Jordan and the security dilemma: Navigating the Iran-Israel ceasefire and public sentiment

After 12 days of open conflict between Israel and Iran, a fragile ceasefire now hangs over the region. Brokered by US President Donald Trump, the truce has paused direct hostilities but left regional tensions unresolved.

What began as a proxy cold war has morphed into a hot confrontation, exposing the Middle East’s precarious balance of power.

Jordan, long a buffer state and diplomatic bridge, finds itself once again at the crossroads of war and diplomacy. While traditionally adept at walking the line between Western alliances and Arab solidarity, the intensity of this moment—and its uncertain aftermath—risk pushing the kingdom beyond its strategic comfort zone.

The conflict’s epicentre may lie elsewhere, but its effects are rippling directly through Jordan. Airspace closures in April 2024 and June 2025 underscore the kingdom’s concern over regional spillover. While framed as defensive, these moves have placed Jordan under scrutiny, especially from Iran, raising questions about its neutrality.

At the heart of the crisis is Iran’s nuclear program. Though Tehran insists its enrichment is peaceful, its uranium levels nearing weapons grade have triggered Israeli strikes under “Operation Rising Lion” and set off a chain of military escalation-classic hallmarks of the security dilemma.

One state’s effort to enhance security leads others to feel threatened, prompting reactions that increase the risk of conflict.

Jordan is now caught between two powerful rivals, both distrusted by much of its population. While the war in Gaza continues to dominate public discourse, the deeper strategic threat may lie in this unfolding Israel–Iran confrontation. How Jordan navigates this high-stakes moment—without being drawn in militarily or politically—may define its regional role in the years ahead.

A pause, not peace: Realities of the ceasefire

On June 24, 2025, Israel and Iran agreed to a US-brokered ceasefire after nearly two weeks of direct military confrontation. The deal followed Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Arak, along with Iranian missile retaliation against US military bases in Iraq, Qatar, and Bahrain.

Both sides declared their military objectives achieved, and the phased de-escalation was hailed by US mediators—particularly former President Donald Trump—as a diplomatic success.

Yet, from a realist international relations perspective, the ceasefire is less a resolution than a tactical recalibration. It reflects not trust but exhaustion and a mutual desire to avoid a prolonged war that neither side could decisively win without unacceptable costs.

Ceasefires of this nature are often strategic pauses: moments when states conserve strength, reassess risks, and prepare for potential re-engagement.

The confrontation intensified a long-standing security dilemma: Israel’s preemptive strikes, meant to neutralise Iran’s nuclear threat, were perceived by Tehran as existential, prompting asymmetric retaliation via proxies and missile strikes.

Each side’s quest for security increased the insecurity of the other. In terms of power balancing, Israel demonstrated its deep-strike capabilities and reaffirmed its US-backed military edge.

Iran, meanwhile, may respond by reinforcing ties with external allies such as Russia, China, Hezbollah, and the Houthis—actors who play an increasingly central role in Tehran’s asymmetric strategy.

Gulf countries, caught in the middle, are likely to hedge, bolstering missile defences while maintaining quiet backchannels with both adversaries.

The great power dynamics underlying the ceasefire cannot be overlooked. The US enabled Israeli strikes while simultaneously brokering the truce—a dual role consistent with hegemonic behaviour aimed at preserving regional order.

Meanwhile, Russia and China are expected to capitalise on Iran’s temporary weakness to extract strategic concessions or expand their influence.

Ultimately, the central driver for both Iran and Israel is regime survival. Iran’s military posture-anchored in dispersed infrastructure and proxy warfare-is designed to deter existential threats and preserve the Islamic Republic. Israel’s doctrine of qualitative military edge is similarly rooted in pre-emption and strategic dominance.

For Jordan, the ceasefire brings momentary relief but not structural stability. The kingdom remains geographically exposed, militarily entangled through its alliances, and diplomatically constrained by a public that rejects both Iranian influence and Israeli aggression.

As great powers reposition and proxy tensions simmer, Jordan must walk a narrow path of principled neutrality—recognising that while war may be paused, the strategic forces driving it remain firmly in place.

Between allies and adversaries

The escalating confrontation between Iran and Israel poses significant risks for Jordan, whose sensitive geopolitical position leaves it exposed on multiple fronts.

Lebanon and Syria remain central to Iran’s regional strategy, with Tehran asserting that its strategic depth now extends to the Mediterranean.

