India needs credible deterrence against Pakistan amid the new normal

CHIEF of Defence Staff (CDS) Gen Anil Chauhan’s recent revelations on Operation Sindoor in an interview on foreign soil, even as questions in this regard remain unanswered at home, were improper. Disclosing tactical mistakes, remedial action and the admission about jets “being down” mattered less than the outcome. His arguable contentions should have been withheld till a full cost-benefit analysis had been done.

Later, speaking in Pune on June 3, Gen Chauhan stated that Op Sindoor was not just about retribution for the Pahalgam terror attack; it was meant to establish limits (red lines) for tolerance. “State-sponsored terrorism from Pakistan has to stop. India is not going to live under the shadow of terror and nuclear blackmail,” he said. He added that Prime Minister Modi had already set the parameters of the new normal in dealing with future terror attacks.

This was the hasty new normal. Home Minister Amit Shah, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and Foreign Minister S Jaishankar have all endorsed PM Modi’s celebration of Op Sindoor. But what outcome is being celebrated?

First, it would be better if a Strategic Defence Review (SDR) is conducted on new-age warfare — the non-contact, beyond-visual-range conflict fought by nuclear-armed India and Pakistan for the first time. While the Indian Air Force (IAF) as well as air defence systems have excelled, little is known about what the Army, Navy and paramilitary forces achieved.

Second, the SDR should evaluate clinically the ‘outcome’. India’s diplomatic delegations travelled across the world, elaborating on terrorism emanating from Pakistan. New Delhi went to great pains to explain that its retribution was only against terrorist hubs, not the Pakistan military, and that the attacks were proportionate, preventive, responsible and non-escalatory.

Extraordinary emphasis was placed by Delhi on strategic restraint during the initial strikes on May 7, which involved, knowingly or unknowingly, taking risks — the “tactical mistakes” that Gen Chauhan referred to. Greater clarity is required on an outcome that sought to end cross-border terrorism without causing damage to enemy airbases. Military instruments like the use of force alone will not end the problem; it will buy time – mow the grass – as Israel, India’s buddy in this battle, will say.

Third, combat losses suffered by the IAF were partially due to the nature of the mission: punitive strikes against terrorist hubs which initially obviated suppressing Pakistan air defence, inherently involving risk and restraint.

A Royal United Services Institute essay (published on June 2) by Prof Justin Bronk has mentioned that Pakistani forces fired PL15 air-to-air missiles from Chinese J10 CE or JF17 fighters and HQ9 long-range surface-to-air missiles. He says the IAF consequently suffered several fighter losses, including one Rafale, one MiG29 and likely a Su30 MKI. On May 8, newspapers carried pictures of debris of aircraft near Srinagar and Bathinda. Did the CDS/Chief of Air Staff question the government on the priority of counter-air operations and the rationality of punitive strikes superseding suppression of the enemy’s air defence?

Fourth, if India will no longer differentiate between terrorists and their sponsors under the new normal, future military responses will not be bound by restraint and proportionality? Will Delhi then wage a non-contact engagement that could escalate into a hot war? In Op Sindoor, only Chinese hi-tech equipment and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems were deployed, but the next round could likely be a collusive hot war.

Fifth, India will require a credible deterrence to prevent a Pahalgam-like terrorist attack as well as a two-front situation.

Sixth, the armed forces are woefully deficient in equipment to fight a conventional war. To bridge the technology and inventory gaps, private-public partnership will need to perform miracles in catching up with the magnitude of the collusive challenge.

The government will have to make available substantial funding for defence spending, especially on modernisation. The current allocation — less than 2 per cent of the GDP — should be increased promptly to 2.5 per cent, and to 3 per cent by 2029. If there is a will, ways can be found either by raising the limit on fiscal deficit and/or through additional tax. While public sentiment will support the additional burden, the ruling party may risk losing votes.

The latest warning by the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal AP Singh, about slippages on orders involving time and cost overruns ought to be taken seriously. Four decades ago, the IAF had arrived at the notional limit of having 45 combat squadrons. The geo-strategic environment has altered phenomenally.

Leave alone meeting the elusive target of 45 squadrons, the strength has gone down to 31 squadrons and is stagnating at that level. The government should take an urgent call on fast-tracking the acquisition of 114 fourth-generation fighters or sign another government-to-government contract with a Western country to buy off the shelf.

Finally, while R&AW’s long arm might be overreaching abroad, intelligence lapses have been mounting at home. Galwan and Pahalgam are two colossal failures that have resulted in operational deficiencies of high magnitude. On the LAC in Ladakh, the Chinese PLA has planted itself along its 1959 claim line.

In Kashmir, despite the revocation of Article 370, alienation among its people has not subsided. A comprehensive security review of Op Sindoor and 11 years of NDA rule should address Kashmir and other issues, along with the outcomes, and review ad hoc decisions taken by the government to lay down the new normal.

Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta (retd) is former Founding Member, Defence Planning Staff.

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