in Shimla)

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