Operation Sindoor: Breaking Gordian knot of terror & talks
Foreign Minister S Jaishankar’s clanger last week that “at the start of the operation we messaged Pakistan, we were hitting only terrorist targets and not Pakistan’s military so it could stay out" (though it chose not to) has proved disingenuous. Why was it said 20 days after Operation Sindoor? Earlier, at Uri and Balakot, “exclusion of Pakistan military" was qualified after the operations. So was it this time. But Pakistan’s response was inevitable. The MEA has clarified it was said during phase 1 at the end of the operation when the DGMOs spoke.
Nearly three weeks on, smoke over Bahawalpur and Muridke has not settled down. The fog of war has not lifted. Truth remains the first casualty. The ceasefire has no expiry date. Two terrorist incidents have taken place in Shopian and Tral and six local terrorists killed. Pahalgam culprits have not been caught. A new Multi-Agency Centre has come up; akin to shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted. For the sixth time, Donald Trump has said he “‘managed to arrange ceasefire and avoid a bad nuclear war." In all previous India-Pakistan conflicts, US crisis management has been a notable feature.
During Kargil and Balakot, diplomacy was riding on the back of the military. In Op Sindoor, Indian diplomacy could not keep pace with the velocity of the brilliantly executed operations that had only one questionable supporter, Israel. No neighbouring country has backed India’s kinetic response, though all have condemned the Pahalgam attack without naming Pakistan. China and Turkiye have come out in support of Pakistan. Despite India’s veiled denial of US intercession, diplomatic teams are being sent abroad for fire-fighting. Pakistan is following suit. In the month of July, Pakistan will hold the UNSC presidency, during which Kashmir is likely to come up.
Both India and Pakistan have celebrated victory. The balance of advantage in the aerial exchange is unarguably with India. Pakistan will live to fight another day as cross-border terrorism will not cease soon. While India may not have a national security policy, it has coined a complex counter-terrorism doctrine, declaring a terrorist attack an act of war and removing the light between proxies and sponsors. Delhi has dispensed with Pakistan’s deniability and dossiers exchange.
Not only is Op Sindoor the shortest stand-off, non-contact skirmish, but also the briefest nuclear crisis. For the first time, the IAF has taken the honours by proving to be the sword arm. It has established air power is minimally escalatory. The termination of the operation was qualified with “any Pakistan misadventure would attract a corresponding response." Pakistan’s inevitable one-notch-up response therefore had escalation built in. Rawalpindi had to escalate to de-escalate and get off ramp. Superior technology and skill in delivery enabled India to maintain domination over escalation control.
This has restored deterrence and expanded space for conventional operations by raising Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. During the conflict, there was no nuclear signalling, except US detection of dynamic targeting that set off the nuclear alarm. The sale-worthiness of made-in-India and tested against Pakistan weaponry has enhanced even as the Chinese watched with a hawk eye.
Despite the stunning rise of technology, the man behind the machine is supreme. The foot soldier will dominate in conquest and defence of territory (PoK and LAC). Op Sindoor was a war of attrition and achieving psychological ascendency. The relevance of the Army will remain due to India’s unsettled borders, internal instabilities and defending sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The internationalisation of Kashmir and re-hyphenation with Pakistan have already happened. On bilateralism, Islamabad’s National Security Committee stated on April 25 in response to Delhi’s slew of non-kinetic measures that “Pakistan shall exercise the right to hold all bilateral agreements with India including but not limited to Simla Agreement in abeyance till India desists from its manifest behaviour of fomenting terrorism inside Pakistan, non-adherence to international law and UN resolutions on Kashmir." The US may say it has “influence", not “control" over Pakistan, it exercises both.
The Composite Dialogue begun in 2004 has remained on-off since 2008. The contours of the post-Pahalgam dialogue will be known after the cessation of firing stabilises into ceasefire. India should drop the charade: response was against terrorist infrastructure not the military, proportionate, responsible and non-escalatory. Ironically, Op Sindoor was required to break the Gordian knot terror and talks won’t go together.
Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta (retd) is a military commentator.
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