Can the Iran-Israel War reignite Abraham Accords? 

The escalated tensions between Iran and Israel have added a combustible layer to the already volatile strategic landscape of the Middle East. While the immediate consequences—military escalation, energy market disruption, and civilian insecurity—have dominated global headlines, a more enduring question has quietly emerged in regional capitals: can this flashpoint lead to new pathways for rapprochement between Israel and the Arab states? The conflict between Israel and Iran has recalibrated strategic priorities and forced regional actors to reassess their threat perceptions and alliance equations. In this context, a limited, interest-based Arab-Israel thaw—though not without complications—could become an unintended but transformative outcome of the conflict.

Strategic shock and realignment

The conflict erupted after a series of retaliatory strikes by both Iran and Israel in each other’s territories, culminating in Iran’s direct attacks on Israeli targets and Israel’s retaliatory operations inside Iranian territory. The scale of this confrontation, although short of a full-scale regional war, exposed Arab states to severe risks. Iran’s proxy network—Hezbollah, Houthis in Yemen, and militias in Iraq—targeted regional maritime routes, oil infrastructure, and digital assets. Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, despite not being directly involved, faced economic fallout and security threats that tested the limits of their strategic autonomy. For these nations, this conflict was a stark reminder that their geographic proximity to Iran and dependence on secure sea lanes still leave them vulnerable, regardless of formal alliances. While traditionally cautious about overt normalisation with Israel due to domestic and pan-Arab sensitivities, these states now recognise that closer strategic coordination with Israel—particularly in cybersecurity, air defence, and maritime surveillance—is not just desirable, but necessary. In this regard, the conflict can act as a “strategic shock” that can catalyse the previously hesitant forms of rapprochement.

The Abraham Accords in 2020 marked a dramatic departure from the historical Arab-Israeli antagonism, with the Islamic nations like UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan opting for normalisation. Yet, the momentum seemed to plateau by 2023, as the conflict between Israel and Hamas re-emerged in the Gaza territory, with Tel Aviv adopting hardline domestic postures that alienated Arab public opinion. However, the Iran-Israel conflict has reintroduced a security-driven logic to normalisation—one less reliant on idealism or the American mediation and more on realpolitik.

The UAE’s response has been instructive. Though cautious in tone, Abu Dhabi maintained quiet intelligence and logistics coordination with Israel during the conflict, particularly concerned about the shipping disruptions. Similarly, Saudi Arabia reportedly resumed backchannel communications with Israeli security officials, focusing on air defence integration and Iranian drone interception capabilities. These developments suggest that while the Abraham Accords may not formally expand in the short term, the architecture of Arab-Israel security cooperation is quietly evolving.

Hedging and the limits of convergence

Nonetheless, this pathway to rapprochement is fraught with constraints. Arab states continue to walk a tightrope between strategic cooperation with Israel and domestic legitimacy rooted in solidarity with the Palestinian cause. The Iran-Israel war has reignited support for Palestine across Arab societies, especially as Israel’s operations in Gaza and Lebanon intensified in parallel. Muffled protests in Jordan, Kuwait, and Egypt revealed deep scepticism toward normalisation in the face of continued suffering in Gaza. This divergence between state-level pragmatism and street-level resistance defines the current phase of Arab-Israeli relations. Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, cannot afford to abandon the Palestinian issue entirely, especially as they pursue leadership roles in the Islamic world. As a result, rapprochement with Israel may take the form of “functional normalisation”—expanding cooperation in discrete areas like climate technology, port security, and cyber surveillance—without formal diplomatic upgrades. This quiet, modular engagement offers room to manoeuvre while minimizing political backlash.

The United States, China, and the Great Power Overlay

The future of Arab-Israel rapprochement also depends on how global actors reposition themselves after the Iran-Israel conflict. The United States remains a critical enabler of the Arab-Israeli coordination. However, American retrenchment from the region in recent years, coupled with political polarisation at home, has eroded Arab confidence in Washington’s long-term reliability. In contrast, China’s growing footprint in the region—highlighted by its role in brokering the 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement—offers Arab states a non-Western alternative for strategic balancing. However, China has steered clear of military entanglements, focusing instead on energy and infrastructure. This creates a paradox. While Beijing can mediate, it cannot secure. Israel, by contrast, offers tactical capabilities that Gulf states can immediately leverage, especially against asymmetric threats. This creates space for a pragmatic recalibration: Arab states may maintain economic ties with China while deepening security interoperability with Israel—thus operationalising their hedging strategies.

Toward a Security-Driven Regionalism?

The most promising long-term outcome of the conflict could be the emergence of a new security-driven regionalism. The region’s interconnected threats—drones, maritime piracy, cyberattacks, and energy infrastructure sabotage—do not respect national boundaries. Going forward, such platforms may be institutionalised into regional security dialogues, emergency response units, or cyber-resilience centres. Israel’s technological edge combined with Gulf capital and strategic geography could form the basis for a modular, inclusive architecture that gradually pulls in more stakeholders—including Egypt, Jordan, and perhaps even Iraq. While political normalisation may lag, security normalization is advancing rapidly and may ultimately shape the new grammar of regional diplomacy.

The Iran-Israel conflict was a flashpoint—but it may also become a framework. While the road to full normalisation between Israel and the Arab world remains complex and nonlinear, the conflict has reshaped strategic calculations. In a region where traditional alliances have often proven brittle, and where ideological positions are increasingly tempered by threats to stability, the space for interest-based, security-first cooperation has widened.

For Arab states, rapprochement with Israel need not be a binary choice. It can emerge as a layered process—quietly operational, issue-based, and regionally integrated. The war has underlined a basic truth—confronting shared threats sometimes makes strange bedfellows—but it also creates enduring bonds of necessity. Whether these bonds mature into formal alliances or remain transactional will depend not only on Iran’s future posture or Israel’s domestic politics but also on the Arab world’s ability to balance legitimacy with leverage. In the meantime, a silent shift is underway—one that may define the contours of the Middle Eastern future order.

Middle East