Peace with Pakistan remains a distant hope

Ashok Ogra

The hurriedly agreed ceasefire announced by both India and Pakistan raises a fundamental question: will the Pakistan state, particularly its highly radicalized army, ever refrain from sponsoring cross-border terrorism. What prevents Pakistan from describing the terrorists ‘Mujhahideen?’ The presence of Pakistani army generals at the funeral of terrorists says it all.

There is no denying that under ‘Operation Sindoor’, the Indian armed forces have boldly destroyed terror camps in Pakistan, demonstrating both deep-strike capabilities and military resolve. India has also made it unequivocally clear that any future terrorist attacks on its soil could be treated as acts of war. It needs to be acknowledged that Pakistan managed to carry out retaliatory measures though successfully intercepted by our air defense systems, and infiltrating as deep as Hisar- though no substantial damage has been reported.

India’s deterrent posture may not be entirely effective, given the strategic calculus of the Pakistan Army. Limited conflicts with India allow the Pakistan army to present itself as the ultimate guardian of national security, thereby preserving its dominance over Pakistan’s political institutions and marginalizing civilian governance. This also explains why the Pakistan Army continues to sanctify a state of permanent confrontation with India, framing Kashmir not just as a territorial dispute but as a divine right. Increasingly, the army sees the country’s raison d’être as rooted more in religious ideology than in civic or territorial concerns.”

As observed by scholar Stephen P. Cohen, the British Indian Army’s defining feature was its detachment from political life or religious ideology. However, what followed after partition was a stark divergence-one that would alter the trajectory of South Asian history.

India’s military leadership, guided by statesmen like Nehru and Sardar Patel, remained committed to this ethos. Field Marshal K.M. Cariappa, the Indian Army’s first Commander-in-Chief, famously insisted that “the Army’s job is not to meddle in politics but to be loyal to the elected government.” India’s democratic institutions, shaped by the Congress Party’s long experience in governance, provided a resilient civilian framework that kept the military in its barracks, even in times of national crisis.

Pakistan, by contrast, entered independence with weaker civilian institutions. The Muslim League had no experience in governance, and the early state lacked a constitution until 1956. Into this vacuum stepped the army. As Ayesha Jalal writes in The State of Martial Rule, the military quickly became “the only coherent institution” in Pakistan, simultaneously defining national security and political identity.

The first definitive breach came in 1958 when General Ayub Khan overthrew the civilian government and declared martial law. Naming himself Field Marshal, Ayub established a military-bureaucratic state, justifying his coup by accusing politicians of incompetence.

It was under General Zia-ul-Haq, however, that the transformation of the army into an ideological entity began in serious earnest. His 11-year rule (1977-1988) remains a watershed moment. Often referred to as “Maulvi Zia” within military circles, he merged statecraft with religious orthodoxy. The army’s motto was changed from “Unity, Faith, and Discipline” to “Faith, Piety, and Jihad in the Path of Allah.” Officers were now promoted not just for their tactical acumen, but for their piety. Beards, Quran memorization, and public religiosity became metrics for career advancement.

With U.S. and Saudi support during the Afghan-Soviet War, Gen. Zia used the opportunity to institutionalize proxy warfare-training, arming, and exporting jihadist groups under the pretext of resisting Soviet occupation. In reality, these networks later became instruments in Pakistan’s campaign against India- first in Punjab and later in Kashmir.

This dubious legacy of Gen. Zia continues unabated under Gen. Asim Munir, who views the military nation’s ideological vanguard.

His recent inflammatory speech provides enough clues of the new mental makeup of the Pakistani army. In reaffirming the two-nation theory, invoking Quranic verses with great fervor (his father was a Imam), and describing Pakistan’s military role in theological terms, Gen. Munir did not merely address his soldiers-he issued a doctrine. In his speech he underscored three key themes:

First, by referring to irreconcilable civilizational differences between Hindus and Muslims, he was attempting at legitimizing the founding myths of Pakistan – a country that Salman Rushdie aptly describes ‘Insufficiently Imagined.’ In doing so, he simply ignored the reality of millions of Muslims who chose to remain in Indi, and who coexist peacefully within its pluralistic democracy. It must have certainly irked Gen Munir to see Col.Sophia Qureshi holding daily press briefings.

