Attack on Iran N-sites & the ‘nuclear apartheid’ argument

American and Israeli aerial attacks targeted Iranian nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz and Esfahan this week, one was reminded of a conversation with the head of the Indian atomic energy establishment soon after the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986. In response to a question about the safety of nuclear plants in India, he said, ‘Our nuclear reactors are so safe that even if a missile hits or an aircraft crashes on them, nothing would happen.’

The point is that when setting up a nuclear power plant or related facilities, nuclear engineers plan for every eventuality, including a war. The most crucial step in ensuring the safety of any nuclear installation is choosing the right location. Besides factors like geological stability and distance from populated areas, such facilities are located away from international borders for strategic reasons. In the case of Iran, the key Fordow uranium enrichment facility was built deep inside a mountain in the central region.

Safety of nuclear facilities – enrichment plants, fuel fabrication units, power plants, waste storage sites – has always been a matter of concern for the global community. Any mishap – accidental or deliberate – can lead to the release of radioactivity, posing danger to humans and the environment. In the ongoing conflict, it has been reported that the aerial raids aimed at nuclear facilities have spared nuclear reactors and have resulted in the destruction of only peripheral facilities at the three nuclear sites. In the recent past, the risks of nuclear facilities in Ukraine, like Zaporizhzhia, being targeted raised concerns in its war with Russia. Another nuclear flash point is North Korea, which has refused to subject itself to international inspections.

The global nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), is not only supposed to police fissile materials but also keep an eye on accidents involving nuclear radiation. The agency, which has been monitoring the situation in Iran, has not found any off-site radiation so far. If a reactor is attacked and damaged, it could lead to the release of radioactivity that could travel far, as happened in the Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters. It would be grossly irresponsible on the part of any party involved in the conflict to attack or destroy a nuclear reactor.

In the years after the Second World War, the need for global cooperation in science was widely felt. This was one of the motivations for the creation of the IAEA in 1957. The idea was to bring governments together, guide them on technological issues and collate information on peaceful uses of atoms. These included electricity production, the use of isotopes in medicine, agriculture, or the basic and life sciences. India was a part of the deliberations that led to the creation of the IAEA. It is a founder member of the agency and has played a pivotal role as a member of its Board of Governors over the decades.

Because nuclear energy is used as a dual-use technology, it is shrouded in secrecy, and information sharing is difficult. The agency depends on national nuclear regulators for information about nuclear installations like power plants, enrichment, waste disposal, etc. The main task of the IAEA is not only to ensure the safety of the handling of nuclear material, but also to prevent its diversion for making nuclear weapons. However, some sort of inequality has been embedded in the functioning of the watchdog from the beginning.

Homi Jehangir Bhabha, who presided over the Scientific Advisory Committee of IAEA, was the first to take a tough stand on the nature of safeguards proposed in the 1960s — one type of regulation for certain countries, which recognised no inspection and another type of rules for European countries. The rest were subjected to stringent checks and inspections. It was argued that the first set of countries was exempt from safeguards as they were the victors of the Second World War, while Europeans could take care of their security because they were more advanced in this sector. Others who did not agree with this system had to face embargoes.

The classic case of such bias was the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE), which was defined as the non-military use of nuclear detonations for civilian purposes such as large-scale engineering, mining, excavation, or creating underground reservoirs. PNEs conducted by America, like Project Rulisson, were celebrated as scientific achievements and incurred no sanctions. India conducted a PNE in 1974 for which it was subjected to sanctions. The premise behind current US attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities is the fear that Iran could develop the capability to produce nuclear weapons.

Atomic energy has long passed its early period of scientific cooperation and the ‘atoms for peace’ motto. It is now connected to large industrial operations involving the safety of plants and potential environmental hazards. And is closely linked with massive financial investments and geopolitics. The private sector is projected to enter the sector for electricity generation sector in many countries, including India. Private nuclear power plants fall under IAEA oversight indirectly. The responsibility to ensure compliance lies with the government, but the IAEA can inspect any facility using nuclear material, regardless of ownership.

IAEA should prepare itself for such challenges, along with its traditional watchdog role under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to ensure countries do not divert nuclear material for weapons. The verification and inspection regime is vital for global stability and to mitigate the risk of nuclear terrorism, but it should be transparent and unbiased. While many countries support the IAEA’s role in non-proliferation, they also demand respect for national sovereignty and equal access to nuclear technology. They advance the ‘nuclear apartheid’ argument that nuclear-armed states block others from developing nuclear technology. The present conflict is a grim reminder of this sore point.

Dinesh C Sharma is a science commentator.

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