Iran’s support for Hezbollah in southern Lebanon constitutes a major threat to Israel in the event of a multi-front conflict, while Syria’s Golan Heights offers strategic value as an additional axis of deterrence.

For Jordan, these developments are far from peripheral; they directly implicate the kingdom in any future confrontation, given its shared borders, intelligence collaborations, and security coordination with Western and Gulf partners.

Jordan shares a long and porous border with Syria, where the discovery and subsequent Israeli-led destruction of an underground Iranian missile facility near Masyaf in September 2024, during “Operation Deep Layer,” revealed the extent of Tehran’s military entrenchment in the Levant.

Although Hezbollah’s operational presence in Syria has reportedly diminished with the appointment of an interim government under Ahmad Al-Sharee, its influence remains deeply rooted in Lebanon. The strategic calculus for Jordan is clear: as Iran disperses key infrastructure across Syria and Lebanon to offset potential Israeli or Western strikes, the risk of spillover—from retaliatory missile strikes, arms smuggling, or cross-border militant activity—increases substantially. Jordan’s northern frontier becomes not just a border but a potential flashpoint.

As a calculated actor, Iran has long anticipated potential attacks on its core military assets and has likely dispersed key infrastructure across hardened terrain—possibly underground or within mountainous regions—in both Syria and Lebanon.

This decentralisation reflects an omni-balancing approach that offsets asymmetric threats by developing multiple deterrence nodes. Despite the internationally recognised transition to Al-Sharee’s leadership, Syria’s fragmented institutions and tenuous cohesion render it vulnerable to being a staging ground for regional adversaries.

For Jordan—already strained by narcotics trafficking and militia flows—the continued use of Syrian territory for Iranian entrenchment compounds existing vulnerabilities.

Recent public opinion in Jordan indicates cautious optimism about Syria’s political transition. According to a May 2025 national poll by NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions, over 91 per cent of Jordanians believe the ousting of Bashar Al-Assad and the appointment of an interim government is a positive development for Jordan—with 62.6 per cent describing it as “very positive.”

Yet this optimism is tempered by apprehension: 73.4 per cent of Jordanians remain concerned about Iran’s regional influence, with 44.7 per cent stating they are “very concerned.” This suggests that Jordanians may view the transition as a chance to reduce Iranian influence rather than as an indicator of full stability.

Still, 30.9 per cent of respondents fear Syria remains unstable and could descend into chaos, 25.7 per cent are concerned about persistent drug trafficking and insecure borders, and 21.3 per cent distrust Al-Sharee’s leadership. These concerns reinforce the idea that Jordan’s security calculus is shaped as much by what persists on the ground as by who governs Damascus.

Meanwhile, Iran’s Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant—embedded within a mountain near Qom—remains a focal point of Iran’s nuclear efforts. While Israel has targeted elements of the site, its fortified underground halls remain intact.

Any future offensive would carry serious regional implications. Given Jordan’s proximity and its hosting of US military assets, it may be perceived by Iran as a potential staging ground or collateral target, particularly if its territory is used for logistics or surveillance.

From an economic standpoint, Jordan could be facing significant obstacles as regional tensions between Iran and Israel heighten uncertainty around energy security.

The Energy Minister’s recent activation of contingency fuel plans to offset potential gas shortages signals growing concern over supply disruptions and rising costs.

Prior to the conflict unfolding, polling by NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions revealed that Jordanians were already deeply burdened by rising living costs, particularly energy.

These risks come at a time when 89.4 per cent of Jordanians view energy as a major burden on their household, with 77.5 per cent describing energy prices as “very expensive.”

As geopolitical instability drives up global fuel prices and threatens regional supply routes, Jordan may face increased fiscal pressure from subsidy demands, inflationary spillovers, and a tightening of household consumption—posing broader risks to economic stability and growth.

Public sentiment and strategic paralysis

The intensifying Israel–Iran conflict is reshaping regional geopolitics while exposing internal fractures in Jordan’s strategic posture. Public sentiment increasingly diverges from Jordan’s traditional balancing act.

When asked, “If there were a conflict between Iran and Israel, who should Jordan support?” polling by NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions revealed that 57.7 per cent believe Jordan should support neither side, while 35.6 per cent favoured Iran and only 5.4 per cent Israel.