Second, Gen. Munir invoked the metaphor of Kashmir as Pakistan’s “jugular vein,” an expression first used by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Such rhetoric has historically served as a euphemism for supporting cross-border insurgency.

Third-and most troubling-was the overt theological framing of military actions. By casting Pakistan’s strategic objectives in religious terms, Gen. Munir has erased the already-thin line between soldier and crusader.

It needs to be mentioned that even some civilian leaders have facilitated the army’s ideological turn. As Prime Minister, foreign educated Z.A. Bhutto banned alcohol, shifted the weekly holiday to Friday, and declared Ahmadiyyas non-Muslims. Imran Khan’s government set up the Rahmatul-lil-Alameen Authority to promote Islamic values among youth. These moves were more than merely symbolic.

This trajectory inevitably has material consequences. The 2025 Pahalgam massacre, which killed 26 civilians, is emblematic of the deadly outcome when the military and the mullah converge. While groups like the Resistance Front (TRF) may claim indigenous legitimacy, they operate with resources and training funneled through Pakistan’s military-intelligence nexus. This is not rogue behavior-it is doctrine in action.

The military’s ideological agenda is mirrored by its deep entanglement in Pakistan’s economy. Ayesha Siddiqa has documented how the army runs a parallel economy-controlling banks, cement factories, housing authorities, fertilizer companies, and even bakeries. She argues, it is now a kleptocratic oligarchy, accountable neither to parliament nor to the public.

It is often said that Pakistan is broke, but its military is not. Fighter jets, drones, submarines, warships-Islamabad continues to amass them all, even as it lurches from one financial bailout to the next.

Within this context, Gen. Munir’s speech was an attempt to reclaim ideological legitimacy at a time when the army is facing public resentment over its role in banning the Tehreek-e-Insaf Party from contesting elections and imprisoning former Prime Minister Imran Khan. Moreover, Gen. Munir’s own authority within the military is not absolute; unlike his predecessors, he did not graduate from the prestigious Pakistan Military Academy in Kakul but from a less elite Officers Training School that was essentially established to supply short-service commissioned officers. This makes his ideological posturing a compensatory move-one aimed at consolidating control.

Confounding the problem is the fact that the Pakistan Army itself is not monolithic; it has internal divisions, with factions ranging from radical elements to more moderate voices. These divisions influence the military’s policies and strategies.

In a well researched book on the Pakistan army, noted journalist Shuja Nawaz describes a visit to ISI HQ: “The corridors were filled with bearded officers in civilian Shalwar-Kameez, many of them with their Sahlwar hitched up above the ankle, a signature practice of the Tablighi Jamaat….. The Jihad in Kashmir had been privatized, handedover to freelancers.”

How else does one explain several coup attempts in Pakistan’s history, and the mystery surrounding the crash of Gen. Zia’s air force helicopter in 1988?

Then there is Balochistan, where insurgency simmers despite decades of military crackdowns. The army’s failure to subdue the province raises further questions about its competence. For Gen. Munir, stirring nationalism over Kashmir, serves as a distraction from growing internal dissent and military fatigue.

Against this background, Gen.Munir speech wasn’t just an oration but a political manifesto . This makes any long-term détente with India increasingly unlikely. For the Pakistan army, India is not just a geopolitical adversary-it is an ideological one. Pluralism, democracy, and secularism challenge the very narrative the army uses to justify its dominance over a nation’s polity.

While Pakistan’s elected governments may sometimes continue offering peace talks, these efforts will finally be arbitrated by GHQ, Rawalpindi. Therefore, the present ceasefire may provide short-term calm, but history shows they are often temporary and do not lead to real and permanent solutions.

Meanwhile, India can learn from countries like Israel and South Korea – both surrounded by enemies- which stay strong despite constant threats. They continue investing in security- both external and internal, technology and national identity to stay resilient. India must follow a similar path-defending itself while growing stronger, smarter, and more united. Also, make it financially untenable for Pakistan to match India’s military might. That and only that will guarantee India’s strategic dominance over Pakistan. Meanwhile, don’t be surprised if another Pakistan-sponsored terror attack takes place, followed by a retaliatory surgical strike by India.

As the saying goes: “Peace is not the absence of enemies, but the presence of strength.”

(The author works as Advisor for reputed Apeejay Education, New Delhi)

The post Peace with Pakistan remains a distant hope appeared first on Daily Excelsior.

News