What Indian military can learn from Ukraine's optimisation of drone warfare
Drone warfare has rapidly transformed military operations, emphasising remote combat power as a deciding factor in both conventional and asymmetric conflicts. From the Nagorno-Karabakh war to the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war and even the recent India-Pakistan conflict, the employment of drones—spanning inexpensive quadcopters to advanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs), and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs)—has shifted the calculus of battlefield dominance. Drones and anti-drone systems now form the foundation of new approaches to warfighting. Their lethal effect multiplies when used as AI-controlled swarms or paired with precision-guided munitions such as cruise missiles. Today, even non-state actors and weaker protagonists rely on drones to counter conventional disadvantages.
For India, drones represent a critical component of military modernisation. The Indian military is inducting a spectrum of drones, ranging from locally produced First Person View quadcopter drones (FPVs) at the tactical level to imported Predator unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) for higher echelon tasks, integrating these assets with electronic warfare (EW), air defence, and anti-drone technologies to meet current and future security challenges.
Ukraine’s innovative deployment of drones as an equaliser against Russia’s larger military machine offers vital lessons and highlights the evolving character of modern warfare. Despite initial predictions of rapid defeat, Ukraine’s resilience, driven by rapid scaling and home-grown development of drones—procuring from a few thousand units in 2023 to an aspired 4.5 million by 2025—offers a template for India facing technologically advanced adversaries and diverse terrains.
Ukraine’s optimisation of drone warfare
Ukraine’s transformation of drones from ISR tools into a decisive component across manoeuvre, firepower, and logistics has revolutionised its military doctrine. Several key elements define this optimization:
Centralised control and coordination
The creation of an Unmanned Systems Force (USF)—a dedicated drone warfare branch—unifies drone operations across domains, manages procurement and R&D, coordinates training, and partners with a vast network of domestic producers. USF command posts and AI-enabled data analysis facilitate swift decision-making, embedding drones deeply within operational planning and execution.
Mass production and rapid innovation
Ukraine’s “Army of Drones” and the Brave1 technology cluster harness the agility of hundreds of small firms and volunteer groups, enabling mass production and rapid battlefield-driven innovation cycles. Design adaptations, which once took years, now materialise within weeks. FPV kamikaze drones that cost just a few hundred dollars are routinely neutralising million-dollar armoured targets, revealing the cost-effectiveness and disruptive power of inexpensive technologies.
Full integration into the kill chain
Drones in Ukraine’s arsenal enable sensor-to-shooter cycles as short as 3–5 minutes for artillery or HIMARS strikes. Persistent quadcopters maintain continuous surveillance of enemy assets, logistics routes, and rear echelons, transforming targeting and battle damage assessment into a real-time, precision enterprise.
Diversification of drone types
Ukraine employs a wide array of specialised platforms:
FPV Kamikaze drones: Low-cost, high-speed systems fitted with high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) or thermobaric warheads for anti-armor and trench operations.
Loitering munitions: These, like Warmate, are used for deep interdiction and targeted strikes.
Long-range UAVs: Platforms such as Bober and UJ-22 conduct strategic attacks on logistics hubs and high-value infrastructure deep within the adversary's lines.
Naval drones: Assets like Magura V5 and Sea Baby have inflicted substantial losses on the adversary's Black Sea Fleet.
ISR drones: Fixed-wing systems provide persistent observation, especially in heavily jammed electronic warfare environments.
Advanced EW adaptation
To survive heavy jamming, Ukraine uses frequency-hopping, strong encryption, backup analog controls, and mesh networking. Counter-drone teams neutralise enemy drones while protecting domestic assets, highlighting the importance of electronic resilience and adaptive tactics.
Night and all-weather capability
Thermal imaging-equipped FPVs enable continuous 24x7 operations, leveraging low-visibility conditions to bypass enemy defences. Robust designs guarantee functionality in severe weather, including snow, rain, and strong winds.
Integration with other arms
Drones are omnipresent companions: Artillery batteries pair with drones for targeting and post-strike assessment. Infantry benefits from embedded drone teams for reconnaissance, minefield mapping, and grenade deployment. Mechanised units employ drone overwatch against anti-tank ambushes.
