The inside story of merger of Sikkim with India

Within a few years of its creation in 1968, India’s external intelligence agency — the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) — played a decisive role in two major operations that reshaped the region’s map. The first was its covert support during the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971. The second, less discussed but no less consequential, was the merger of Sikkim with India in May 1975.

At the time of India’s independence, 565 of the 600 princely states joined the Indian Union through bilateral Instruments of Accession. Sikkim, also a member of the Chamber of Princes and the Constituent Assembly, remained outside this process. Sardar Patel wanted Sikkim to accede, but Nehru disagreed. Ultimately, the December 1950 treaty gave Sikkim protectorate status — India would handle its external affairs, defence, communications, currency and posts.

In 1947, smaller Sikkimese parties that supported merger, joined the Sikkim State Congress (SSC), led by Tashi Tshering. They wanted an end to absentee landlordism, a representative government and eventual accession to India. Tshering met Nehru twice, in 1948 and 1949. While Nehru was sympathetic to the first two demands, he rejected outright the merger, saying that Sikkim should evolve “according to its own genius."

On May 1, 1949, Tshering led 5,000 people to the palace gates, demanding reform. The Maharaja fled to the Political Office. But with Indian support, the monarchy regained control, and the pro-democracy movement was sidelined. India’s policy was what I called “an apparent appeasement towards the Maharaja and cautious containment of pro-accession forces."

Electoral reforms introduced by the Maharaja in 1953 failed to satisfy public demands. A “parity system" was introduced to balance representation between the majority Nepalese (75 per cent) and the minority Bhutia-Lepcha (25 per cent) populations, but combined with nomination quotas, it ensured pro-monarchy outcomes.

By the 1960s, new personalities were reshaping Sikkim’s politics. In 1958, LD Kazi married Eliza Maria Lanford Rai, a charismatic figure who played an influential role in his party. In 1963, Rajkumar Palden Thondup Namgyal married Hope Cooke, a young American who dreamed of being queen of a Himalayan kingdom. Thondup used the marriage to draw international attention to Sikkim’s cause.

Following his father’s death in 1963, Thondup became the 12th Chogyal — ‘Dharam Raja’ — a title officially recognised by India at his coronation in 1965. He was dissatisfied with the 1950 treaty and began openly pleading for greater autonomy. In 1967, he told reporters that he wanted more political freedom. A year later, on India’s Independence Day, Sikkimese students in Gangtok chanted slogans like “We are buffers, not duffers" and “Indians leave Sikkim."

In 1972, India offered Sikkim permanent association status with associate membership of UN-affiliated bodies like the WHO. The Chogyal rejected it, as his lawyers advised him that it would leave Sikkim worse off than under the 1950 treaty.

At this point, diplomacy had run its course. A covert operation was the only solution. Towards the end of 1972, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi summoned R&AW chief RN Kao and her principal secretary PN Haksar. She showed them a letter from the Chogyal in which he had used the title ‘His Majesty’ — suggesting sovereign status. She turned to Kao and asked, “Can you do something about this?"

Kao asked for two weeks. He returned in 10 days and said, “Yes." Gandhi agreed, but made one thing clear: the operation could go all the way to merger, provided it had public support.

Around June 1973, I was called by Kao. He assigned me this operation and I was told to meet my regional chief PN Banerjee in Calcutta. There, in July 1973, the mission was laid out: unite pro-democracy groups, assure them that India would no longer shield the Chogyal, support Kazi Lhendup Dorji’s Sikkim National Congress (SNC) and prepare for a possible merger, while keeping the Chogyal under the illusion that negotiations were still possible, so he wouldn’t actively oppose the process or mobilise against the upcoming elections.

In R&AW, only Kao, Banerjee, and I knew the final objective of merger. In the Ministry of External Affairs, only Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh was aware of it.

Given the sensitivity, I began keeping a personal diary. I also spent time in the National Archives and Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, reviewing declassified documents to understand how Sikkim policy had evolved since 1947.

A three-member operational team was formed: my predecessor (whom I replaced), Punjab Pradhan (a Nepalese officer) and Myingma Tshering (a Bhutia). To maintain secrecy, we worked mostly at night. The operation was divided into three phases, with each phase planned after the previous one succeeded.

Phase one was to build pressure on the Chogyal to cede administrative power. That was accomplished through the May 8, 1973 tripartite agreement between the Chogyal, three political parties and the Foreign Secretary. BS Das was appointed Chief Executive, with the Chogyal reduced to a figurehead.

I arrived in Sikkim in August 1973. My job was to assist Kazi’s party in preparing for elections and securing at least a two-thirds majority in the Assembly.

The elections, held on April 15, 1974 under the supervision of the Election Commission of India, delivered a landslide: the SNC won 31 out of 32 seats. On May 11, the Assembly passed resolutions seeking closer ties with India and participation in Indian institutions.

Despite the Chogyal’s objections, the Assembly passed the Government of Sikkim Bill. With the 35th Constitutional Amendment on September 7, 1974, Sikkim became an Associate State. Kazi was appointed the first popularly elected Chief Minister.

Events moved quickly after that. In February 1975, the Chogyal attended King Birendra’s coronation in Kathmandu, irritating New Delhi. On April 10, the Sikkim Assembly passed two resolutions — one calling for full merger with India, the other demanding the Chogyal’s removal. These moves were endorsed in a referendum held on April 14, with 97 per cent voting in favour. A day earlier, Sikkim’s military guards had been disarmed by the Indian Army. We even arranged for the Chogyal’s ham radio frequencies to be jammed to prevent him from making public appeals.

In May 1975, the Indian Parliament approved the 36th Constitutional Amendment. With presidential assent on May 15, Sikkim officially became India’s 22nd state the next day and BB Lal was appointed its first Governor.

GBS Sidhu is former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat.

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