Get the awaam on board in Kashmir

THE crack of an AK-47 rifle shot is a deafening 150-160 decibels at point-blank range. Opened recently for tourists with its remoteness touted as its USP, the Baisaran meadow — 7 km southeast of Pahalgam — had no security personnel deployed to protect the hundreds enjoying a balmy afternoon on the verdant greens. The nearest CRPF post was an hour’s journey away on a precipitous, muddy pony track. The tourism authorities had fenced the meadow, constructing a ticketed entry gate. Armed terrorists in military fatigues and salwar-kameez virtually took control of the entry/exit gates and herded unsuspecting tourists to carry out targeted killings.

Questions arise about Pahalgam’s draw as a tourism hub and about its safety for visitors keen on a sojourn in ‘paradise’. Pahalgam is located at the junction of the fabled ‘Y’ shaped Lidder river valley at a height of 7,200 ft. It has been a ‘village of shepherds’ for Gujjar-Bakarwals. The two arms of the ‘Y’ are the rugged Aru sub-valley on your left and the Betaab sub-valley on your right. Aru is preferred by trekkers/mountaineers, while Betaab leads to Chandanwari — the roadhead for the Amarnath Yatra. Among the other sub-valleys is the hilltop Baisaran meadow with breathtaking views of Pahalgam and the forested mountains, snows, mists and mellow fruitfulness of the Lidder valley.

The security establishment has always been aware that this valley is hemmed in its west and southwest by densely forested and remote hills and valleys, of which Kokarnag, Tral and Khirim stand out as terrorist havens, as also the Warwan valley in the east. This is where overground workers provide them logistics and information support without which terrorism cannot flourish. Security agencies know from bitter experience that large-scale ‘jungle bashing’ is a wasteful and demoralising activity, more so as technical intelligence is rendered void due to serious terrain constraints. Thus, a general search of remote areas is a strict no-no and is better executed by surprise domination of select areas for limited periods. It is thus human intelligence that remains the key to success in anti-terror operations.

Wise nations can at best plan to lower the terror frequency to acceptable limits by getting their awaam firmly on board. The aam aadmi intuitively supports the stronger side. We need to be stronger, and this demands as much if not more effort than linear retribution does. It also demands that retribution does not run counter to a people-friendly approach. The high-grade hard intelligence needed for successful anti-terror operations primarily comes from the people, an empirical truth often sacrificed at the altar of populist, headline-grabbing retaliation.

In his 2000 bestseller The Tipping Point, Malcolm Gladwell said small things can make a big difference. Apply his theory to Kashmir and you get the new ‘normal’ — adopting Intezamia, Jawan aur Awaam and Aman hai Muqaam as the state policy.

Musings