Rare insights by a former Army Chief
Examining the decision-making process behind significant military events is crucial for comprehending the full scope of military history. By delving into the intricacies of how and why decisions were made, future scholars can uncover the contextual factors that influenced key choices.
In India, literature focusing on military decision-making is relatively sparse. General NC Vij’s book ‘Alone in the Ring’ brings this perspective into sharp focus. Over his last six years in the Indian Army, General Vij served as the Director General Military Operations (DGMO), the Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS), and the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). These roles provided him not only with a ringside view of critical events, but also positioned him to shape decision-making at the highest levels, introducing new operational concepts and welfare measures in the Indian Army.
The book is structured into eight chapters, each focusing on a particular decision made or influenced by the author, lending it a thematic coherence that facilitates understanding.
The book commences with the Kargil War, during which the author was the DGMO. He frankly admits to the lack of intelligence and the initial unpreparedness of the troops that led to the initial setbacks. While it is well known that the Army and Air Force were ordered not to cross the Line of Control, Gen Vij reveals that India was ready to launch a full-scale war on Pakistan if the fighting in Kargil did not result in a complete vacation of areas occupied by Pakistan.
As compared to the deep understanding that existed between the political and military leaderships in the Kargil War, Operation Parakram showed the complete absence of a clear political aim. Gen Vij takes us behind the curtains to the discussions held between the political and military leadership while deciding on a response to the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001.
The Indian Army was ordered to mobilise for war, but no clear political directions were given on the military objectives. In the words of the author, “The government decided not only to hold off on an offensive but also to not remove troops from the border. This dichotomous and economically unviable approach seemed to lack clear aim and purpose.”
The lessons of Operation Parakram led to a review of the Indian Army’s operational doctrine and resulted in what is termed the ‘cold start doctrine’. Since there was no official announcement, there has been much debate on whether such a doctrine exists and its operational efficacy. Gen Vij throws light on how the doctrine was developed during his tenure as the Army Chief and the reasoning behind its adoption. This chapter would be of great interest to scholars who are keen to study the doctrinal developments in the Indian Army.
One decision that was forcefully implemented by Gen Vij as the COAS was the construction of the Line of Control (LoC) fence. When he initially discussed this idea with the Army’s senior commanders, there was universal opposition on the grounds that the project was impractical and could lead to a defensive mindset. Gen Vij admits that he “did not have total belief that this fence experiment would definitely deliver”, but something new had to be done to reduce the infiltration across the LoC.
Construction of the 550-km LoC fence started in July 2003 and was completed by September 2004. Having served on numerous occasions in Jammu and Kashmir, I can personally testify how the construction of the fence has been of immense value in controlling terrorist activity in the region.
Gen Vij also describes his interaction with the political leadership on the issue of India sending troops to Iraq to participate in the US-led Operation Iraqi Freedom. He clearly stated his opposition to this proposal in a letter to the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister. The author tellingly writes, “The military leadership must always present a frank and forthright opinion on matters of national security, and communicate it clearly and precisely to the government, irrespective of whether it is in consonance with the government’s views or not.”
Other chapters of the book dwell on jointness and integration within the military, Operation Khukri to rescue Indian peacekeepers in Sierra Leone, and the major reforms undertaken during Gen Vij’s tenure as the COAS for improving the welfare, self-esteem and honour of the soldiers.
An interesting aspect of the book is its ability to connect specific historical events to contemporary thought, creating a seamless narrative that bridges past experiences with current strategic thinking. A recurrent theme throughout the book is the need for India to develop a national security strategy, the absence of which hinders strategic planning by the defence forces.
Gen NC Vij’s ‘Alone in the Ring’ not only sheds light on some of the operational challenges faced by the Indian Army, but also underscores the importance of strategic clarity and adaptive leadership. The book is an indispensable read for those interested in military leadership and decision-making.
The reviewer is former Northern Army Commander
Book Review