Decentralised doctrine and training
Brigade-level drone schools prepare operators for FPV piloting, EW survival, and precision strikes. Continuous training absorbs attrition and keeps the workforce current with technological advancements.
Psychological and strategic impact
Constant surveillance and precision strikes have eroded the adversary's troop morale. Strategic, deep cross-border attacks showcase Ukraine’s capacity to impose significant costs well beyond the frontline, underscoring drones’ role in psychological warfare.
Lessons for India: Building a drone-centric capability
The Ukraine war demonstrates that drones are not auxiliary but central to modern military capacity. India faces technologically advanced adversaries across varied terrain—the Himalayas, deserts, cities, and the Indian Ocean—and must institutionalise drone warfare as a core capability across all wings of the military.
Organisational reforms
A Joint Drone Warfare Directorate under the CDS should be formed for standardisation, acquisition, and doctrine development. Army battalions would benefit from integrated drone platoons with ISR, FPV, and counter-drone elements, while brigades should house unmanned-effects' companies equipped for swarms and EW. Operational Corps should manage long-range ISR and strike through dedicated Drone & EW Groups. The Air Force should optimise for deep-strike, loyal wingman roles, and swarm integration, while the Navy needs USV and UUV squadrons for coastal defence and maritime strike operations.
Equipment modernisation
A layered system is essential. These should include:
Strategic drones for deep strikes (1,000–2,000 km range); operational drones at brigade levels for loitering munitions, relay UAVs, and EW-hardened ISR; and tactical drones which include FPV kamikaze systems and modified commercial off-the-shelf assets.
Maritime drones for anti-ship and mine operations.
Counter-drone systems with passive sensors, jammers, and hard-kill weapons complete the ecosystem.
Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTPs)
TTPs should prioritise kill-chain compression—target identification to strike within five minutes. Training must prepare for GNSS-denied environments using inertial navigation and frequency-hopping. Swarm tactics, such as FPV swarms and decoy deployments, should overwhelm defences. Rear-area protection by hardening logistics bases and deploying mobile teams, and the formation of USV "wolf packs" for maritime operations are necessary innovations.
Training and human capital
A multi-tier training pipeline is required:
Tier 1: Four-week foundation for FPV pilots.
Tier 2: Six-week advanced operator training.
Tier 3: Four-week counter-drone specialisation.
Additional simulation-based training for EW scenarios and FPV swarm coordination, alongside specialised courses for repair and battlefield upgrades, ensure a resilient, adaptive human capital base.
Industrial ecosystem
Public–private partnerships must mirror Ukraine’s “Army of Drones,” fostering collaboration between startups, established industry, and defence public sector undertakings. iDEX programs should focus on challenging environments—high-altitude endurance, low-signature FPVs, and direct energy countermeasures. Innovation cells embedded in operational units enable fast prototyping and field-driven evolution.
Policy and legal framework
Rapidly updating rules of engagement for AI-assisted lethal actions is critical. Cybersecurity for UAS control and robust data protection standards must anchor operational trust. Policy must keep pace with the speed of technological and doctrinal change.
Metrics for success
Success should be quantified. For example:
Sortie rates per brigade, per day.
Sensor-to-strike kill-chain durations, aiming for sub-5 minute cycles.
Cost-benefit ratios, comparing drone loss versus target value.
EW resilience, tracked by mission success rates under jamming.
Innovation tempo, measured as days from field feedback to operational upgrade.
Conclusion
It appears the outcomes in future warfare will depend on how effectively drones are leveraged at scale, speed, and with adaptability. The emergence of AI-guided, multi-domain drones—as both offensive and counter-drone assets—heralds a paradigm shift. Ukraine’s experience underlines that battlefield success is built on institutional agility, relentless innovation, and integrated operations, not technology alone. For India, establishing dedicated drone units in formations, investing in versatile equipment, developing robust TTPs, and sustaining innovation with industry and academia form the bedrock for future dominance. A modular, scalable, and joint ecosystem will deliver India a vital asymmetric edge, deterring adversaries and securing its interests in forthcoming conflicts.
The writer was Vice Chief of the Indian Army.
Defence