The IAF, from a support arm to a strategic force in the skies

IN 2021, the late Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Bipin Rawat, had dismissively dubbed the Indian Air Force (IAF) as a ‘support arm’ of the Indian Army’s (IA) combat units, like the artillery and engineers, during wartime. Speaking at a webinar organised by the Global Counter-Terrorism Council in New Delhi, General Rawat — who died in an IAF helicopter crash in 2022 — had asserted the supremacy of his parent service in remarks that provoked agitation, deepening further the long-standing operational rivalry between the IA and the air force. But four years later, following last month’s high-intensity and technologically-driven Operation Sindoor, the IAF cannot possibly be viewed as a mere adjunct or ‘support arm’ to the ground forces; it has emerged grandly as a focal pillar of India’s overall military strategy, deterrence posture and bold expeditionary capability in 21st century warfare. From the precision-guided munition strikes against Islamist terror hubs across Pakistan — most notably in the Punjab province in the early hours of May 7 — to the successive attacks thereafter on key military infrastructure, like Pakistan Air Force (PAF) bases, the IAF ably demonstrated that its doctrinal and operational role was nowhere close to the flippant designation ascribed to it by General Rawat. Operation Sindoor was also the first instance since the 1971 war with Pakistan in which the IAF played the dominant, overarching and near-standalone role in not only setting the battlefield tempo but also influencing the strategic direction of the four-day conflict before a ceasefire was called on May 10. And, while Operation Sindoor’s operational details remain classified, technically, it still endures, open-source intelligence and flight-tracking data have more than vindicated the IAF’s emergence as a fully integrated, offensive force with the autonomy, firepower and dexterity to shape the outcome of hi-tech warfare between two nuclear-armed rivals. And though it suffered undisclosed losses — a fact recently acknowledged by CDS General Anil Chauhan, successor to General Rawat, in interviews with Reuters and Bloomberg — its effective employment of air-launched standoff weapons allowed it to neutralise high-value enemy targets deep inside hostile territory. It reportedly accomplished this without exposing frontline assets to the risk of close-range retaliation, reflecting a doctrinal emphasis on survivability, precision engagement and technological superiority. Working in tandem with the two other services, especially the IA, the IAF conducted a range of precision air strikes, ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) missions and drone swarm attacks into Pakistani territory, independently spearheading several mission-critical operations. This, in turn, has prompted a re-evaluation of India’s historically army-centric warfighting model with regard to Pakistan, as all four previous wars between the two were land-centric in which air power had, indeed, played supportive and tactical roles, but not the decisive role it exhibited in Operation Sindoor. And, while there is no doubt that the IA’s role remains critical in territorial engagements and border defence, realisation has dawned upon military planners that future conflicts, if any, would largely be determined in the aerial, digital, algorithmic and electromagnetic domains rather than exclusively, like earlier, on ground. The IAF-dominated Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS), which fuses surveillance inputs from multiple sources to track and intercept incoming aerial threats via an ingeniously structured multi-tiered defensive grid, too, worked admirably in neutralising incoming Pakistani missiles and drones and minimising damage to negligible levels. Conversely, just as the IAF has broken free of its long-assigned ‘support arm’ role, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) — historically overshadowed by the politically dominant Pakistan army — too has emerged as the more coherent and strategically decisive instrument of defence during its retaliatory Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoon (Wall of Lead). Its ability to execute deep-strike missions, manage integrated air defence and deploy standoff precision munitions underscores a transformative shift in Pakistan’s military architecture. For the first time, the PAF had not only led kinetic operations against India but also shaped strategic decision-making, analogous to the IAF’s doctrinal evolution. Historically, the Pakistan army has not only been the pre-eminent fighting force for the past 78 years but also its de facto political establishment, exercising control over the country’s strategic nuclear deterrent, foreign and fiscal policies, domestic media and multiple aspects of civil society. However, in response to Operation Sindoor, the PAF assumed a strategic leadership role by spearheading Pakistan’s frontline reaction, while subordinating the army to managing ground deployments, which it did somewhat inefficiently. From launching retaliatory standoff strikes to executing real-time ISR operations and maintaining aerial deterrence, the PAF emerged as a sophisticated and agile force capable of independent action. Independent overseas analysts and commentators have noted that the PAF displayed better battlefield awareness, rapid threat assessments and a nuanced understanding of network-centric warfare than the army. It displayed a high degree of professionalism in leading integrated air campaigns; its employment of drone swarms and kamikaze smart munitions underlined its transformation from being the army’s tactical support arm to an independent strategic force, dominating the battlespace for Pakistan. Pakistan watchers say this high-profile role reversal in national defence has severely ‘disrupted’ the army’s monopoly on military prestige. And, by default, the PAF’s tech-savvy approach to warfighting has also highlighted the army’s slower response times to the deadly Indian missile and drone attacks and reliance on outdated ground doctrines, temporarily eclipsing its presumed ascendency. It would not be inaccurate to surmise that Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoon has reshaped Pakistan’s military optics as the PAF’s performance signals a potential doctrinal shift, even though the army remains Pakistan’s ultimate power broker. As warfare becomes entirely technology-driven and largely aerospace-centric, the PAF’s rise could challenge old hierarchies and pave the way for a more balanced command structure in Pakistan’s defence establishment. Independent overseas defence analysts argue that this operational imbalance may have prompted the recent elevation of Pakistan army chief General Asim Munir to the five-star rank of Field Marshal, interpreting it as an attempt to reassert the army’s primacy. But reports from Pakistan indicate that the PAF’s role has shifted focus away from the army’s omnipresent GHQ in Rawalpindi to the air HQ in Islamabad, presenting multiple future possibilities. Rahul Bedi is a senior journalist.

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