Pak-Afghan War and India’s Options

K N Pandita and Fatima Baloch

The USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) militarily intervened in Afghanistan in 1979, toppling President Mohammad Daud Khan and installing a communist government under Babrak Karmal. In response, Afghan mujahideen-backed by the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states-waged a decade-long proxy war that ultimately led to the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Following the retreat, Pakistan supported warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, whose rivalry with other mujahideen commanders sparked a brutal civil war in 1992. As former allies turned on one another, Afghanistan plunged into chaos. In this vacuum, the Taliban-largely composed of madrassa students backed by the Pakistan military-emerged in 1994 as a new force opposing the warlords. They eventually seized control, defeating Hekmatyar, once considered Pakistan’s proxy. Pakistan declared strategic depth against India by installing a highly pro-Pakistan regime on its western border-one that remained hostile across the Durand Line and to Pakistan’s very existence.
Buoyed by perceived success in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s military establishment adopted similar proxy tactics in Kashmir. Islamabad supported, trained, and funded militant groups-most notably Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), led by Masood Azhar, and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), led by Hafiz Saeed-which fueled an insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir. Prior to the Soviet invasion, Kashmir had been widely regarded as a peaceful region known for its natural beauty and international tourism.
For decades, India responded to cross-border militancy with strategic restraint, focusing on counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism within its own borders, while relying on diplomacy and international pressure to curb terrorism. However, major attacks-such as the Uri assault in 2016, the Pulwama bombing in 2019, and subsequent incidents in areas like Pahalgam-shifted India’s posture.
India’s initial responses targeted terrorist infrastructure inside Pakistan. When Islamabad failed to remain neutral, actively supporting terrorists and engaging in hostilities, tensions escalated into a direct India-Pakistan confrontation in May 2025. India launched Operation Sindoor, a targeted military campaign aimed at dismantling terror networks responsible for mass civilian casualties. Although India briefly paused the operation, it warned that any future terrorist attack would trigger Operation Sindoor 2.0-an even more forceful military response against the Pakistan Army, which had become an active participant in India’s war on terror.
Since then, there have been no attacks on the Indian Army in Kashmir. India has relaunched large-scale operations to hunt down terrorists in the region, while Pakistan remains unable to openly support Kashmiri and Punjabi militants due to fear of Operation Sindoor’s resumption. As a result, parts of Kashmir have seen a return to relative normalcy. Meanwhile, Pakistan is grappling with escalating internal security crises in provinces such as Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), alongside deteriorating relations with Afghanistan.
Despite possessing a large cache of nuclear weapons, Pakistan now faces a deepening security crisis and existential threat. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch separatist groups such as the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) continue to wage high-intensity insurgencies. Frustrated by its inability to suppress these movements, Pakistan has launched fighter jet and drone strikes into Afghanistan-violating Afghan sovereignty-and opened a full-scale western front. Nevertheless, TTP and BLA fighters continue to operate inside Pakistan. Islamabad’s strikes appear aimed at pressuring Kabul to dismantle anti-Pakistan insurgent networks.
These developments underscore Islamabad’s failure to manage asymmetric warfare. In desperation, it seems to be attempting to internationalize its internal conflicts-provoking Afghanistan in hopes that regional powers such as China, Qatar, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States will pressure Kabul to act against groups sheltered along the Afghan border. It is worth noting that after the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan sided with the U.S. and NATO-led war on terror in Afghanistan, serving as a key coalition ally for two decades. Pakistan received honorary Non-NATO status and substantial military, economic, and financial aid from the U.S. During this period, the TTP emerged and aligned ideologically with the Afghan Taliban in their insurgency against coalition forces. Pakistan’s repeated interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs has brought destruction and misery, fueling nationalist and anti-Pakistan sentiments among Afghans and the Taliban 2.0. Afghanistan now views a TTP-controlled Pakistan as a potential source of long-term peace and security-envisioning both countries as sharia-based Islamic allies. Consequently, Afghanistan is unlikely to abandon the TTP in its war against Pakistan.
Pakistan has made it clear that unless the TTP is dismantled-or unless the Afghan Taliban acts against the TTP and BLA-cross-border pressure will persist. Islamabad likely hopes for either a diplomatic resolution or direct Taliban action. Simultaneously, it appears to be preparing for potential escalation with India in areas such as Sir Creek and other border sectors. There is a growing possibility that the TTP could expand its territorial control within Pakistan, evoking memories of the Taliban’s rapid takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021. A scenario in which militant groups exercise significant territorial control in a nuclear-armed state would be profoundly destabilizing.
Notably, this Afghan-Pakistan conflict was predicted in an article titled “Pakistan’s War Option and India’s Strategic Response,” published in early October 2025.
Conclusion and India’s Options
Pakistan’s ongoing military campaign against Afghanistan appears aimed at forcing the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) to cease attacks and surrender. However, Afghanistan has a long history of resisting external pressure-having not capitulated to the USSR, the United States, or NATO-and is unlikely to succumb to Pakistani demands. The TTP and BLA insurgencies are expected to continue with major attacks on Pakistani military installations and ambushes. Islamabad may escalate its operations further inside Afghanistan. There is also a growing likelihood that Pakistan will attempt to provoke a confrontation with India-either to gain domestic support, distract from internal instability, or internationalize the conflict by appealing to the United Nations and other global powers for protection against the TTP, BLA, and Afghan Taliban (TTA).
In this context, India must remain vigilant and strategically proactive. New Delhi should deepen coordination with the Afghan government and engage with secular Baloch nationalist movements, offering defensive support where aligned with India’s interests. India should also prepare contingency plans, including a calibrated expansion of Operation Sindoor 2.0-both to secure its own national security and to liberate Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) before the potential collapse of the Pakistani state and the risk of its control passing to extremist groups such as the TTP. India must recognize that a TTP-dominated Pakistan armed with nuclear weapons would pose a significantly more dangerous and unpredictable threat. It would be far more difficult to manage such a radical neighbor with a jihadist ideology.

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