Red alert for Pak on the terror front

ON the night of May 6-7, India launched Operation Sindoor, comprising a series of military strikes against terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan. Nine terror camps were hit, which included five in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and four in the Punjab province. Among the most significant targets were Muridke and Bahawalpur.

Muridke, about 40 km from Lahore, is the headquarters of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and its front organisation, Jamaat-ud-Dawa. The Resistance Front (TRF), which initially claimed responsibility for the Pahalgam massacre, is known to be affiliated with the LeT. Bahawalpur is home to the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), which operates from the Jamia Masjid Subhan Allah complex, also known as the Usman-o-Ali campus.

Operation Sindoor is significantly larger in scale and scope than the cross-border strikes in 2016 and 2019. The message that it sends out is also far more powerful and unequivocal. And in this message, there are some key shifts in India’s future strategy for dealing with Pakistan.

First, major terror attacks will meet with a punitive response. Since the limited strikes of 2016 and 2019 failed to deter Pakistan from using terrorism as an instrument of state policy, greater pain must be felt by those who are directly controlling the terrorist movement. If the Pakistani military is unwilling to rein in the terrorist leadership, then India will do so using the military instrument.

India has long adopted a posture of strategic restraint. However, the shifting security environment, particularly after the gruesome Pahalgam attack, has triggered a recalibration. Targeting deeper locations like Bahawalpur and Muridke indicates that India no longer considers mere retaliation sufficient. The new approach seeks to alter cost-benefit calculations for those orchestrating terrorism from across the border.

At the government briefing after Operation Sindoor, a montage of past terror attacks (from the 2001 Parliament attack to Mumbai 2008, Uri 2016, Pulwama 2019 and the Pahalgam attack) was shown to underscore the toll of cross-border terror, after which the message “…No More” flashed. The presentation may have appeared dramatic, but it underlined India’s resolve that it would no longer tolerate terrorism emanating from Pakistani soil.

Second, there are two choices in front of the Pakistan Army. It must either dismantle the entrenched military-jihad complex it has long nurtured, or risk plunging the country into a ruinous conflict with India, one that could push Pakistan deeper into instability and peril.

For decades, the Pakistan Army has treated jihadi groups as strategic assets, using them to bleed India while maintaining plausible deniability. With Operation Sindoor, India is making it clear that there is no distinction between the state and the proxies it sponsors. This blurring of lines is deliberate. By hitting targets in Punjab, India signals that safe havens are no longer immune, regardless of their political sensitivity.

In his briefing to the press, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri said India’s “actions were measured, non-escalatory, proportionate, and responsible. They focused on dismantling the terrorist infrastructure and disabling terrorists likely to be sent across to India.” This was a subtle message to Pakistan that the escalation could be controlled if it restrains from any military retaliation, and in the long run, puts a check on terrorist activities. Whether the Pakistan Army heeds this message is uncertain.

Third, India is clear that space exists for a limited conventional conflict below the nuclear threshold. Pakistan flashes its nuclear card at the very first opportunity whenever there is an India-Pakistan crisis. Minister Hanif Abbasi has stated that if India were to halt water supply to Pakistan by suspending the Indus Waters Treaty, Islamabad would be prepared to strike with nuclear weapons. Muhammad Khalid Jamali, Pakistan’s Ambassador to Russia, made a similar threat.

India no longer sees itself as constrained by Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail. It has gradually moved up the ladder in the use of conventional forces to target terror infrastructure in Pakistan. Operation Sindoor, with its strikes in the Punjab heartland, has set a new standard in the employment of airpower, once considered highly escalatory, in responding to terror attacks.

Fourth, the clamour from some international quarters for providing direct evidence linking Pakistan to terror attacks in India has run its course. India has been the victim of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism for decades and is on firm ground when it states that the fountainhead of terrorism lies in that country. The problem is not the foot soldiers who execute the attack, but the terrorist and army leadership in Pakistan that nurtures terrorism.

The demand for irrefutable proof ignores the nature of proxy warfare. Terror outfits are designed precisely to offer deniability. The consistency of terror attacks in India, the identity of the perpetrators, their training grounds, ideological narratives and sources of funding all point to an ecosystem that cannot function without state patronage.

Fifth, there is also a message for the international community. There is a level of frustration in India over the inability of global institutions like the United Nations to hold Pakistan accountable for its support to terrorism. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar admitted in the National Assembly that he had worked hard to get the reference to the terror group TRF removed from the final text of the UN Security Council resolution condemning the Pahalgam attack.

While international opinion and diplomatic support are important, they are not key factors when deciding on India’s options to respond to Pakistan’s terrorism. Platitudes that seek to equate both countries and call on them to exercise restraint, irrespective of the nature of the provocation, will be ignored by India.

Operation Sindoor sets new doctrinal benchmarks: that terror infrastructure will be struck; that nuclear deterrence will not shield proxy actors; that the global community’s moral ambivalence will not override India’s sovereign choices; and that the Pakistan Army must reckon with the consequences of its long-standing compact with jihadist groups.

Unfortunately, this makes South Asia a less stable region. Pakistan must now confront the hard truth about the trajectory of its future if it continues down the path of using terrorism as a state policy.

Lt Gen DS Hooda (retd) is former northern army commander.

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