The politics of Palestine in European Union

A man holds a Palestinian flag as he watches displaced Gazans crossing the Netzarim corridor from the southern Gaza Strip | AFP

In a very telling post on X, French President Emmanuel Macron on April 11, 2025 wrote - “Here is France’s position—it is clear: Yes to peace. Yes to Israel’s security. Yes to a Palestinian state without Hamas”, calling for a resolution of the conflict and reiterating the support for two-state solution. Further, President Macron’s declaration that France could recognise the Palestinian state points towards changing dynamics within the European Union. This development also needs to viewed with the earlier recognition of Palestine by Spain, Norway and Ireland in 2024, highlighting the emerging consensus on the statehood. Additionally, many European countries such as Belgium are also discussing the possibility of recognising the statehood. This raises the question whether this move is influenced by the changing geopolitics of the region or is being driven by the domestic pressure.

Looking at the larger picture of the European Union member states on the issue of the Palestinian state —first are those member states that recognised Palestine under Soviet rule such as Poland, Hungary, Czech republic etc. Although Budapest, since then, has distanced itself from its position, as was visible in its rejection of Palestinian membership vote at the UNGA in May 2024.

Second, as far as the EU is concerned, its position was emphasised in 1999 where it pointed towards “the continuing and unqualified Palestinian right to self-determination... convinced that the creation of a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State...would be the best guarantee of Israel's security and Israel's acceptance as an equal partner in the region”. It goes on declare its “readiness to consider the recognition of a Palestinian State in due course.” Further, in 2014, the European Parliament adopted a resolution for “in principle recognition of Palestinian statehood and the two state solution”. Moreover, the EU remains the largest provider of external assistance with €1.177 billion multi-annual financial allocation for Palestine, under the European Joint Strategy 2021-2024.

Third are those member states that have recently recognised the Palestinian state such as Norway, Spain and Ireland justifying their position that there can be “no peace in the Middle East without a two-state solution.” There are other member states that have voiced their intentions to recognise the Palestinian state in coming months such as France and Belgium. It needs to be carefully analysed as to what is leading the European nations to recognise Palestinian state—is it to add momentum to the political process of recognition; or is it stemming from their critical position on the situation in Gaza; or is it a response to the mounting domestic pressure.

Decoding the response

The European Union nations are under stress on the issue of the Israel-Gaza as this conflict has exposed the divisions within the EU. While the EU unanimously condemned the October 7, 2023 attacks by Hamas and called for immediate cessation of violence, this initial unanimity was short-lived as divergences in national interests and varied perceptions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict emerged. Divisions emerged due to the concerns raised by some member states regarding the position taken by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen where she was accused of ‘unacceptable bias towards Israel’. Another was the launch of review of its financial assistance to Palestine to ensure that it is not indirectly enabling the terrorist organisations to carry out attacks on Israel. This was followed by conflicting statements by the EU on whether the aid has been suspended or not. However, some member states such as Germany halted their aid to Palestine pending financial review. This was criticised by other member states such as Spain, which called the decision as ‘betrayal of European values’. Also, in the wake of Israeli charges that some of UNRWA’s employees participated in the attacks of the October 7 massacre, EU member states were split on the question of whether to freeze UNRWA’s funding. The EU declared it would review the funding, some of its member states such as Germany, Italy, the Netherlands suspended the funding, while other like Ireland did not. These fractured positions as compared with the unequivocal positions taken on Ukraine makes the EU highly vulnerable to the accusations of double standards and further dents its idea of emerging as a credible geopolitical actor.

This moral dilemma was also highlighted in the positions taken the top leadership of the EU, which was in contradiction to the European Commission President’s position. European Council President Charles Michel’s statement that “EU must be a steadfast advocate for peace and respect for international law, as in the case of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine” highlights the need for the EU to re-emphasise its core values and outlook. Similarly, the High Representative Josef Borrell had warned of EU being accused of “double standards, particularly in view of our strong stance on Ukraine relative to our perceived positions on Israel and Palestine”, further adding that if EU failed to talk about violation of international law in both Ukraine and Gaza, “we lack the moral authority necessary to make our voice heard”.

While the EU leaders have issued statements to respect international law and pursue a two-state solution, the bloc has remained largely on the sidelines. This is visible in the fact that it appears to be a divided house when it comes to defining its relations with Israel. While countries like Austria and Hungary have supported Israeli action, member states like Spain, Ireland have been extremely critical. As EU foreign policy requires unanimity, any opposing voice can veto collective action. The current push by some member states to recognise Palestine as a state can also be understood as an effort to formulate a policy position by circumventing the consensus-based approach of the EU. However, their domestic politics also needs to be factored in where there is growing sentiment in favour of recognising Palestine and increasing humanitarian concerns regarding the conflict which is visible in the massive street protests in various EU member states. Member states like Spain, Belgium have seen mass streets protests and demonstrations over months. Moreover, the public opinion in European Union countries have been shifting; for example, in YouGov poll, 51 per cent of Germans and French were in favour of seeking the prosecution of Israeli officials for war crimes in relation to the current conflict, while 61 per cent were in favour in Belgium. The poll also highlighted that public opinion within their respective countries is inclined towards taking a more balanced approach towards the conflict.

In short, against the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its impact on Europe, this Palestine-Israel conflict has become a new test for the EU in dealing with its member states on one hand and managing its institutions on the other hand.   Josef Borrell statement with reference to the Gaza conflict —“We were reactive at best, passive at worst, certainly not as proactive as we should have been”— reveals the deeper divisions within the Bloc in its relations with Israel and the role that the Union can play in the conflict.

The author is an Assistant Professor at Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.  The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.

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