OPINION | Continuing risk of war due to Pakistan’s compulsive acts of terrorism against India
Image of Pakistan Army personnel used for representation | X
In May 2025, India launched punitive military operations in response to a major cross-border terror attack orchestrated by Pakistan’s “deep state”—the nexus between the Pakistani Army and its terrorist proxies. The result was a four-day armed conflict between two nuclear-armed neighbours, highlighting a recurring and destabilising pattern that has persisted for over three decades. Pakistan’s routine attempts to foment terror on Indian soil, believing itself shielded by nuclear deterrence, have led to an atmosphere of persistent tension and periodic violence along the India-Pakistan frontier. Following this latest conflict, and Pakistan’s subsequent diplomatic inroads with countries such as the United States and Saudi Arabia, under the enduring patronage of China, the risk of renewed and escalated confrontation has grown markedly.
Causes for compulsive terrorism by Pakistan
Ideological foundation of the State
Pakistan’s state identity is rooted in religious nationalism, having been founded on the basis that Indian Muslims required a separate homeland. The survival and thriving of a secular, democratic India with a substantial Muslim minority undermines Pakistan’s founding logic. Maintaining animosity with India—especially regarding Kashmir—justifies both Pakistan’s separate identity and the dominance of its military apparatus.
Role of the Pakistan Army
The Pakistani Army constitutes the core of state power. Genuine peace with India would diminish the military’s political supremacy and threaten its substantial defence budget. By keeping the India threat alive and utilising terrorism as a deniable, cost-effective tool, the army consolidates its internal relevance, secures external funding (notably from China), and maintains cohesion under its command. Terrorism thus becomes an expedient instrument of state policy, keeping India unsettled and sustaining the army’s primacy.
Strategic asymmetry and proxy war doctrine
After successive defeats in conventional warfare—1947-48, 1965, 1971, and the Kargil conflict of 1999—Pakistan recognised its inability to overpower India militarily. From the 1980s, under Zia-ul-Haq’s doctrine of “bleed India with a thousand cuts,” Pakistan institutionalised terrorism through its ISI. This approach aimed to destabilise Jammu and Kashmir, internationalise the dispute, and seek strategic parity with India, even as the latter’s economic and military strengths underwent extensive growth.
Radicalisation and use of jihadist proxies
Pakistan’s state apparatus nurtured Islamist militant groups—like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Hizbul Mujahideen—as strategic “assets.” These organisations fuelled cross-border terrorism, supported the regime’s ideological narrative, and provided leverage against India. Over time, dismantling this jihadist infrastructure has grown exceedingly risky for Pakistan, threatening both regime legitimacy and internal security, thus rendering the state unwilling and unable to dispense with these terrorist groups.
Domestic political utility
Whenever Pakistan’s civilian government faces legitimacy crises, anti-India rhetoric and terrorist activities become rallying devices to bolster nationalist feelings and divert public attention. The “Kashmir issue” serves as an emotive unifier, crossing lines of ethnicity and political factionalism within Pakistan, and reinforcing domestic regime stability.
Pakistan’s manipulation and global impunity
Pakistan has excelled at international diplomatic manoeuvring to evade serious repercussions for its support of terrorism. With steadfast backing from China and deft manipulation of the geopolitical, financial, and religious dynamics, Pakistan has repeatedly persuaded key global players to overlook its use of terrorism as a tool of statecraft. A recent example involved the Pakistani Army Chief, widely believed to be the mastermind behind the deadly attack against Indian civilian tourists, being received at the White House and showcased as a valuable partner in resource talks, underscoring Pakistan’s ability to deflect international censure.
Possibility of the next round of conflict
Multiple developments render another round of conflict as a distinct possibility. Pakistan’s improved ties with the US—at a moment when India-US relations appear strained—offer it a strategic confidence boost. Although the May 2025 conflict ended badly for Pakistan (with 11 air bases struck by India), Pakistan quickly spun a narrative of early military successes, including the downing of Indian aircraft, to save face domestically and internationally.
Moreover, the signing of a Saudi-Pakistan Defence Agreement has enhanced Pakistan’s esteem in the Islamic world, emboldening its stance against India. Simultaneously, Pakistan has promoted conspiracy theories implicating India in attacks by anti-Pakistan groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA). Inside India, growing public impatience for more decisive retaliation compounds the risks of swift escalation in any future confrontation.
How should India prepare for the next round
Operation Sindoor and subsequent events have underscored the necessity for India to sustain constant vigilance against its neighbour’s reliance on terrorism as policy. Clear lessons from past engagements must be incorporated into India’s future security strategy: military preparedness, modernisation, and the adoption of a proactive, technology-centric defence posture are imperative for deterrence and rapid response.
Strategic and doctrinal shift
India should maintain its doctrine of proactive deterrence, firmly signalling that every terrorist attack will provoke robust, overt military retaliation. State-sponsored terrorism must be reclassified not merely as a criminal act, but as an act of war—warranting tangible penalties upon Pakistan’s military-terrorist complex and its wider economic interests. This posture will require India to sustain high levels of preparedness, ready for protracted conflict, while avoiding any complacency that could tempt Pakistan’s deep state into further aggression under its nuclear umbrella.
Border and economic security
India must be alert to unconventional threats, including attempts at economic sabotage or attacks on critical infrastructure. Vulnerable regions—including Jammu, Kargil, and Sir Creek—warrant heightened military and intelligence focus due to their susceptibility to infiltration and terror strikes. Civilian and military targets alike must be protected against both direct and proxy attacks.
Strategic communications and deterrence
India must consistently signal to Pakistan, and the international community, its willingness and capacity to retaliate forcefully to any provocation—militarily, politically, and economically. This messaging should clarify that India recognises Pakistan’s ongoing military modernisation, including its pursuit of tactical nuclear arms, and is prepared to counter any such miscalculations with decisive, measured responses.
Modernisation, technology, and self-reliance
To face the demands of 21st-century warfare, India must develop an agile, networked military force capable of acting swiftly under a nuclear overhang. Modernisation should prioritise advanced precision munitions, drone integration, C4ISR (“Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance”), robust air and anti-drone defences, and real-time cyber and space operational capabilities. Indigenous equipment production must be advanced to secure operational autonomy and to support the growth of India’s domestic defence industry.
Jointness and interoperability
A unified military response to emerging threats requires deeper integration among the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Initiatives such as Integrated Theatre Commands, institutionalised joint training, and regular large-scale multi-domain exercises must proceed urgently. Strong political backing and legal reform will accelerate this process, ensuring that India’s armed forces can act cohesively and powerfully in any conflict scenario.
Conclusion
The persistence of terror as an instrument of Pakistani policy is deeply rooted in its civil-military imbalance and entrenched jihadist networks. Until Pakistan addresses these internal issues, its compulsion towards terrorism is unlikely to wane. India, for its part, must impose clear costs on Pakistan for its continued support of terrorism, up to and including threats to Pakistan’s own stability. At the same time, India must seek broader international support to ensure that Pakistan is compelled to recognise the dire repercussions of exporting terror—both for regional peace and its own future stability.
(The writer was Vice Chief of the Indian Army)
(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK)
Defence