Op Sindoor takeaway: No going back from the new normal

ON May 12, Prime Minister Narendra Modi briefed the nation on the outcome of Operation Sindoor. Even more important, he laid out a robust doctrine to give effect to his long-standing vision of “zero tolerance” for terrorism. That the PM chose Buddha Jayanti or Vesakh for his speech was a message that India was not a reckless war-mongering country, but wanted to secure her people and live in peace.

Amidst the information warfare, the military briefings over the past three days — restrained, shorn of hyperbole and backed by evidence — have helped convey the correct picture. No military campaign is open-ended. Each has a set of objectives. The PM’s address was an unambiguous statement on the achievement of Operation Sindoor’s political and military objectives.

A categorical assertion of success is not just a need for reassuring the nation. It is also an important element of deterrence. Any ambiguity on the assessment of the military outcome in Pakistan, as we have seen in the past, leads to the pursuit of higher and dangerously risky ambitions on both terrorism and Jammu and Kashmir.

The Prime Minister has laid out three pillars of deterrence — continuation of Operation Sindoor, a new doctrine, and conditions relating to talks, trade and water. The operation has not ended, just paused. This involves a force posture and a state of readiness that gives credibility to India’s position.

In the age of modern warfare, with reliance on drones, missiles and layered air defence systems, combined with sophisticated image and technical intelligence, this can be done at a relatively lower cost than was incurred during Operation Parakram in 2002. Similarly, this operation has shown vast improvement in the military’s capacity for rapid mobilisation and a sharp reduction in response time.

The central pillar is the new doctrine with three elements. The first is the evolution of a robust strategy since the Uri attack in 2016. There will be a strong response to each terrorist attack. If Pakistan responds militarily, India will maintain escalation dominance and prevail in the conflict. There will be strategic ambiguity on the scale, nature and impact of a terrorist attack that will trigger a response. Equally, there will always be an element of surprise, without repetition, on the timing, pattern and instrument of India’s retaliation.

Our response after Pulwama and Pahalgam drew a distinction between terrorists and the military. The doctrine erases the differences between terrorists and Pakistan state sponsors after a brazen participation of senior military leaders in the funeral of slain internationally recognised terrorists. This element places the responsibility on Pakistan’s state and military for any act of terrorism against India.

The element that made the headlines is the rejection of nuclear blackmail. After India and Pakistan declared themselves nuclear weapons states in 1998, Pakistan has intensified cross-border terrorism in the belief that India will desist from conventional military retaliation to avoid the prospects of escalation into a nuclear conflict — thus giving Pakistan the space to pursue a low-intensity conflict with India under the nuclear shield. In this it also drew lessons from some of the war games played out by experts in the West, which demonstrated a high probability of a conventional war escalating into a nuclear exchange.

Unlike India, which declared its nuclear doctrine soon after becoming a nuclear weapons state, Pakistan has had no official doctrine. There are declaratory statements with differing thresholds at various points of time for the use of nuclear weapons, which, although not officially stated, also includes the possibility of the first use, starting with Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, then Director General of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, in January 2002. By 2011, Pakistan also changed its doctrine from credible minimum deterrence to full-spectrum deterrence and began diversifying its weapons and delivery systems to include strategic, tactical and operational weapons.

While this may suggest a lower threshold of use for tactical and operational weapons against our conventional forces, it is also not clear if Pakistan has operationalised it and achieved the required level of integration of nuclear and conventional forces. Pakistan’s posture, coupled with its internal dynamics and proclivity for threats, should be a concern to the international community, not India’s counter-terrorism response.

The Prime Minister has, nonetheless, clearly conveyed that Pakistan’s nuclear threats and its capacity to generate international alarm will not deter India from taking punitive conventional measures in response to terror attacks.

Nuclear weapons are usually not war-fighting instruments, but guarantors of state survival, and thresholds for use are usually high. In the Ukraine war nuclear threats were not implemented despite the declared red lines being crossed. India will, of course, keep a close eye, as it must, on Pakistan’s nuclear forces and assets, and will also have a ready list of counterforces and countervalue targets.

Pakistan is also aware of India’s doctrine that could inflict an unacceptable cost on it. Before and during Operation Sindoor, India acted with great restraint in the face of nuclear bluster from Pakistan. As a responsible nuclear weapons state, India would also be very careful not to target nuclear facilities in a conventional military operation. This was clearly stated in our military briefing.

The address also unequivocally rejected any dialogue or cooperation with Pakistan, including on rivers, as long as it continues with terrorism. Equally, the PM dismissed any third-party role in reaching a pause in the current operations and ruled out any prospects of international mediation. India has never accepted it and will not, going forward.

The new strategy will entail heightened risks. Pakistan may attempt to test the resolve of the new doctrine. There will be the increased burden of defence investments and preparedness, even as we keep an eye on the northern border and our seas. We will also have to protect international economic confidence. Our diplomacy will have to resist efforts to raise international alarms about a major conflict and the temptation to mediate a long-term solution to J&K. There are concerns about re-hyphenation. But we must focus on the fact that the two countries are far apart on every attribute of power and on different trajectories of growth. At the same time, India won’t lose sight of the PM’s original vision of peace and prosperity in South Asia.

India has reached this point after going through decades of trying every other means to seek international scrutiny and accountability from Pakistan, and force a change in its behaviour. Even though history has shown the limits of military force in dismantling terrorism, from Sahel to Middle East to Afghanistan, there is now no going back from the new normal.

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