Pahalgam terror attack: Why is India's move to hold Indus Water Treaty in 'abeyance' a huge strategic shift against Pak?

In light of the terrorist attack in the Baisaran Valley of Pahalgam, India’s decision to hold the Indus Water Treaty in 'abeyance' signals a firm stance against cross-border aggression in the form of a dramatic shift in the region’s hydropolitics.

 

Signed on September 19, 1960, by then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Field Marshal Ayub Khan, under the auspices of the World Bank, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) carefully delineates control over the Indus river system, granting India rights over the Eastern Rivers – Ravi, Beas and Sutlej, while reserving the Western Rivers – Indus, Jhelum and Chenab for Pakistan, with the former permitted limited usage for hydropower and irrigation. As the lower riparian in the Indus river system, Pakistan has long harboured deep-seated concerns over its water security, given India’s upstream position.

 

Notably, this is not the first instance where India has reconsidered the Indus Waters Treaty, in light of security concerns. Following the 2016 Uri attack, India threatened to revoke the treaty, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi declaring that “blood and water cannot flow together.” 

 

India’s evolving stance under Prime Minister Narendra Modi reflects a broader strategic recalibration, not merely as a reaction to the recent terror attacks, but as part of a deliberate reassessment of the Indus Waters Treaty and its hydro-strategic leverage, proactively aligning water security, national interest, and diplomatic strategy.

 

After the Uri attack, India decided to restart the Tulbul project on the Jhelum river in the Kashmir Valley, previously suspended considering Pakistan's objections.

 

The mandatory annual meeting of the IWT commissioners had become irregular after the 2019 Pulwama attack and the last meeting took place in May 2022, indicating IWT's purpose of cooperation is lost except its arbitration part. At the meeting between the two commissioners of the Permanent Commission on Indus Waters (PCIW) in March 2022, Pakistan raised objections over 10 hydropower projects. Pakistan decided to invoke Article 9 of the IWT,  which provides for the resolution of differences and disputes through various international forums of arbitration, over the 1,000MW Pakal Dal hydropower project on the Chenab river. It considers the design of the 330MW Kishanganga project on the Jhelum and the 850MW Ratle project on the Chenab, a violation of the Indus Water Treaty.  

 

Dissatisfied with Pakistan’s protracted complaints process and the delays surrounding its Kishanganga and Ratle hydropower projects, India advocated for amending the IWT to enable swifter resolution of bilateral water disputes. On January 25, 2023, India formally notified Pakistan, demanding treaty modifications and accusing it of repeatedly acting against the spirit and objectives of the agreement. Pakistan, however, dismissed the prospect of abrogation, citing its lower riparian status and its critical dependence on the Indus river system. This diplomatic exchange signalled a significant shift in India’s stance, marking a turning point that set the stage for future escalations in water diplomacy.

 

Both countries meanwhile have been pursuing two different conflict-resolution options. The two processes were unleashed concurrently, whereby Pakistan took its case to the arbitration court in the Hague under Article IX of the treaty. India proceeded with the appointment of neutral experts. The IWT’s clauses dealing with the appointment of neutral experts or the International Court of Arbitration and the honest broker’s role for the World Bank are unique to IWT, and mostly absent in other regional transboundary water agreements.

 

Although the Treaty allocated three western rivers to Pakistan, India was entitled to draw up to 3.6 million acre-feet (MAF) from their waters. Yet, for decades, India refrained from constructing major storage dams, a stance that could be viewed either as an exercise in restraint or a missed opportunity—depending on perspective. 

 

An assertive infrastructure strategy also aligns with India's entitlements under the treaty framework, in addition to catering for a rapidly expanding population and demand for a more efficient and sustainable energy strategy to meet future needs.

 

This recalibrated approach is evident in India’s major infrastructure projects aimed at fully utilizing its eastern rivers share. These include the Shahpur Kandi Dam on the Ravi river, completed in 2024, the Makaura Pattan barrage under the second Ravi-Beas link in Punjab, and the Ujh Dam project on the Ujh river in Jammu and Kashmir. The Shahpur Kandi barrage, long mired in political disputes, remained incomplete for years, allowing a significant portion of river Ravi’s waters to continue flowing into Pakistan—until now. Despite being declared a national project in 2008, its construction faced repeated delays, and it was only after central intervention in 2018 that the deadlock was finally broken, paving the way for its long-awaited completion. 

 

With the completion of the Shahpur Kandi barrage, waters of the Ravi, which had continued to flow into Pakistan, will instead irrigate farmland in Jammu and Kashmir’s Kathua and Samba districts. Additionally, the region will receive 20 per cent of the hydel power generated from the dam’s 206MW capacity.

 

These developments not only optimize India’s water entitlements under the treaty but also serve the agricultural and energy needs of Punjab and northern hill states, reinforcing India's push toward self-sufficiency and strategic resource management.

 

Pakistan has rejected India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty and reiterating its binding nature asserted that “Any attempt to stop or divert the flow of water belonging to Pakistan as per the Indus Waters Treaty, and the usurpation of the rights of lower riparian will be considered as an Act of War.” 

 

Ismail Serageldin’s warning that “the wars of the next century will be fought over water,” resonates now more than ever. The aftermath of the Pahalgam terror attack has thrust the Indus Waters Treaty into sharp focus, revealing its dual role as both a lifeline and a geopolitical instrument. While India cannot immediately block the flow of water, it does have the capacity to regulate it in ways that could harm Pakistan’s agriculture and economy. As Pakistan seeks World Bank intervention, India's decision to hold the Indus Water Treaty in 'abeyance' raises intricate legal dilemmas, exacerbated by the treaty’s lack of an exit clause. Beyond legal complexities and security concerns, the treaty demands institutional reassessment through the lenses of ecology and climate change, and as a potent force in shaping international relations. 

 

While water remains an essential resource, India’s measured actions underscore its prerogative to safeguard national security and reassess agreements that no longer serve its interests in the current geopolitical landscape. By halting the unilateral concessions historically extended to Pakistan, India signals a shift toward a more assertive approach, reinforcing its commitment to self-preservation and equitable resource management on its terms.

 

These complexities underscore the strategic significance of hydro-diplomacy, reinforcing its intersection with national security. 

Vaishali Basu Sharma is a security and economic affairs analyst. 

 

India