Indo-Pak conflict: The nuclear bogey is here to stay

LIKE Banquo’s ghost in Macbeth, the spectre of nuclear weapons has hovered over India-Pakistan conflicts in recent decades. Notwithstanding disclaimers, it does so over the Operation Sindoor strikes as well.

Looking back, the risk of an actual nuclear outbreak seems to be low, almost negligible. But as the events unfolded, several pathways that could have led to that dreaded event became visible.

The urgency of addressing these pathways seems to have prompted the US to shift from its arms-length posture to active diplomacy and help broker a ceasefire. The Indian proposition is that the ceasefire was reached bilaterally, but it’s apparent that it was brokered by Uncle Sam, who does not tire of reminding us about it.

On May 12, speaking at the White House on the eve of his visit to Qatar, US President Trump declared, “My administration helped broker a full and immediate ceasefire, I think a permanent one, between India and Pakistan, ending a dangerous conflict of two nations with lots of nuclear weapons.” The previous day, he praised the Indian and Pakistani leadership for ending the “current aggression” and said “millions of good and innocent people could have died.”

Even before the crisis escalated, Pakistan had hinted at a nuclear response. Following the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) by India, a statement from the Pakistan Prime Minister’s office said any attempt to stop or divert the waters would be considered as an act of war “and responded to with full force across the complete spectrum of national power.” This reference to “complete spectrum” clearly related to nuclear weapons.

Then, as the crisis escalated, Pakistan sent more nuclear signals. On May 10, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif called a meeting of the National Command Authority, the top body that takes decisions on the country’s security as well as those related to nuclear weapons. This was later conveniently denied by Pakistan.

There was a lot of misinformation swirling around developments relating to nuclear weapons. One came from the landing of a Beechcraft Super King Air 350 aircraft — purportedly of the US Department of Energy — in Sargodha shortly after an Indian strike on Kirana Hills, where some Pakistani nuclear weapons are reportedly stored. It transpired later that this aircraft, which did belong to the US agency, had been bought by Pakistan in 2010 and its presence had nothing to do with anything nuclear.

India denied that it conducted a strike on Kirana Hills, a mountain range located about 15 km from the Mushaf airbase near Sargodha, which it did strike. But there is evidence of two hits near the entrance of the facilities at Kirana Hills. Let’s be clear their strikes on Nur Khan base near Rawalpindi, Malir near Karachi and on Kirana Hills was clear messaging since these facilities are host or adjacent to facilities relating to nuclear weapons.

This became explicit on May 12 when Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his address to the nation, declared that “India will not tolerate nuclear blackmail. India will strike precisely and decisively at the terrorist hideouts developing under the cover of nuclear blackmail.”

This is a new doctrinal assertion, since in the past 40 years in which India has suffered from cross-border terrorism, it was the nuclear factor that had stayed the Indian hand. On May 13, in his official briefing, Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal rejected Trump’s account of the ceasefire and also insisted that “the military action was entirely in the conventional domain.”

India has a nuclear doctrine, which says that its nuclear weapons are only for retaliation against a nuclear, chemical or biological weapon attack on India or Indian forces anywhere. Pakistan does not have an enunciated doctrine, but it has asserted at various times that India is the target of its weapons, which will be used if it suffered major territorial loss, destruction of key military assets or economic strangulation.

It would be foolhardy to ignore the prospect of a nuclear war even if there is a self-conscious effort to keep it in the conventional domain. These dangers have been evident in the recent Indian strikes on Pakistani Air Force (PAF) facilities. The Op Sindoor strikes were limited — they initially struck at terrorist facilities, and hit Pakistani military facilities only after the PAF launched attacks on Indian aircraft over Indian territory. All this was limited to the 48 or so hours of the main conflict.

In an actual war, even one that lasts two or three weeks, the bombing would be much more intense. This is where problems can occur. As of now, India keeps its nuclear weapons de-mated — the weapon and the fissile core separate — so as to promote nuclear safety and political oversight. But in the case of Pakistan, where the military runs the show, both the weapons and cores are mated and held by the Army.

The big danger in an all-out war, even if India intends to keep it entirely conventional, is that it may inadvertently end up hitting a large number of nuclear weapons storage sites using weapons like the SCALP (Storm Shadow), Crystal Maze and Paveway-type bombs that can penetrate fortified bunkers. Without intending to do so, it may degrade the Pakistani nuclear arsenal to the point where the country is confronted with a “use it or lose it” dilemma. In this event, it may find itself being compelled to escalate things to the use of nuclear weapons.

Manoj Joshi is Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

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