Iran & US: A lost opportunity to mend relations in 1978

THE late Zbigniew Brzezinski would have been envious, had he been alive, at the smooth way President Donald Trump could execute the dramatic bombing of Iran’s three nuclear sites on June 22, which, according to the US government, had “completely and totally obliterated" their nuclear weapons programme.

The present generation might not remember US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski under President Jimmy Carter. He was as brilliant in the academic world and as influential in realpolitik as Henry Kissinger because he was the founder of the prestigious “Trilateral Commission", along with David Rockefeller, to steer global future to the political and commercial advantage of America and its allies.

However, 47 years ago, Brzezinski was also responsible for hardline actions taken by Carter presidency to prop up the regime of the unpopular ruler of Iran, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, which had caused deep resentment against America among the Iranian public and their influential clergy. In 1980, Brzezinski shamed himself for leading the messy “Operation Eagle Claw" to rescue American hostages in the American embassy, which ended in a fiasco. This might not have happened had Carter listened to advice from moderates like his Secretary of State Cyrus Vance or former ambassador George Ball.

This deep resentment against the US and Israel is still predominant, according to Trita Parsi of the Quincy Institute and founder and former president of the ‘National Iranian American Council’. On June 22, Parsi ridiculed American and Israeli expectations that the Iranian public would rise in revolt against the Khamenei regime after their bombing. He added that “Donald Trump has guaranteed that Iran would become a nuclear power" even if there is a regime change.

Parsi compared this to the June 7, 1981 Israeli bombing of Iraq’s Osirak nuclear research reactor, which, instead, boosted Iraqi nationalism and won international sympathy, and which forced President Ronald Reagan to impose sanctions on Israel.

Since the 1940s, Iran, under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was of utmost priority for US strategic interests in its “containment policy" against the Soviet Union as the “frontier state" between Moscow and the Persian Gulf oil reserves. Like Trump, Brzezinski wanted to maintain American pre-eminence in the region.

It was under Brzezinski’s influence that President Carter praised the monarch “for turning Iran into an ‘island of stability’ and for ‘deserving the respect and the admiration and love which your people give to you’." This was at a dinner in Niavaran Palace, during Carter’s visit to Iran on the 1977 New Year’s Eve. However, the Shah and family had to flee the country on January 16, 1979.

According to the BBC’s Persian releases, Carter knew of the serious rumblings beneath the surface against the Shah but had used hyperbole only to boost the monarch. Unfortunately, the Shah took this as a green signal from America and intensified his repressive measures against the religious and Communist opposition, thereby becoming more unpopular.

During this period, Brzezinski influenced Carter to veto his Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s advice for adopting a cautious approach compared to his own idea for tough measures, including possible positioning of American troops in Iran, to help the Shah.

Richard Falk, American professor emeritus of international law at Princeton University, said that in January 1979, he accompanied “peaceniks" Ramsey Clark and Philip Luce to visit Iran during the revolutionary ferment when they were told by US Ambassador William Sullivan that the White House had rejected his efforts to grasp this “unfolding reality" as Brzezinski wanted to save the Shah.

In 2019, the National Security Archives of the American George Washington University (NSA-GWU) published the hitherto unknown text of advice given by George Ball, veteran diplomat, in November 1978 on Carter’s request. This was during the period when Carter received divergent opinion from his advisers Cyrus Vance and Brzezinski. It may be mentioned that George Ball had distinguished himself as the only cabinet member of Presidents John F Kennedy and Lyndon B Johnson, who advised against the escalation of the Vietnam War.

Ball’s report, dated December 17, 1978, mentioned that the Shah regime had been “irreparably damaged by recent events" and any more violent repression would turn Iran into another Lebanon. Ball also chastised the American leadership for making the monarch believe that “Iran was a power equal to America", which had contributed to his megalomania. He included Israel also in this list. Ball wanted this strategy to be changed and the monarch be sternly told that his days in future were precarious.

Here, he was particularly referring to President Richard Nixon’s period when the US decided, on Henry Kissinger’s advice, “to treat the Shah as the guardian of Western interests in the whole Gulf area, that had contributed to megalomania and ultimately the current debacle."

Ball ruled out a military solution and recommended “reaching out quietly to Khomeini", who was considered as a “legendary and almost sacred figure by the Iranian people", and that the French should be consulted to “make Khomeini’s visit to France as brief as possible."

Also, he recommended that the Shah should establish a Council of Notables, with members approved by the US, that would identify a way to transfer power to a responsible entity. He also suggested that America should keep the Shah on the scene only if he was prepared to transfer power to a responsible civilian authority. Ball felt that Iran’s armed forces would transfer their allegiance to the new ruler even if the monarch left the country.

Finally, he said that “we might have to contemplate the occupation of at least the Southern half of the country with oil fields" if the new government falls into the Soviet orbit.

The NSA-GWU concluded that, ultimately, Ball’s memo was pigeonholed, leading to the disorderly change of government. One version quoted Carter’s remarks to Ball that “he could not tell another Head of State what to do." Another version cited Iran scholar James Bill, who had interviewed Ball, that it was National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski who was instrumental in shelving his report.

Perhaps, Iran would have been friendlier towards the West had Ball’s ideas been implemented in 1978.

Views are personal.

Vappala Balachandran is former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat.

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