Indian Retaliation To Pak Aggression Was A Necessity, But Dialogue Must Resume Once Peace Prevails
Two weeks after the Pahalgam terror attack, India finally retaliated by launching air attacks against 9 targets. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, in his press statement, emphasised India choosing non-military targets linked to Pakistan’s terror machine.
Since India’s 2019 Balakot attack, after the Pulwama suicide bombing of Indian paramilitary personnel, Delhi assumed that Pakistan had been finally deterred from sponsoring terrorism. The abrogation of Article 370 and the division and downgrading of Jammu and Kashmir into two union territories, followed by an extended President’s rule, fanned Indian complacency that terrorism stood defeated.
These smug conclusions rested on two flawed presumptions. One, the conclusion that an economically beleaguered Pakistan was preoccupied with domestic political instability and terrorism emanating from Balochistan and Afghanistan; and two, that a weakening Pakistani state meant its army was also handicapped. However, that was never so, as China props up Pakistan as a counterweight to India in South Asia. Pakistan, if anything, has upgraded its air force and army. With India allocating resources to counter China across the Line of Actual Control, its residual military resources do not greatly outweigh those of Pakistan, except in the naval domain.
Before Pahalgam, multiple warning signs were aflutter that some mischief could be expected from the Pakistan army. Pakistan had blamed India and Afghanistan for the March hijacking of a train by militants of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). Then came the completely unhinged public speech by army chief General Asim Munir, reviving the discarded 2-nation theory, which died when Bangladesh was created in 1972. His terming “Kashmir” as Pakistan’s “jugular vein” indicated that they were again preparing to mainstream internationally the Kashmir issue. The general having conspired to detain mass leader Imran Khan indefinitely, the Sharif government is his puppet. The director general of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has just been also designated as the National Security Advisor. This means the army now has its representative directly advising the cabinet. All pretences of civil control over the military are jettisoned.
On the Indian side, General Munir correctly assumed that a BJP-led government would not but retaliate after the brutal, communal and close-quarter killing of 26 males. The Pakistani army is generally good at tactical surprise, like in the case of the Kargil intrusion. They lack strategic perception of how their antagonist may react. They rely on the nuclear bluff to stymie India from broadening retaliation. The Modi government, like that of Vajpayee in 1999, has called the Pakistani bluff. This time the targets include not only most training camps of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir but also their declared headquarters at Muridke and Bahawalpur, respectively.
In both places, the terror outfits have created charitable institutions, providing education and healthcare. That earns them public goodwill, facilitates recruitment and enables fund collection abroad, especially in the Gulf. The facade also becomes a protective shield against scrutiny of their real motives and actions. India came close to attacking Muridke after the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, but the US was still in Afghanistan and hunting for Osama bin Laden. Their pressure and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s pacifist instincts held India back. India chose instead to use the international route to name and shame Pakistan. The UN Security Council’s listing of global terrorists was also employed, despite Chinese foot-dragging. That process has just obtained for India the custody of Tahawwur Rana, co-conspirator with David Headley. That may also be a motivating factor for the Pakistan army’s urgency to create a major distraction, as his revelations will uncover ISI’s direct complicity in 26/11.
In 2019, President Donald Trump played a vital role in de-escalating the situation quickly. In his present incarnation, he is totally enmeshed in the global trade chaos that he has churned. He also has Ukraine and Gaza conflicts already choking his claimed diplomatic prowess. China, for the same reason, may actually be against the South Asian conflict escalating. It needs India as a potential market, probably assuming that Trump will not easily back off.
What then can happen next? Pakistan will certainly retaliate. It can be mostly symbolic, like in 2019, with LoC firing already taking a toll. Its problem is target selection. India does not have terrorist training camps breeding anti-Pakistan militancy. It has also seen India beginning to weaponise river waters, which is an existential threat. If it targets military facilities, then escalation is inevitable. If it goes after the run-of-river projects on Chenab and Jhelum, that too would cross India’s red lines.
Pakistani generals lose jobs after tactical mistakes. President Pervez Musharraf's coup followed an attempt to replace him. Unfortunately, with the degradation of the position of America as an arbiter in such situations, the off-ramps look shaky. Pakistan has to back off from resumed sponsorship of terror against India. India needs to restore deterrence. But this time, unlike in 2019, India also needs, once calm returns, to open dialogue with Pakistan. Shutting all doors has proven as risky as appeasement. Diplomacy must find a middle path.
KC Singh is former secretary, Ministry of External Affairs
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