OPINION | Rethinking theatre commands: A call for strategic prudence in India's defence structure

Just days after a tense skirmish with Pakistan, India’s Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Anil Chauhan, came out with a thought-provoking book titled 'Ready, Relevant and Resurgent: A Blueprint for the Transformation of India’s Military'. In the book, released by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, General Chauhan lays out a vision for a modernised force, better structured to meet the demands of 21st-century warfare. Central to this transformation is the proposed creation of Integrated Theatre Commands (ITCs), where operational control will rest with theatre commanders rather than the traditional service chiefs, who will retain responsibility for "raise, train, and sustain" (RTS) functions.

The CDS rightly underscores the importance of “deliberation” and “diligent prognosis” in reimagining the future of warfare. However, while the vision is bold and ambitious, its current articulation overlooks some critical operational and strategic realities—particularly regarding the Indian Air Force (IAF). The blueprint, as it stands, does not adequately absorb the hard-earned lessons from Operation Sindoor, a landmark operation that decisively demonstrated the primacy of air power and the strategic necessity of centralised command for limited aerial resources.

While the CDS notes that the transformation will bring about new operational and administrative challenges, there appears to be insufficient attention paid to the foundational preconditions for success. The high degree of jointness, doctrinal integration, and resource optimisation needed to make theatre commands viable is far from being realised today. Rushing into implementation without resolving these fundamental issues risks creating a system that looks integrated on paper but is fragmented in practice.

Equally concerning is the assumption that the geographical unification of forces under a single commander will, by default, enhance warfighting capability. This belief discounts the unique strategic nature of air power, which differs substantially from land or maritime force structures. Air assets are not bound by terrain; they operate in a domain defined by speed, flexibility, and range. Fragmenting these scarce resources among multiple theatre commands could drastically reduce their operational effectiveness and weaken national-level response capability.

In the evolving theatre of modern warfare, integration and synergy among the armed forces are essential. However, any structural reform, particularly the creation of ITCs, must be anchored in operational wisdom and an honest assessment of capability gaps. As a well-informed citizen of India, I feel compelled to raise concerns about the rollout of theatre commands without due regard to two central challenges: the IAF’s critical resource shortfalls and the glaring neglect of the strategic lessons from Operation Sindoor.

The imperative of centralised air power control

Operation Sindoor, a defining joint-services operation, made one fact indisputably clear: in modern warfare, air power is not just a supporting element—it is the spearhead. The IAF played a pivotal role across the entire spectrum of combat, from interdiction and surveillance to precision deep-strike operations. The flexibility and reach of the IAF proved indispensable in shaping the battlefield and ensuring operational success.

Despite these realities, the current blueprint for theatre commands envisions dividing the IAF’s already limited assets across geographically bounded commands. This goes against the very nature of air power, which thrives on strategic mobility, central coordination, and rapid redeployment. Unlike land forces, which defend and hold defined territories, air power must be centrally commanded to exploit its agility and avoid duplication or waste of scarce high-value assets.

Lessons from Operation Sindoor: Ignored at our peril

Operation Sindoor stands as a stark warning to planners pushing for decentralisation of air command. The operation’s success hinged on centralised decision-making and the ability to mass limited air assets at critical junctures. The IAF's capacity to dominate the battlespace was made possible only through unified command and real-time resource allocation.

More importantly, the operation would have exposed the acute shortage of high-end aerial platforms—AWACS, aerial refuelling tankers, and long-range strike aircraft. These are not divisible commodities. Slicing them up into piecemeal theatre allocations is not only tactically imprudent but strategically irresponsible. Without centralised control, the effectiveness of these assets will be diluted, and the nation’s ability to mount a coordinated defence across fronts will be severely compromised.

The risk of premature implementation

While the ambition behind theatre commands is commendable, the risks of premature implementation cannot be overstated. The services are still working through long-standing doctrinal differences. Interoperability in training, logistics, and command structures remains a work in progress. Crucially, the IAF continues to face capability shortfalls, both in terms of quantity and technological edge.

Moreover, the strategic realities facing India differ sharply across theatres. The northern frontier demands a vastly different approach compared to the western seaboard or the northeastern corridor. A one-size-fits-all theatre model risks flattening these distinctions and weakening our deterrent posture where it matters most.

A call for strategic reassessment

This is not a call to resist jointness—it is a call to do it right. Theatre commands should not be built around structural symmetry but operational necessity. Before moving forward, we must undertake a rigorous review of lessons learned, from Operation Sindoor and other joint exercises. We must prioritise investment in air capabilities, resolve doctrinal inconsistencies, and build a central command structure that empowers—not fragments—our limited resources.

The IAF must not be relegated to a tactical support role in a land-centric command design. It must retain the strategic autonomy and flexibility to project power where and when it is needed most. Any integrated structure that marginalises air power risks rendering itself obsolete in the very conflicts it aims to win.

Conclusion

India stands today at a historic crossroads in defence planning. Let us not confuse transformation with progress, nor structure with strength. Change is necessary—but only when it is informed, inclusive, and strategically sound. If we are to build a future-ready military, we must begin by listening to the operational truths written in our own history.
Theatre commands should emerge from capability, not compromise. They should foster true unity—not just administrative uniformity. Above all, they should sharpen, not blunt, our ability to fight and win the wars of tomorrow.

As the Americans famously say—if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.

Jai Hind

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.

Defence