This asymmetry reflects strong anti-Israeli sentiment more than genuine ideological affinity with Tehran. However, this perceived favorability is complicated by widespread concern: 73.4 per cent of Jordanians are concerned about Iran’s influence. This duality, viewing Iran both as a symbolic counterweight and a destabilising force, illustrates Jordan’s strategic ambivalence.

Jordanians’ views on non-state actors also reflect this nuance. While 84 per cent consider Hamas a legitimate resistance movement, only 41.2 per cent say the same about Hezbollah. In contrast, 43 per cent label Hezbollah a terrorist organisation. Despite both groups receiving Iranian support, Hezbollah’s identity as an Iranian proxy erodes its legitimacy, especially due to its active involvement in Syria.

The overwhelming consensus on Daesh (93.5 per cent terrorist designation) and Al-Qaeda (69.7 per cent) reinforces a broader rejection of extremist groups, suggesting that perceptions of legitimacy are based more on regional implications than ideology.

Public sentiment constrains Jordan’s foreign policy. While 75.9 per cent want to limit ties with Israel, only 14.4 per cent support stronger relations with Iran, suggesting a broad mandate for disengagement. This narrows Jordan’s ability to project clear policy positions, particularly as neutrality becomes harder to maintain in the face of drone interceptions, regional escalations, and strategic blame narratives.

Strategic and economic fallout beyond Jordan

The United States’s direct military intervention—led by President Donald Trump’s authorisation of strikes on Iran’s Natanz, Fordow, and Arak nuclear sites—marked the peak of the Israel–Iran confrontation that ultimately gave way to a tense ceasefire.

Domestically, the decision has faced bipartisan backlash, as lawmakers from both parties have questioned the legality of launching such operations without congressional authorisation, reigniting debates over the constitutional limits of presidential war powers and executive overreach in foreign policy.

While Trump had long positioned himself as reluctant to engage in new wars, the latest strikes represent a return to high-stakes US militarism in the region. Arab governments and the public alike viewed Washington’s posture during the escalation not as a stabilising deterrent but as a one-sided alignment with Israeli strategic interests.

The perception that peace under current US leadership equates to the political capitulation of Iran and Palestine has deepened public scepticism. In countries like Jordan, where 57.7 per cent of the population favours neutrality in the Israel–Iran conflict and only 5.4 per cent support Israel, the strikes risk fueling broader narratives of Western double standards and regional subjugation.

Iran’s influence spans a vast proxy network—from Hezbollah in Lebanon and militias in Syria to the Houthis in Yemen and Iraqi paramilitary groups—positioning Tehran as a central force behind asymmetric threats across the region.

If Iran were to surrender or be decisively defeated, analysts warn this could create a dangerous vacuum in the regional balance—potentially paving the way for a resurgence of Sunni extremist groups, similar to those that thrived in previous power vacuums across Iraq and Syria.

The dismantling of a dominant Shiite actor like Iran could upend deterrence dynamics, embolden non-state actors, and destabilise areas where fragile governance persists. The Levant, in particular, could witness heightened cross-border militant activity and a recalibration of extremist networks seeking to exploit weakened state structures and sectarian grievances.

Holding the line in a region on edge

As the Israel–Iran confrontation halts under a fragile ceasefire, Jordan finds itself navigating a conflict it did not create yet cannot fully avoid.

With shared borders, security partnerships, and domestic pressures, the kingdom is at the crossroads of regional escalation and internal restraint.

Public opinion offers no clear mandate for alignment-only a consistent call for distance from both rivals.

Yet Jordan’s geography and alliance networks pull it into proximity with the very conflict it seeks to evade. This is not rooted in apathy but in strategic caution: while the Syrian transition is cautiously welcomed by most Jordanians, Hezbollah is met with suspicion, and Iran’s regional influence remains deeply unpopular.

Jordan’s challenge will be to uphold principled neutrality, resisting regional polarisation while reinforcing its role as a stabiliser. As the security dilemma intensifies, Jordan’s ability to hold the line—shaped by both public sentiment and geopolitical reality—may prove to be its most valuable strategic asset.

The ceasefire may have paused open warfare, but Jordan’s strategic calculus must now shift to anticipating the next phase- one that will likely unfold not on battlefields but across borders, alliances, and public opinion.

The writer is a media and research analyst at NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.

Middle East