Beyond strategy: How Operation Sindoor defied expectations

1. The 22/4 Pahalgam was another brutal attack after 26/11 which was unacceptable to India and could not be left unpunished without muscular retaliation. The methodologies of execution of these two terror attacks were violent and inhuman. India felt that it had to take more audacious actions to put a stop to the madness, teach Pakistan a lesson, and expose their blatant support for cross-border terrorism.

 

 

2. After Mumbai attacks, India prepared a list of terrorist training camps operating from inside Pakistan and shared them with the leading countries and Pakistan in the form of target folders. It was made clear that any such future trigger event, India will retaliate with ferocity. The decision to carry out any military action inside Pakistan was left to political leadership. India had to wait for more than eight years after Mumbai massacre, until the Uri attack to punch back at Pakistan for continuing with their cross-border terrorist activities. The retaliation after Pulwama was more muscular and served to deter Pakistan Army temporarily. These Indian strikes sent a strong message that India would not hesitate to enter Pakistan to destroy or degrade terrorist infrastructure.

 

 

3. Op Sindoor exposed Pakistan as a country that continues to sponsor and support terrorism. The selection of nine targets was done meticulously, displaying synergy between military and intelligence agencies in identifying targets and its details for successful execution of aerial targeting. The precise execution of the attack over the terror epicentres dealt a significant blow to the terror industry that Pakistan had been cultivating for decades. The killing of five most wanted terrorists and many others associated with running the terror factory is a huge setback that ISI, the most active sponsor of terrorist groups, is struggling to digest. The terrorist’s safe havens were located in markaz, sarjal, masjid, maskar and camps in various locations inside Pakistan opposite to Line of Control (LOC) and International Border (IB). For the first time, targets in Pakistan’s Punjab were struck. These places were used to organise, plan, raise funds, communicate, train, recruit, transit and operate in relative security due to the backing of Pakistan’s premier institution, the Pakistan Army.

 

 

4. Initially, there was fear and confusion in Pakistan. The first casualty was its political leadership. Realising the might and intent of India, the foreign minister of Pakistan announced that there would be no further action from Pakistan as long as India did not escalate. However, this narrative did not last long. The Pakistan Army, under extreme pressure from terrorist leadership, decided to retaliate to satisfy their proxies, whom they had been cultivating for long and had developed a mutually dependent relationship in overcoming each other’s weaknesses.

 

 

5. India conducted retaliatory strikes in a classical manner. The world had previously witnessed high-tech operations during the Gulf wars in 1991. Prior to the ground assault by the surface forces, Iraq’s fighting capability was decimated through aerial bombardments. Thereafter operational success of the Army of coalition forces was quick with minimum causalities. Similarly, India used its drones, loitering munitions, missiles, air to surface bombs/missiles to degrade or destroy Pakistan’s air defence capability. The limited SEAD/DEAD operations carried out by India in certain sectors were effective in creating corridors for conducting air operations. The attacks on eight airfields and their aircraft operating surfaces were highly successful and would have supported further air operations with minimal attrition. More such operations would be required to achieve a certain degree of control of air in the form of air superiority or supremacy to assist Army in conducting ground operations with minimal interference from the Pakistan Air Force.

 

 

6. On the Pakistani side, it is evident that the selection of targets was done by the ISI primarily to please the terrorists groups and their leaders, rather than to escalate into a full-fledged war. The targets initially were innocent civilians, hospitals, schools and religious places. These attacks were carried out mainly utilising swarm drones, missiles and artillery. One odd attack was carried out using HATF surface to surface missile. The majority of these attacks were foiled. The attacks carried out by Pakistan were a failure indicating poor operational acumen and limited involvement of military professionals in planning and selection of targets. The small drones did not carry substantial warhead to create any damage to any of the air defence systems on Indian side.

 

 

7. The respect enjoyed by radical elements in Pakistan was clearly visible when the senior civil and military leadership attended the state funeral for the terrorists killed in Indian strike. These elements enjoy significant clout in Pakistani society. The Pakistan Army heavily depends on them to conduct nefarious activities, which helps reinforce its image as a powerful and controlling institution and the self-proclaimed saviour of the nation. With the Pakistan Army suffering heavy casualties at the hands of BLA and the western border remaining sensitive, activating the eastern border with India defies logic. The clear message was that support for radical elements will continue and they would be funded and cultivated to achieve future objectives.

 

 

8. The planning and conduct of Operation Sindoor and subsequent retaliatory strikes by India have several important key takeaways:

 

        a. India as a responsible democratic nation is once again endorsed.

 

        b. The Indian population supports political leadership that can make strong decisions during crises.

 

        c. India succeeded in proving that Pakistan is a terror state and that terrorist organisations now have limited safe havens in Pakistan as they stand exposed.

 

        d. Initial measures adopted by Indian leadership after the Pahalgam attack, prior to Operation Sindoor, effectively targeted Pakistan’s core instruments of national power. Had India continued these measures, Pakistan would have been strangulated economically, diplomatically and militarily.

        e. The Operations exposed Pakistan’s leadership as propaganda masters and the Pakistan Army as weak domestically and internationally.

 

        f. India must maintain a formidable military with state-of- the-art assets and a robust defence industrial base to protect national interests at all times.

 

        g. The operations demonstrated synergy and jointness among civilian leadership, the military, Intelligence agencies, police and paramilitary organisations in planning and conducting warfare.

 

        h. The failure of Pakistan’s long-standing policy of bleeding India by a thousand cuts.

 

        i. The operations successfully exposed the nuclear bluff of Pakistan and highlighted India’s capability to control the escalation ladder.

 

9. India once again agreed to a ceasefire from a position of strength, which is considered a strategic move. However, India’s diplomatic, informational, military and economic coercion will continue to prevent the adversary from reorganising, funding and supporting terrorist networks. Let this be the beginning of the end of the terror state of Pakistan.

 

Air Vice Marshal KS Suresh Kumar (Retd) is an Indian Air Force Veteran

India